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The Honolulu Advertiser

 1     MARCH 20, 2001 --- SESSION 2     8:32 a.m.       DAY 12


 3   Q     I'd like to follow-up, Commander, on that.  

 4   A     Excuse me, Admiral.  Sir, did I answer your second 

 5   question?  The second part of that question?   

 6   Q     Go ahead and answer that and Admiral Sullivan will jump 

 7   in with a follow along.  

 8   A     The first was, was the under instruction watch a 

 9   standard on board my ship, and I told you that it was a 

10   practice, that that was not in keeping with the standards that 

11   I knew them to be.   

12         I don't know that I fully understood the second part of 

13   your question, Admiral, and what more I would need to explain.  

14   Q     I'll have some follow-on to that as well, in the 

15   meantime I think that was (inaudible).   


17   Q     Commander, I just wanted to follow-up on what my two 

18   other Court members are discussing of the practice.  I've had 

19   your job, I understand what you see on a daily basis.  A 

20   submarine crew is a small crew, it's a hundred and fifty or so 

21   individuals.  You get to know them, especially a Commanding 

22   Officer who's been in command for two years, you know their 

23   habits, you know their moods, and the fact that you can sit 

24   there and tell me that when you walked into sonar or any other 

25   place and see that someone who you know is not fully qualified 


 1   on a watch, and that doesn't register on your scope, I'll be 

 2   really having a hard time with that.  Can you shed some light 

 3   on that?  

 4   A     Admiral, on that day when I walked into the sonar on the 

 5   two occasions, I saw Seaman Rhodes and I saw Petty Officer 

 6   Bowie.  I also had the opportunity during this EASTPAC, 

 7   because I knew that Seaman Rhodes was a new crew member, to 

 8   spend time in sonar.  By having the ARCI installation and 

 9   having the sea heave (phonetic) during our transit to Alaska, 

10   it afforded us the opportunity to deploy towed arrays and 

11   operate with a sonar shack fully manned.

12         So, when I walked through sonar and I see four men 

13   sitting in chairs, and I see the Sonar Supervisor behind them, 

14   I don't pause to ponder and question is this an under 

15   instruction watch?  Is this a qualified watchstander?  Is this 

16   man only qualified on broad band and workload share but not an 

17   advanced sonar operator?

18         Admiral, when I sign that watch bill it is an order from 

19   me.  I am fully aware, under most circumstances, but not all, 

20   when I see an individual that I know is a new crew member 

21   standing a watch that if he is brand new, and I'm in the lower 

22   level of the engine room, and I don't see a qualified over 

23   instruction nuclear trained Petty Officer standing by, I know 

24   that that's wrong.  And I don't recall ever seeing that where 

25   I had an under instruction watch without a qualified over 


 1   instruction watch back aft.   

 2         And sir, truthfully, I sit here before you telling you 

 3   that I don't recall ever seeing an unqualified under 

 4   instruction watch in sonar with one broad band operator.  I 

 5   never recognized that before.  


 7   Q     Commander Waddle, did you read your plan of the day for 

 8   the 9th of February?  

 9   A     Sir, I read the plan of the day.  

10   Q     And in the plan of day doesn't it list Seaman Rhodes and 

11   being dink, which is delinquent in his qualifications?  

12   A     Sir, I look at the plan of the day for the schedule.  I 

13   did not look at the plan of the day for the paragraph which 

14   showed delinquent watchstanders.  I sign the plan of the day, 

15   I don't approve the plan of the day.  

16   Q     At the bottom of the plan of the day doesn't it say in 

17   bold type all hands are responsible for the contents of the 

18   plan of the day?  

19   A     Sir, could we call that up as an exhibit if it exists?   

20   Q     Certainly.  Pull up the plan of the day, please.   

21         (Inaudible background conversations.)   

22                 THE WITNESS:  To answer your question on the 

23   bottom of Exhibit 3, it says all hands are responsible for the 

24   contents of the plan of the day.  



 1   Q     And you're part of the Greeneville crew, you're the 

 2   Commanding Officer?  

 3   A     Yes, I am part of the Greeneville crew, and the -- and 

 4   was the Commanding Officer.  

