00021
1 MARCH 20, 2001 --- SESSION 2 8:32 a.m. DAY 12
2 BY RDML STONE:
3 Q I'd like to follow-up, Commander, on that.
4 A Excuse me, Admiral. Sir, did I answer your second
5 question? The second part of that question?
6 Q Go ahead and answer that and Admiral Sullivan will jump
7 in with a follow along.
8 A The first was, was the under instruction watch a
9 standard on board my ship, and I told you that it was a
10 practice, that that was not in keeping with the standards that
11 I knew them to be.
12 I don't know that I fully understood the second part of
13 your question, Admiral, and what more I would need to explain.
14 Q I'll have some follow-on to that as well, in the
15 meantime I think that was (inaudible).
16 BY RADM SULLIVAN:
17 Q Commander, I just wanted to follow-up on what my two
18 other Court members are discussing of the practice. I've had
19 your job, I understand what you see on a daily basis. A
20 submarine crew is a small crew, it's a hundred and fifty or so
21 individuals. You get to know them, especially a Commanding
22 Officer who's been in command for two years, you know their
23 habits, you know their moods, and the fact that you can sit
24 there and tell me that when you walked into sonar or any other
25 place and see that someone who you know is not fully qualified
?00022
1 on a watch, and that doesn't register on your scope, I'll be
2 really having a hard time with that. Can you shed some light
3 on that?
4 A Admiral, on that day when I walked into the sonar on the
5 two occasions, I saw Seaman Rhodes and I saw Petty Officer
6 Bowie. I also had the opportunity during this EASTPAC,
7 because I knew that Seaman Rhodes was a new crew member, to
8 spend time in sonar. By having the ARCI installation and
9 having the sea heave (phonetic) during our transit to Alaska,
10 it afforded us the opportunity to deploy towed arrays and
11 operate with a sonar shack fully manned.
12 So, when I walked through sonar and I see four men
13 sitting in chairs, and I see the Sonar Supervisor behind them,
14 I don't pause to ponder and question is this an under
15 instruction watch? Is this a qualified watchstander? Is this
16 man only qualified on broad band and workload share but not an
17 advanced sonar operator?
18 Admiral, when I sign that watch bill it is an order from
19 me. I am fully aware, under most circumstances, but not all,
20 when I see an individual that I know is a new crew member
21 standing a watch that if he is brand new, and I'm in the lower
22 level of the engine room, and I don't see a qualified over
23 instruction nuclear trained Petty Officer standing by, I know
24 that that's wrong. And I don't recall ever seeing that where
25 I had an under instruction watch without a qualified over
?00023
1 instruction watch back aft.
2 And sir, truthfully, I sit here before you telling you
3 that I don't recall ever seeing an unqualified under
4 instruction watch in sonar with one broad band operator. I
5 never recognized that before.
6 BY CAPT. MACDONALD:
7 Q Commander Waddle, did you read your plan of the day for
8 the 9th of February?
9 A Sir, I read the plan of the day.
10 Q And in the plan of day doesn't it list Seaman Rhodes and
11 being dink, which is delinquent in his qualifications?
12 A Sir, I look at the plan of the day for the schedule. I
13 did not look at the plan of the day for the paragraph which
14 showed delinquent watchstanders. I sign the plan of the day,
15 I don't approve the plan of the day.
16 Q At the bottom of the plan of the day doesn't it say in
17 bold type all hands are responsible for the contents of the
18 plan of the day?
19 A Sir, could we call that up as an exhibit if it exists?
20 Q Certainly. Pull up the plan of the day, please.
21 (Inaudible background conversations.)
22 THE WITNESS: To answer your question on the
23 bottom of Exhibit 3, it says all hands are responsible for the
24 contents of the plan of the day.
25 BY CAPT. MACDONALD:
?00024
1 Q And you're part of the Greeneville crew, you're the
2 Commanding Officer?
3 A Yes, I am part of the Greeneville crew, and the -- and
4 was the Commanding Officer.
