Sub sailor watching radar admits he got lazy; Waddle denied testimonial immunity
By Dan Nakaso
Advertiser Staff Writer
The USS Greeneville's fire control technician in charge of radar tracking admitted today he got "lazy" and failed to follow standing orders for reporting surface ships.
Petty Officer Patrick Seacrest had been granted testimonial immunity for appearing at the court of inquiry into the Greeneville's sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel Ehime Maru last month. But the intense questioning Seacrest faced by the court's counsel, Capt. Bruce MacDonald, may have served as a preview for the kind of treatment the submarine's captain could expect as a witness.
Cmdr. Scott Waddle’s request for testimonial immunity was denied by the commander of the Pacific Fleet this afternoon as the court of inquiry underway at Pearl Harbor neared an abrupt end.
Waddle has asked for the immunity before he would testify about the events of Feb. 9, when the Greeneville crashed into the Ehime Maru.
Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, the ship's officer of the deck, has also asked for testimonial immunity, but the three admirals presiding over the court are still considering his request.
MacDonald this morning hammered at Seacrest to explain why he had failed to chart the ships being tracked on the Greeneville's Contact Evaluation Plot, or CEP, as required.
"You made that decision completely on your own, didn't you, Petty Officer Seacrest?" MacDonald said. "... It was only going to be a six-hour cruise. ...You got lazy, didn't you, Petty Officer Seacrest?"
"Yes, sir," Seacrest answered.
Seacrest had been tracking three contacts for much of his shift and didn't consider any of them to be within 4,000 yards — the distance that required him to report the contacts, according to Waddle's standing orders.
Lost contact
Like everyone else who has testified during the first 11 days of the court of inquiry, Seacrest said that civilians who were in the control room didn't hamper the ship's operations.
The Greeneville had just finished performing ascending and descending maneuvers — "angles and dangles" they're called in the Navy ö when Seacrest lost the contact identified only as Sierra 10. After a series of high speed rudder turns, he still had contact with Sierra 12 and Sierra 13, which later turned out to be the Ehime Maru.
Though the information was vague, Seacrest believed Sierra 12 and 13 were far away, so he didn't report their status to the officer of the deck, he testified.
In fact, he had no communication with either the officer of the deck, executive officer or commanding officer in the 90 minutes he was in control of the fire control watch.
And no one called for a briefing just before rising to periscope depth, as is typical, Seacrest said. Then Seacrest heard the sonar supervisor announce a new contact, Sierra 14, over the Greeneville's communication system.
Turned attention away
Seacrest didn't hear any of the officers in the control room acknowledge the contact, and his crest's data on Sierra 14 was sketchy.
Then he heard Waddle say, "I have a good feel for the contact picture" before ordering the Greeneville to periscope depth.
As the Greeneville began to rise, the sub's computer indicated that Sierra 13 — the Ehime Maru — had closed from 15,000 yards to 4,000 yards.
But Seacrest turned his attention to the new contact, Sierra 14. He thought Sierra 12 and 13 were far away, but worried that he didn't know enough about Sierra 14.
MacDonald asked Seacrest why he didn't speak up about the poor data for Sierra 14.
MacDonald: "Isn't that your responsibility?"
Seacrest: "Yes, sir."
MacDonald: "That's not very good backup, is it, Petty Officer Seacrest?"
Seacrest: "No, sir."
Seacrest watched the periscope's view through a shipboard monitor and could see Coen turning in a circle. It was an unusually hazy day with swells of 4 to 6 feet. Waves washed over the periscope lens, Seacrest said.
Coen then announced "No close contacts," Seacrest said.
Coen began to adjust the periscope for an aerial search of helicopters when Waddle took over, Seacrest said.
Waddle "did a quick 360-degree search" and paid particular attention to the area of the sonar contacts, roughly between 340 and 40 degrees, Seacrest said.
Contacts believed distant
Holding an imaginary periscope in his hands, Seacrest turned in halting motions. "He was looking and stopping, looking and stopping."
"I thought all the contacts were distant," Seacrest said, "... because we didn't see them visually."
As the Greeneville headed toward the surface in an "emergency blow" maneuver, Seacrest could hear Waddle calling out the ship's depths over the "1 MC" communication system.
At 90 feet, Seacrest expected to feel the submarine go up and down as it began breaking the surface.
"Instead," he said, "there was a loud noise in the aft/port corner of the control room and then a few seconds later a second, a not-so-loud noise."
Couldn't explain
Data in the ship's sonar shack showed that 15 seconds after the crash, someone recategorized Sierra 13 as being 9,000 yards away.
Seacrest said that he "outspotted" all of the contacts much earlier, based on Waddle's periscope search.
He couldn't explain why the "sonar logger" data that is outside his area would say otherwise.
Whatever the case, MacDonald asked: "Petty Officer Seacrest, do you think you were backing up" the officer of the deck?
Seacrest: "No, sir.
MacDonald: "Do you think you were backing up your command?"
Seacrest: "No, sir."
Before Seacrest took the stand, many courtroom observers considered what the fire control technician was going to say as perhaps the most important testimony of the entire court of inquiry.
"This is like where you buy the testimony of the small fry to nail the large guy," said Jay Fidell, a former Coast Guard attorney and court of inquiry investigator who has been watching the proceedings. "It's 'NYPD Blue.' It's the 'Law & Order' scenario. Inevitably, it's always that way."
Proceedings may end today
The court reconvened this afternoon by calling its final witness, the submarine fleet’s doctor. He testified that the Greeneville’s periscope was capable of correcting the vision of Waddle and Coen.
Coen read a statement to the court accepting “full responsibility” for his role in the crash. He turned frequently to the families of the Japanese victims as he pleaded for their forgiveness and asked the court of inquiry to allow him to continue his Naval career.
Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer then submitted a written, unsworn statement to the court of inquiry this afternoon, which was not read.
Neither Coen nor Pfeifer called any witnesses.
After lawyers for Coen and Pfeifer rested, Waddle’s lawyers said they were unprepared for the speed of this afternoon’s proceedings and they needed a recess.
Testimony urged
On Friday, the wife of a teacher killed in the accident urged Waddle to testify "without making any deals" and tell the Navy to change its program allowing civilian guests aboard ships to observe military exercises.
Charles Gittins, Waddle's attorney, has played down the effect of Seacrest's testimony on Waddle's case. Gittins, who has tried over the last two weeks to pin partial responsibility for the accident on Seacrest and other members of the crew, has said he welcomes the fire control technician's testimony.
If Waddle gets immunity, Gittins has said, the skipper would discuss whether he felt rushed the day of the accident, how he conducted his periscope search and what he knew about the ship's surroundings when he ordered an emergency surfacing maneuver.
After two weeks of testimony that often focused on Waddle's micromanaging command style, observer Fidell said he believed the three admirals presiding over the court of inquiry no longer needed to hear from the captain.
"We are really kind of at the end anyway," Fidell said. "We've heard from the brass. We've heard from all of the people you'd want to hear from on the ship except for a few specified people. They don't need his testimony."