 5   Q     So you're responsible for reading the plan of the day, 

 6   is that right?  

 7   A     Sir, I am responsible for reading the plan of the day.  

 8   Q     So you had the plan of the day which had Seaman Rhodes 

 9   as being delinquent, and you had this watch bill put before 

10   you which listed Seaman Rhodes on the watch, correct?  In 

11   sonar.  

12   A     Sir, I signed the watch bill, Exhibit 41, and approved 

13   it.  I rely upon my subordinates when they provide me with the 

14   watch bill to ensure its accuracy.   

15         In command, when a piece of paper, and I know the 

16   Admirals know this, goes to a Commanding Officer it generally 

17   alerts the subordinates in that they need to provide attention 

18   to detail and ensure its correctness and accuracy.   

19         That has been a standard and an expectation that I have 

20   come to know and that I am supported as a junior officer, 

21   department head, Executive Officer and have come to expect as 

22   a Captain.

23         In the more than one year period that I have served with 

24   CDR Pfeifer as my Executive Officer and Master Chief Kaufman 

25   as my Chief of the Boat, I cannot recall a single time where I 


 1   have had an unqualified watchstander listed on a watch bill, 

 2   knowingly.   

 3   Q     The problem I'm having with this is there are a number 

 4   of signatures on the bottom of that watch bill.  And a number 

 5   of those people are responsible for Seaman Rhodes, knowing 

 6   Seaman Rhodes' qualification status, and everybody signed off 

 7   on that watch bill, and my sense is nobody knew Seaman 

 8   Rhodes's status, the correct status.   

 9         What does that say to you about your crew, the people 

10   that were responsible for knowing Seaman Rhodes' qualification 

11   status?  

12                 MR. GITTINS:  Objection.  What the officer 

13   clearly testified that he did know that Rhodes was unqualified 

14   and he missed that on the watch bill.  The individual with the 

15   cognizance over that department knew he was unqualified, 

16   didn't catch it.  Any other implication is improper and calls 

17   for Commander Waddle's speculation.  

18                 CAPT. MACDONALD:  I think we should hear his 

19   speculation on this, sir.  


21   Q     I want to hear, this is an implication of the standards 

22   on Greeneville.  So you have a number of people that signed 

23   this watch bill and it's taken over the standards on this boat 

24   in terms of how they enforce Force wide standards, so I want 

25   to hear the answer.  


 1         Maybe you can answer the question that way, Captain.   

 2   A     Sir, it was wrong --  

 3   Q     Okay.   

 4   A     -- to put Seaman Rhodes on this watch bill, Exhibit 41 

 5   listed as qualified watchstander.  It was wrong.  


 7   Q     Continuing on, and the reason we're spending some time 

 8   on this is it's a very important point.  

 9   A     Admiral, I agree with you.  

10   Q     As you so state, it is wrong.

11         What is also disturbing is that, for over two years 

12   there's a practice going on on this watch station, and the 

13   Commanding Officer is unaware of that.

14         Now, the fact that you have a command that is not very 

15   large in terms of number in people, -- number of people, and 

16   the submarine community prides itself on knowing each other, 

17   but yet it is also now reflective of a command where you've 

18   got a loose organization with regard to complying with 

19   SUBPAC's requirements for qualifications and department heads 

20   and all the way up through the CO saying, well, I didn't know 

21   we were doing that is disturbing.  And it goes along the same 

22   lines as nine out of 13 folks out of position, because the 

23   underway watch bill is the blueprint for how a ship or boat is 

24   going to operate when they go to sea on any particular day, 

25   would you not agree with that statement?  It's the blueprint 


 1   for how we're going to operate our ships at sea?  

 2   A     Admiral, I agree that the watch bill is an order, in 

 3   this case signed by me, giving clear direction to my 

 4   subordinates that I expect the men that are listed in each 

 5   column to comply with that written order.   

 6   Q     Right.   

 7         Now, the other question I had, you signed this watch 

 8   bill on the 9th of February, you did so knowing that roughly a 

 9   third of your crew in wardroom was being left behind ashore 

10   for training, is that correct?  