5 Q So you're responsible for reading the plan of the day,
6 is that right?
7 A Sir, I am responsible for reading the plan of the day.
8 Q So you had the plan of the day which had Seaman Rhodes
9 as being delinquent, and you had this watch bill put before
10 you which listed Seaman Rhodes on the watch, correct? In
11 sonar.
12 A Sir, I signed the watch bill, Exhibit 41, and approved
13 it. I rely upon my subordinates when they provide me with the
14 watch bill to ensure its accuracy.
15 In command, when a piece of paper, and I know the
16 Admirals know this, goes to a Commanding Officer it generally
17 alerts the subordinates in that they need to provide attention
18 to detail and ensure its correctness and accuracy.
19 That has been a standard and an expectation that I have
20 come to know and that I am supported as a junior officer,
21 department head, Executive Officer and have come to expect as
22 a Captain.
23 In the more than one year period that I have served with
24 CDR Pfeifer as my Executive Officer and Master Chief Kaufman
25 as my Chief of the Boat, I cannot recall a single time where I
?00025
1 have had an unqualified watchstander listed on a watch bill,
2 knowingly.
3 Q The problem I'm having with this is there are a number
4 of signatures on the bottom of that watch bill. And a number
5 of those people are responsible for Seaman Rhodes, knowing
6 Seaman Rhodes' qualification status, and everybody signed off
7 on that watch bill, and my sense is nobody knew Seaman
8 Rhodes's status, the correct status.
9 What does that say to you about your crew, the people
10 that were responsible for knowing Seaman Rhodes' qualification
11 status?
12 MR. GITTINS: Objection. What the officer
13 clearly testified that he did know that Rhodes was unqualified
14 and he missed that on the watch bill. The individual with the
15 cognizance over that department knew he was unqualified,
16 didn't catch it. Any other implication is improper and calls
17 for Commander Waddle's speculation.
18 CAPT. MACDONALD: I think we should hear his
19 speculation on this, sir.
20 BY VADM. NATHMAN:
21 Q I want to hear, this is an implication of the standards
22 on Greeneville. So you have a number of people that signed
23 this watch bill and it's taken over the standards on this boat
24 in terms of how they enforce Force wide standards, so I want
25 to hear the answer.
?00026
1 Maybe you can answer the question that way, Captain.
2 A Sir, it was wrong --
3 Q Okay.
4 A -- to put Seaman Rhodes on this watch bill, Exhibit 41
5 listed as qualified watchstander. It was wrong.
6 BY RDML STONE:
7 Q Continuing on, and the reason we're spending some time
8 on this is it's a very important point.
9 A Admiral, I agree with you.
10 Q As you so state, it is wrong.
11 What is also disturbing is that, for over two years
12 there's a practice going on on this watch station, and the
13 Commanding Officer is unaware of that.
14 Now, the fact that you have a command that is not very
15 large in terms of number in people, -- number of people, and
16 the submarine community prides itself on knowing each other,
17 but yet it is also now reflective of a command where you've
18 got a loose organization with regard to complying with
19 SUBPAC's requirements for qualifications and department heads
20 and all the way up through the CO saying, well, I didn't know
21 we were doing that is disturbing. And it goes along the same
22 lines as nine out of 13 folks out of position, because the
23 underway watch bill is the blueprint for how a ship or boat is
24 going to operate when they go to sea on any particular day,
25 would you not agree with that statement? It's the blueprint
?00027
1 for how we're going to operate our ships at sea?
2 A Admiral, I agree that the watch bill is an order, in
3 this case signed by me, giving clear direction to my
4 subordinates that I expect the men that are listed in each
5 column to comply with that written order.
6 Q Right.
7 Now, the other question I had, you signed this watch
8 bill on the 9th of February, you did so knowing that roughly a
9 third of your crew in wardroom was being left behind ashore
10 for training, is that correct?