11   A     Sir, I signed the watch bill with full knowledge, 

12   understanding and satisfaction knowing that I was taking to 

13   sea that day, 9 February, the number of qualified 

14   watchstanders I needed to support a seven hour distinguished 

15   visitor cruise.  

16   Q     When I look at the number of folks that you left behind, 

17   and put myself in the position of having someone come to me 

18   and say we're going to leave about a third of our folks behind 

19   for training, one of the first things I would think of is 

20   well, then, I better pay attention to the watch bill because 

21   this is not the whole crew of Greeneville I'm taking out 

22   there, so who is standing in what position, what their 

23   qualifications are.

24         It's natural for a Commanding Officer who's concerned 

25   about increased risk and making sure we have the right balance 


 1   that we go to sea to take that into consideration when he's 

 2   signing the 9 February watch bill.  Is that also in agreement 

 3   with how you view it?  

 4   A     Yes, I agree with that.  I'd like to --  

 5   Q     Well --  

 6   A     -- add, if I may, please.  

 7   Q     I'd like to ask a question and you can address that.  

 8   So, since we agree on that -- 

 9   A     I agree -- 

10   Q     What's baffling to me is knowing you're leaving a third 

11   of your officers and crew ashore, no tough questions were 

12   asked down the chain, is Rhodes qualified, what's the team 

13   look like?  Hey, XO, hey, senior Watch Officer, I'm concerned 

14   that people stay in the right position because we're not going 

15   out with our full team.

16         There's no safety, efficiency, backup leadership on 9 

17   February from the Commanding Officer who's approving this to 

18   make sure that crew is safe.  So I'd like you to answer your 

19   thought process on safety, efficiency, backup on 9 February 

20   with a third of the crew ashore, nine of the 13 folks only 

21   stood in the positions you designated, you've got an 

22   unqualified watch, that to me does not meet the standard of 

23   yours and I'd like to hear what your thinking was when you 

24   signed that watch bill with those themes in mind.   

25   A     Admiral, and that was a lot I just heard there.  If I 


 1   understand, you want me to answer the question my thought 

 2   process on how safety, efficiency and backup were incorporated 

 3   into this watch bill, and how my crew came to the decision to 

 4   leave approximately a third behind that day for training, is 

 5   that --  

 6   Q     How you factored in the fact that you've got a third of 

 7   your folks on the beach.  

 8   A     Yes, sir.  

 9   Q     Of your crew.  

10   A     I'm going to answer that.   

11         The first thing with the watch bill, when a watch bill 

12   is presented to me as Captain I look at the watch bill in 

13   general overview.  I don't dissect it, Admiral, and go down 

14   through the watch bill item by item, man by man.  And I think 

15   Admiral Sullivan will understand where I'm going with this.   

16         I consider two men, two men key on a maneuvering watch 

17   bill and on my underway watch bill and that's my helmsman and 

18   my throttleman.  Those are two men that I am particularly 

19   concerned with because they have direct impact on the 

20   maneuverability of the ship.   And how these men steer their 

21   course and answer propulsion bells.  But that's not to say 

22   that other watchstanders on that watch bill aren't important.  

23   They are.

24         So, I look at who my key supervisors are in these 

25   positions, who's my Sonar Supervisor, who is my Navigation 


 1   Supervisor if I have 'em on board, my assistant navigator, who 

 2   are my Quartermasters.

 3         On this day, Admiral, I did not see Seaman Rhodes's name 

 4   on that watch bill, nor did I see an under instruction by his 

 5   name.  It's not there, it's not there on Exhibit 41.  And 

 6   Admiral, I didn't read the plan of the day section that day 

 7   that identified Rhodes as delinquent.   

 8         If I had known and recognized that Rhodes was 

 9   delinquent, and that his name was on this watch bill as a 

10   qualified watchstander, I guarantee you I would have fixed 

11   that.   

12         Further, (indiscernible) plan the role of safety, 

13   efficiency and backup.  I hope I shed some light on my thought 

14   process as a Captain on what I do when I receive a watch bill.  