11 A Sir, I signed the watch bill with full knowledge,
12 understanding and satisfaction knowing that I was taking to
13 sea that day, 9 February, the number of qualified
14 watchstanders I needed to support a seven hour distinguished
15 visitor cruise.
16 Q When I look at the number of folks that you left behind,
17 and put myself in the position of having someone come to me
18 and say we're going to leave about a third of our folks behind
19 for training, one of the first things I would think of is
20 well, then, I better pay attention to the watch bill because
21 this is not the whole crew of Greeneville I'm taking out
22 there, so who is standing in what position, what their
23 qualifications are.
24 It's natural for a Commanding Officer who's concerned
25 about increased risk and making sure we have the right balance
?00028
1 that we go to sea to take that into consideration when he's
2 signing the 9 February watch bill. Is that also in agreement
3 with how you view it?
4 A Yes, I agree with that. I'd like to --
5 Q Well --
6 A -- add, if I may, please.
7 Q I'd like to ask a question and you can address that.
8 So, since we agree on that --
9 A I agree --
10 Q What's baffling to me is knowing you're leaving a third
11 of your officers and crew ashore, no tough questions were
12 asked down the chain, is Rhodes qualified, what's the team
13 look like? Hey, XO, hey, senior Watch Officer, I'm concerned
14 that people stay in the right position because we're not going
15 out with our full team.
16 There's no safety, efficiency, backup leadership on 9
17 February from the Commanding Officer who's approving this to
18 make sure that crew is safe. So I'd like you to answer your
19 thought process on safety, efficiency, backup on 9 February
20 with a third of the crew ashore, nine of the 13 folks only
21 stood in the positions you designated, you've got an
22 unqualified watch, that to me does not meet the standard of
23 yours and I'd like to hear what your thinking was when you
24 signed that watch bill with those themes in mind.
25 A Admiral, and that was a lot I just heard there. If I
?00029
1 understand, you want me to answer the question my thought
2 process on how safety, efficiency and backup were incorporated
3 into this watch bill, and how my crew came to the decision to
4 leave approximately a third behind that day for training, is
5 that --
6 Q How you factored in the fact that you've got a third of
7 your folks on the beach.
8 A Yes, sir.
9 Q Of your crew.
10 A I'm going to answer that.
11 The first thing with the watch bill, when a watch bill
12 is presented to me as Captain I look at the watch bill in
13 general overview. I don't dissect it, Admiral, and go down
14 through the watch bill item by item, man by man. And I think
15 Admiral Sullivan will understand where I'm going with this.
16 I consider two men, two men key on a maneuvering watch
17 bill and on my underway watch bill and that's my helmsman and
18 my throttleman. Those are two men that I am particularly
19 concerned with because they have direct impact on the
20 maneuverability of the ship. And how these men steer their
21 course and answer propulsion bells. But that's not to say
22 that other watchstanders on that watch bill aren't important.
23 They are.
24 So, I look at who my key supervisors are in these
25 positions, who's my Sonar Supervisor, who is my Navigation
?00030
1 Supervisor if I have 'em on board, my assistant navigator, who
2 are my Quartermasters.
3 On this day, Admiral, I did not see Seaman Rhodes's name
4 on that watch bill, nor did I see an under instruction by his
5 name. It's not there, it's not there on Exhibit 41. And
6 Admiral, I didn't read the plan of the day section that day
7 that identified Rhodes as delinquent.
8 If I had known and recognized that Rhodes was
9 delinquent, and that his name was on this watch bill as a
10 qualified watchstander, I guarantee you I would have fixed
11 that.
12 Further, (indiscernible) plan the role of safety,
13 efficiency and backup. I hope I shed some light on my thought
14 process as a Captain on what I do when I receive a watch bill.
15 I look at those key things that I consider important to me,
16 and I rely upon my subordinates to do their job to ensure that
17 they give me a watch bill that is accurate, that reflects the
18 qualifications of the men that are required to sit those
19 stations, and the fact that we had an unqualified watchstander
20 listed in the position for a qualified man is wrong. It's
21 wrong.
22 How did I justify leaving a third of my crew behind?
23 My Executive Officer, CDR Pfeifer and the Chief of the Boat,
24 along with the department heads that you have heard under
25 various testimony in the past 11 days came up with a plan
?00031
1 which would support our initiative to leave other crew members
2 behind so that they could participate in classroom training to
3 prepare them for the upcoming deployment.
4 It was a decision that my command's leadership made,
5 that I approved, to allow those men to stay behind.
6 When the watch bill was provided to me and the officer
7 watch bill was provided to me, I looked at those two. I
8 determined that I had qualified men that were capable to take
9 the submarine to sea that day, and provide for the safe
10 operation of that submarine, continue to enforce my standards
11 and execute that day's mission which was the distinguished
12 visitors trip. I was confident we would be able to do that.
13 We had done it before.
14 BY VADM. NATHMAN:
15 Q Captain.
16 A Sir.
17 Q Actually Commander Waddle. Your Chief of the Boat signs
18 the watch bill and your XO signs the watch bill, right?
19 A Admiral, that is correct. The Chief of the Boat's
20 signature is on Exhibit 41, and the Executive Officer's
21 signature is also on Exhibit 41.
22 Q Go back to Admiral Stone's question then. You have this
23 montra (phonetic) of efficiency, safety, backup that your crew
24 told us about all last week, and we heard a lot of that.
25 We also talked to your Chief of the Boat about
?00032
1 specifically about some of his watch bill oversight. So, from
2 the XO's standpoint, and from your Chief of the Boat's
3 standpoint, I would expect then that if these were important
4 things for you that those two individuals would have that same
5 sense that you have. And if they do, why didn't your Chief of
6 the Boat then do what Admiral Stone was asking, what was their
7 compensation for -- what was their lookout, what was their
8 backup for you?
9 They presented you a watch bill in a process that goes
10 to a change to make sure that it's thoroughly vetted, okay, so
11 how did they consider the third of the crew? How did they
12 consider the amount of people that were out there? I mean we
13 saw numerous examples, we say when you went to do angles and
14 dangles you replaced the Helmsman with a guy that was more
15 qualified, and it bothers me when I hear about we're doing a
16 lot of training. Well, why didn't you take the opportunity to
17 train somebody different. But where is the Chief of the Boat,
18 and where is the XO then in this Monday true an of backup
19 safety efficiency when it comes to supporting you in producing
20 a watch bill that will provide for safe conduct of a mission
21 on Greeneville on the 9th of February?
22 A Admiral, I can't tell you what discussions took place
23 between my Executive Officer and the Chief of the Boat.
24 Q They were part of the approval process to send a third
25 year crew on board of offshore -- on shore for training, so
?00033
1 they knew of that impact. They had -- they were cognizant of
2 that decision. They participated in that decision.
3 They also participated in the same decisions on the
4 watch bill. So I'm trying to figure out, I'm trying to figure
5 out how I can figure this conflict of what you said your
6 command was all about, and I would hope that your Chief of the
7 Boat and your XO would have the same sense, the same montra,
8 the same feeling, that's what they would do when they looked
9 at things. Explain why you get a watch bill with this type of
10 amount of turmoil in it when it's produced as a product where
11 your two key players on the boat are responsible for it before
12 it comes to you?
13 A Admiral, I can't explain it, but I know that when I
14 first heard Admiral Sullivan say that nine of 13 watchstanders
15 were not in their designated spaces, I didn't believe it. And
16 I know that counsel for me didn't believe it either. She said
17 I don't see it. So I asked for the watch bill and I took a
18 look at Exhibit 41, and I highlighted those names, and the
19 Admiral was correct, they were nine out of 13 that weren't in
20 their designated space.
21 It was not effective planning. I don't refute that.
22 And I would look at the maneuvering watch bill and put the
23 underway watch bill beside it if I were the Exec., I'd done it
24 in the past, and see what type of watch rotation was required.