15   I look at those key things that I consider important to me, 

16   and I rely upon my subordinates to do their job to ensure that 

17   they give me a watch bill that is accurate, that reflects the 

18   qualifications of the men that are required to sit those 

19   stations, and the fact that we had an unqualified watchstander 

20   listed in the position for a qualified man is wrong.  It's 

21   wrong.   

22         How did I justify leaving a third of my crew behind?   

23   My Executive Officer, CDR Pfeifer and the Chief of the Boat, 

24   along with the department heads that you have heard under 

25   various testimony in the past 11 days came up with a plan 


 1   which would support our initiative to leave other crew members 

 2   behind so that they could participate in classroom training to 

 3   prepare them for the upcoming deployment.   

 4         It was a decision that my command's leadership made, 

 5   that I approved, to allow those men to stay behind.   

 6         When the watch bill was provided to me and the officer 

 7   watch bill was provided to me, I looked at those two.  I 

 8   determined that I had qualified men that were capable to take 

 9   the submarine to sea that day, and provide for the safe 

10   operation of that submarine, continue to enforce my standards 

11   and execute that day's mission which was the distinguished 

12   visitors trip.  I was confident we would be able to do that.  

13   We had done it before.   


15   Q     Captain.   

16   A     Sir.  

17   Q     Actually Commander Waddle.  Your Chief of the Boat signs 

18   the watch bill and your XO signs the watch bill, right?  

19   A     Admiral, that is correct.  The Chief of the Boat's 

20   signature is on Exhibit 41, and the Executive Officer's 

21   signature is also on Exhibit 41.  

22   Q     Go back to Admiral Stone's question then.  You have this 

23   montra (phonetic) of efficiency, safety, backup that your crew 

24   told us about all last week, and we heard a lot of that.   

25         We also talked to your Chief of the Boat about 


 1   specifically about some of his watch bill oversight.  So, from 

 2   the XO's standpoint, and from your Chief of the Boat's 

 3   standpoint, I would expect then that if these were important 

 4   things for you that those two individuals would have that same 

 5   sense that you have.  And if they do, why didn't your Chief of 

 6   the Boat then do what Admiral Stone was asking, what was their 

 7   compensation for -- what was their lookout, what was their 

 8   backup for you?

 9         They presented you a watch bill in a process that goes 

10   to a change to make sure that it's thoroughly vetted, okay, so 

11   how did they consider the third of the crew?  How did they 

12   consider the amount of people that were out there?  I mean we 

13   saw numerous examples, we say when you went to do angles and 

14   dangles you replaced the Helmsman with a guy that was more 

15   qualified, and it bothers me when I hear about we're doing a 

16   lot of training.  Well, why didn't you take the opportunity to 

17   train somebody different.  But where is the Chief of the Boat, 

18   and where is the XO then in this Monday true an of backup 

19   safety efficiency when it comes to supporting you in producing 

20   a watch bill that will provide for safe conduct of a mission 

21   on Greeneville on the 9th of February?   

22   A     Admiral, I can't tell you what discussions took place 

23   between my Executive Officer and the Chief of the Boat.  

24   Q     They were part of the approval process to send a third 

25   year crew on board of offshore -- on shore for training, so 


 1   they knew of that impact.  They had -- they were cognizant of 

 2   that decision.  They participated in that decision.   

 3         They also participated in the same decisions on the 

 4   watch bill.  So I'm trying to figure out, I'm trying to figure 

 5   out how I can figure this conflict of what you said your 

 6   command was all about, and I would hope that your Chief of the 

 7   Boat and your XO would have the same sense, the same montra, 

 8   the same feeling, that's what they would do when they looked 

 9   at things.  Explain why you get a watch bill with this type of 

10   amount of turmoil in it when it's produced as a product where 

11   your two key players on the boat are responsible for it before 

12   it comes to you?  

13   A     Admiral, I can't explain it, but I know that when I 

14   first heard Admiral Sullivan say that nine of 13 watchstanders 

15   were not in their designated spaces, I didn't believe it.  And 

16   I know that counsel for me didn't believe it either.  She said 

17   I don't see it.  So I asked for the watch bill and I took a 

18   look at Exhibit 41, and I highlighted those names, and the 

19   Admiral was correct, they were nine out of 13 that weren't in 

20   their designated space.   