25 But I also had a very good and a very strong Command Master
?00034
1 Chief, Chief of the Boat when I served as an Executive Officer
2 who was a good planner, and he was an excellent administrator,
3 and he did things very, very well which made my job as an
4 Executive Officer easier.
5 We heard under oath the Master Chief's testimony. He
6 told the Court, hey, I'm a great executor, I can carry out the
7 plan, but I'm not a very good administrator.
8 And so I know based on his testimony that that may have
9 placed more burden on the Executive Officer, and the
10 department heads subordinate to the Executive Officer to come
11 up with a watch bill, maneuvering watch and NC watch bill
12 which made sense.
13 Admirals, it's obvious that the plan was not efficient,
14 because the plan didn't work. The plan ended up with nine men
15 in the afternoon watch not in their designated assignments.
16 Q This goes then to your team's support for the ship and
17 for the Captain. The team support was deficient then in
18 backup, efficiency and safety?
19 A Admiral, I respectfully disagree with that particular
20 comment. And I'll explain why.
21 The watch bill on 9 February was not reflective of a
22 watch bill let's say of a crew that has worked up through a
23 pre overseas movement period that is ready to take the ship
24 out for a six month period.
25 As Admiral Sullivan and I both know, when you're
?00035
1 preparing a crew for a major inspection, a major operation,
2 you look carefully to try to provide balance amongst the three
3 different watch teams. You pick the strong throttleman, that
4 might perhaps provide some backup to the mediocre average
5 reactor operator and then maybe a little bit stronger
6 electrical operator when you're working on the maneuvering
7 team.
8 On this particular day, Admiral, we didn't take a crew
9 to sea that was taking the submarine out for a pre overseas
10 movement or for an inspection. I took my ship to sea with
11 a crew that was qualified to execute the day's events. And
12 when I looked at that watch bill, Exhibit 41, I was satisfied
13 when I signed it, sir, that I had qualified men in the right
14 positions who had the right balance to perform that job that
15 day.
16 That's not to say that if we needed to move a person
17 from one position to another that we couldn't do that, because
18 the operations on that day dictated that I have qualified men.
19 I don't refute the fact that Seaman Rhodes wasn't qualified
20 and was sitting in a qualified watch station. That was
21 clearly wrong. And it was also wrong and I'll make it clear
22 to the Court that nine out of 13 men were not in their
23 designated spaces, contrary to the approved order that I
24 signed.
25 And I consider that to be the exception and not the rule
?00036
1 for the way that my submarine did business.
2 Q Okay.
3 BY RADM SULLIVAN:
4 Q Just one final question on this watch bill. There were
5 three different watch bills going on at the same time. Every
6 submariner knows what you were doing, you had a maneuvering
7 watch, a modified piloting watch bill and an underway watch.
8 In my recollection is you're not required to sign the
9 underway watch, you're required to sign the maneuvering watch
10 and piloting watch.
11 Did you ever have those three watch bills in your hands
12 at the same time to cross check, to do the cross checking that
13 you just described to the Court?
14 A I don't remember, Admiral. I know that you cited three,
15 but there are in fact more watch bills than just the three.
16 There's the Engineering Department watch bill, there is the
17 rig for dive watch assignments, of which the ship's Diving
18 Officer brings forward and I sign. And I recall specifically
19 reviewing rig for dive with Lieutenant Pritchett that day, but
20 I don't sign the engineer watch bill.
21 And I do sign the ship's underway watch bill. That was
22 a practice that I inherited, and I understand that the SORM
23 lists the Executive Officer as the approving authority, but
24 what has transpired in my command that I'm very interested to
25 know who my helmsmen are, who my throttlemen are, so I made a
?00037
1 change and I became the approving authority for that watch
2 bill. But to answer your earlier question, sir, I didn't have
3 all watch bills side by side when I approved this watch bill,
4 nor did I do cross checks to see how a personnel would move
5 from a maneuvering watch bill to the underway watch bill, to
6 support a modified piloting party, piloting party. I didn't
7 do that.
8 I rely upon my subordinates to do that part of the
9 planning, which would permit me to maintain the bigger
10 picture. And I'd add that in the almost two years that I was
11 in command, I didn't see problems with watch bills, or
12 difficulties where personnel were not in their designated or
13 assigned spaces. I didn't see that, sir.
14 Q But to -- how often do you leave a third of your crew
15 in? This is not a typical day.
16 A No, sir, it's not a typical day. And I can't give you
17 exact numbers, but I know that we did it on one, perhaps maybe
18 two other occasions where distinguished visitors were taken to
19 sea and in those periods we did not leave -- I can't tell you
20 how many personnel that we left behind, but I do know that we
21 left men in port to either participate in training, or,
22 Admiral, to give 'em a break. That was in keeping with
23 Admiral Konetzni's standard of people. And that's what we
24 would do. But we always ensure that we took qualified men to
25 sea to man the required watchstations.
?00038
1 BY RDML STONE:
2 Q Just to follow-up on Admiral Sullivan and also a
3 question that was asked earlier here about the watch bill.
4 And that is, once you signed the watch bill, as Commanding
5 Officer you own that, we all know that. We sign documents, we
6 own what's in that document and it's incumbent on us to have
7 some methodology we're using to make sure we're not giving our
8 signature away, that we're checking on it.
9 So, in this case with Rhodes I'm interested in what
10 methodology are you using on board Greeneville to ask those
11 questions, to make yourself aware whether it's through the POD
12 that was mentioned or asking your Senior Watch Officer the
13 question, hey, Senior Watch Officer, what are you doing to
14 ensure that I don't have any unqualified people here?
15 In other words there's some accountability for you to
16 have a system then in place in which you're checking that,
17 otherwise you're giving your signature away.
18 Could you explain what you're using as your methodology
19 to ensure that you're checking on what the standard is and in
20 viewing that in your people?
21 A Yes, sir. I will attempt to answer that.
22 My methodology I think is clearly demonstrated on the
23 bottom of Exhibit 41 here, by the fact that I have add least
24 at a minimum six signatures before my final signature goes on
25 that piece of paper.
?00039
1 I rely upon the department heads, the Chief of the Boat,
2 the Executive Officer to give me a watch bill that was
3 accurate, correct and reflected the qualification of the
4 individuals on that sheet.
5 Did I have a procedure in place which provided for cross
6 checking of the watch bill and its preparation? Did I
7 micromanage? No, sir, I didn't micromanage my crew. I
8 empowered them to do their job.
9 In my stateroom I had a picture of the Theodore
10 Roosevelt, it was given to me by a good friend who flew down
11 for a change of command and the words -- I'll paraphrase, it
12 said the mark of a good executive is a man who picks good
13 people to carry out his tasking, and enough common sense to
14 not meddle in their affairs while they carry out their tasks.
15 I didn't micromanage the watch bill, but I will say that
16 my periodic spot checks of the watch bill and whether or not
17 it was working is if I needed to speak to a Petty Officer, if
18 I needed to locate a chief, if I needed to find an officer I
19 knew where to go to look at the watch bill, to find that
20 individual, or ask his location. Was he on watch? Was he
21 sleeping? Was he working out? Where could I find him?
22 And that was one of the methods with which I could use
23 to spot check the watch bill, not knowing that I was doing it
24 at the time, but that's one of the things that I would do.
25 The rig for dive watch bill, it was something that I
?00040
1 looked at carefully as well, because watertight integrity of
2 the ship is something that the submarine force has made
3 mistakes over the number of years. When you get an
4 inexperienced Petty Officer who is submarine qualified to do
5 the initial check, and then maybe a junior officer to follow
6 it up. And so I always made it a point -- I wouldn't say
7 always, I made an effort to communicate to my Diving Officer
8 the importance of having some balance there so that we had an
9 experienced officer with maybe a not quite experienced Petty
10 Officer, and the same thing was true in the watch teams. When
11 I take a look at this watch bill, as I did on a number of
12 occasions, I would look to see if there was balance.