21         It was not effective planning.  I don't refute that.  

22   And I would look at the maneuvering watch bill and put the 

23   underway watch bill beside it if I were the Exec., I'd done it 

24   in the past, and see what type of watch rotation was required.  

25   But I also had a very good and a very strong Command Master 


 1   Chief, Chief of the Boat when I served as an Executive Officer 

 2   who was a good planner, and he was an excellent administrator, 

 3   and he did things very, very well which made my job as an 

 4   Executive Officer easier.   

 5         We heard under oath the Master Chief's testimony.  He 

 6   told the Court, hey, I'm a great executor, I can carry out the 

 7   plan, but I'm not a very good administrator.   

 8         And so I know based on his testimony that that may have 

 9   placed more burden on the Executive Officer, and the 

10   department heads subordinate to the Executive Officer to come 

11   up with a watch bill, maneuvering watch and NC watch bill 

12   which made sense.   

13         Admirals, it's obvious that the plan was not efficient, 

14   because the plan didn't work.  The plan ended up with nine men 

15   in the afternoon watch not in their designated assignments.  

16   Q     This goes then to your team's support for the ship and 

17   for the Captain.  The team support was deficient then in 

18   backup, efficiency and safety?  

19   A     Admiral, I respectfully disagree with that particular 

20   comment.  And I'll explain why.   

21         The watch bill on 9 February was not reflective of a 

22   watch bill let's say of a crew that has worked up through a 

23   pre overseas movement period that is ready to take the ship 

24   out for a six month period.   

25         As Admiral Sullivan and I both know, when you're 


 1   preparing a crew for a major inspection, a major operation, 

 2   you look carefully to try to provide balance amongst the three 

 3   different watch teams.  You pick the strong throttleman, that 

 4   might perhaps provide some backup to the mediocre average 

 5   reactor operator and then maybe a little bit stronger 

 6   electrical operator when you're working on the maneuvering 

 7   team.  

 8         On this particular day, Admiral, we didn't take a crew 

 9   to sea that was taking the submarine out for a pre overseas 

10   movement or for an inspection.  I took my ship to sea with 

11   a crew that was qualified to execute the day's events.  And 

12   when I looked at that watch bill, Exhibit 41, I was satisfied 

13   when I signed it, sir, that I had qualified men in the right 

14   positions who had the right balance to perform that job that 

15   day.   

16         That's not to say that if we needed to move a person 

17   from one position to another that we couldn't do that, because 

18   the operations on that day dictated that I have qualified men.  

19   I don't refute the fact that Seaman Rhodes wasn't qualified 

20   and was sitting in a qualified watch station.  That was 

21   clearly wrong.  And it was also wrong and I'll make it clear 

22   to the Court that nine out of 13 men were not in their 

23   designated spaces, contrary to the approved order that I 

24   signed.   

25         And I consider that to be the exception and not the rule 


 1   for the way that my submarine did business.   

 2   Q     Okay.   


 4   Q     Just one final question on this watch bill.  There were 

 5   three different watch bills going on at the same time.  Every 

 6   submariner knows what you were doing, you had a maneuvering 

 7   watch, a modified piloting watch bill and an underway watch.   

 8         In my recollection is you're not required to sign the 

 9   underway watch, you're required to sign the maneuvering watch 

10   and piloting watch.  

11         Did you ever have those three watch bills in your hands 

12   at the same time to cross check, to do the cross checking that 

13   you just described to the Court?  

14   A     I don't remember, Admiral.  I know that you cited three, 

15   but there are in fact more watch bills than just the three.  