13 If I knew that I had an Officer of the Deck that wasn't
14 particularly strong, and what I mean by that is he was newly
15 qualified and didn't have the experience, the Chief of the
16 Boat and the XO took great effort to ensure that we gave him a
17 good Diving Officer, a strong Chief of the Watch so that a
18 young Officer of the Deck, one that didn't have the experience
19 such as the engineer, my weapons officer or navigator would
20 have some balance in that watch team.
21 And I know my subordinates looked for that.
22 Admiral, I don't know if I answered your question fully,
23 but I'll tell you that I didn't have a checklist, and the
24 Navy's effort to reduce the paperwork, instructions and
25 processes that we have, I didn't make a checklist. I didn't
?00041
1 think it was necessary to have something in place. But I
2 think there's some valuable lessons learned that have come out
3 of this accident, and the watch bill is one of 'em.
4 It's a message that needs to be communicated, to not
5 only the submarine community, but every other community in our
6 Navy. That it's not just a piece of paper, it in fact is an
7 order, whether it comes from me as the Captain or from the
8 Executive Officer if he chooses to be the approving authority
9 on another submarine. And the crew should comply with it.
10 It's not an option.
11 And when the crew doesn't, measures should be taken to
12 provide adequate administrative support to ensure that the
13 process works.
14 Admiral, in this case the process broke.
15 RDML STONE: I have no further questions, just
16 to note that that's not a new lesson. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
18 BY VADM. NATHMAN:
19 Q Captain, let's go to a different area here.
20 We've gotten testimony from a number of folks, Chief of
21 Staff, SUBPAC, your crew, that on the day of 9 February that
22 you went out and the submarine -- your submarine went to test
23 depth, and it exceeded classified speed limits for submarine
24 operations for distinguished visitor embarkations. Why did
25 you do that?
?00042
1 A To fully demonstrate the capabilities of the submarine,
2 Admiral.
3 Q Would they know any better, -- would they know the
4 difference between the classified depth and the unclassified
5 depth? Is it that significant that they -- what's the value
6 to the DVs in terms of actually taking the boat to that
7 particular depth?
8 A There's something special about that number. And in
9 this particular case I didn't think about it. I didn't put
10 the fact that I was taking distinguished visitors to that
11 particular depth, or that particular speed. It wasn't in the
12 forefront of my mind as an intentional act to compromise
13 information. But I do know that testimony in demonstrating
14 that act to the visitors, that it's something special to say
15 that you have observed the operational abilities of this ship.
16 I'm not trying to give you an excuse. I didn't think
17 about it, sir.
18 Q Well, it's classified, right?
19 A Yes, it is.
20 Q It's a classified manner to exceed the -- a certain
21 depth, which I recall is eight hundred feet and 25 knots. So,
22 are you just -- you don't think about partaking classified
23 matters?
24 A Admiral, I didn't think about that issue, but yes, I
25 think about the (indiscernible) classified information, and
?00043
1 knowing that any time a submarine crew embarks visitors, that
2 they are going to see information other than a ship perhaps
3 achieving a speed greater than 25 knots or going deeper than
4 eight hundred feet.
5 They have access to indications, they have access to
6 information, unknowingly. They may not recognize or fully
7 understand what they see, but Admiral, there are those that
8 embark on unclassified distinguished visitor cruises that do
9 see classified displays, such as the Fire Control displays
10 that we showed in closed session. Those displays were clearly
11 in full view of the distinguished visitors that were in the
12 control room at the time preceding the collision.
13 Q But there's no specific guidelines or -- so it's just a
14 habit of yours then, if it's classified then you can choose?
15 A No, sir.
16 Q No, you can choose that you can violate the guidelines
17 on classified material because you feel it's important to show
18 the DVs, even though you have guidance not to do it, the full
19 operational capability or envelope of the U.S. submarine?
20 A Admiral, I made a decision to take the submarine to test
21 depth, and to operate the ship and demonstrate its full
22 capabilities. I did not think about exposing the
23 distinguished visitors to classified information. That was a
24 mistake.
25 Q Have you done it before?
?00044
1 A Yes, I have.
2 Q You didn't think about it then either?
3 A No, sir, I did not.
4 Q Did you think back on why you're doing something like
5 that? I mean, it was a deliberate act, something you did to
6 demonstrate to DVs you have done it before, so obviously you
7 had to consider why you were doing it. How did you reconcile
8 that with the fact that it's classified?
9 A Sir, I didn't reconcile that knowing the fact that it
10 was classified, that it was an issue.
11 There's something special about taking the ship to its
12 deepest depth capability. I was demonstrating to the
13 distinguished visitors what our submarines, these wonderful
14 engineering pieces of marvel can do. The same thing is true
15 with the large rudder turns.
16 If you order a full bell at 10 knots, it's like watching
17 the grass grow. But if you ordered full bell at a speed of 27
18 knots -- excuse me, speed of 25 knots your guests get a full
19 understanding of the impact and the capability of the ship.
20 Q Another conclusion would be that you're giving them
21 an e-ticket ride at Disneyland on a submarine.
22 A No, I'm not trying to give anybody a ride or thrill, I
23 want to clearly demonstrate to the distinguished visitors what
24 the warship and what a trained crew can do. That was the
25 intent of those acts.
?00045
1 Q Tell me about deep water samples on Greeneville for DVs?
2 A Deep water samples?
3 Q Uh-huh.
4 A When the submarine was operating at test depth I asked
5 the torpedomen to collect salt water and put it in oil sample
6 bottles to commemorate the event. And I would give these
7 water samples to the guests as a memento to provide them with
8 something that they could remember their tour and their
9 embark. On those bottles we would put the Greeneville sticker
10 and the statement that they'd been at test depth and perhaps a
11 date.
12 Q So there's a correlation between their visit with a
13 bottle of water and the test depth of the ship, something
14 they're not likely to forget?
15 A To commemorate the event along with a signed photograph
16 that I would give 'em, sir.
17 Q But they're not likely to forget that they have deep
18 water samples from a classified test depth of a U.S.
19 submarine, they're not likely to forget that number.
20 A Sir, the -- whether they're likely to forget or not, I
21 can't speculate. But I do know that the bottle of water, salt
22 water with a Greeneville submarine sticker on it was to serve
23 as a reminder of that day's events, of their time on board the
24 ship where they had example pour you're to the submarine
25 force.
?00046
1 Q Reminding them of how deep it went. So when they -- I
2 assume when they have it on their coffee table and other
3 friends come over, from who knows where, and they're asked
4 about that, they'll explain what it was and they'll tell
5 people about the test depth capability of the U.S. submarines.
6 You don't feel like you should safeguard that information,
7 Captain?
8 A Sir, I can't speculate what the visitors would do, or
9 what they wouldn't do with the bottles of salt water.
10 Q Did you give -- tell me about the mementos you gave your
11 DV, did you give 'em styrofoam cups that were crushed at
12 depth?
13 A On this particular trip, sir, I don't recall if we had
14 given the distinguished visitors styrofoam cups or not, but I
15 do recall during a family cruise where we took crew member
16 families to Lahaina, those that had flown in from the
17 mainland, that some styrofoam cups had been put in a mesh bag
18 in -- I don't remember the area, but it was exposed to
19 submergence pressure such that as the boat went deeper the
20 styrofoam cups were crushed and it afforded the kids the
21 opportunity to write their names or the date that they had
22 been on board the submarine so that when the thing got
23 squished it was a memento that they could take with them.
24 On that particular day, 9 February, Admiral, I don't recall
25 giving any of the distinguished visitors styrofoam cups.(next)
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