16   There's the Engineering Department watch bill, there is the 

17   rig for dive watch assignments, of which the ship's Diving 

18   Officer brings forward and I sign.  And I recall specifically 

19   reviewing rig for dive with Lieutenant Pritchett that day, but 

20   I don't sign the engineer watch bill.   

21         And I do sign the ship's underway watch bill.  That was 

22   a practice that I inherited, and I understand that the SORM 

23   lists the Executive Officer as the approving authority, but 

24   what has transpired in my command that I'm very interested to 

25   know who my helmsmen are, who my throttlemen are, so I made a 


 1   change and I became the approving authority for that watch 

 2   bill.  But to answer your earlier question, sir, I didn't have 

 3   all watch bills side by side when I approved this watch bill, 

 4   nor did I do cross checks to see how a personnel would move 

 5   from a maneuvering watch bill to the underway watch bill, to 

 6   support a modified piloting party, piloting party.  I didn't 

 7   do that.   

 8         I rely upon my subordinates to do that part of the 

 9   planning, which would permit me to maintain the bigger 

10   picture.  And I'd add that in the almost two years that I was 

11   in command, I didn't see problems with watch bills, or 

12   difficulties where personnel were not in their designated or 

13   assigned spaces.  I didn't see that, sir.   

14   Q     But to -- how often do you leave a third of your crew 

15   in?  This is not a typical day.  

16   A     No, sir, it's not a typical day.  And I can't give you 

17   exact numbers, but I know that we did it on one, perhaps maybe 

18   two other occasions where distinguished visitors were taken to 

19   sea and in those periods we did not leave -- I can't tell you 

20   how many personnel that we left behind, but I do know that we 

21   left men in port to either participate in training, or, 

22   Admiral, to give 'em a break.  That was in keeping with 

23   Admiral Konetzni's standard of people.  And that's what we 

24   would do.  But we always ensure that we took qualified men to 

25   sea to man the required watchstations.   



 2   Q     Just to follow-up on Admiral Sullivan and also a 

 3   question that was asked earlier here about the watch bill.  

 4   And that is, once you signed the watch bill, as Commanding 

 5   Officer you own that, we all know that.  We sign documents, we 

 6   own what's in that document and it's incumbent on us to have 

 7   some methodology we're using to make sure we're not giving our 

 8   signature away, that we're checking on it.

 9         So, in this case with Rhodes I'm interested in what 

10   methodology are you using on board Greeneville to ask those 

11   questions, to make yourself aware whether it's through the POD 

12   that was mentioned or asking your Senior Watch Officer the 

13   question, hey, Senior Watch Officer, what are you doing to 

14   ensure that I don't have any unqualified people here?

15         In other words there's some accountability for you to 

16   have a system then in place in which you're checking that, 

17   otherwise you're giving your signature away.  

18         Could you explain what you're using as your methodology 

19   to ensure that you're checking on what the standard is and in 

20   viewing that in your people?  

21   A     Yes, sir.  I will attempt to answer that.   

22         My methodology I think is clearly demonstrated on the 

23   bottom of Exhibit 41 here, by the fact that I have add least 

24   at a minimum six signatures before my final signature goes on 

25   that piece of paper.   


 1         I rely upon the department heads, the Chief of the Boat, 

 2   the Executive Officer to give me a watch bill that was 

 3   accurate, correct and reflected the qualification of the 

 4   individuals on that sheet.   

 5         Did I have a procedure in place which provided for cross 

 6   checking of the watch bill and its preparation?  Did I 

 7   micromanage?  No, sir, I didn't micromanage my crew.  I 

 8   empowered them to do their job.   

 9         In my stateroom I had a picture of the Theodore 

10   Roosevelt, it was given to me by a good friend who flew down 

11   for a change of command and the words -- I'll paraphrase, it 

12   said the mark of a good executive is a man who picks good 

13   people to carry out his tasking, and enough common sense to 

14   not meddle in their affairs while they carry out their tasks.   

15         I didn't micromanage the watch bill, but I will say that 

16   my periodic spot checks of the watch bill and whether or not 

17   it was working is if I needed to speak to a Petty Officer, if 

18   I needed to locate a chief, if I needed to find an officer I 

19   knew where to go to look at the watch bill, to find that 

20   individual, or ask his location.  Was he on watch?  Was he 

21   sleeping?  Was he working out?  Where could I find him?   

22         And that was one of the methods with which I could use 

23   to spot check the watch bill, not knowing that I was doing it 

24   at the time, but that's one of the things that I would do.   

25         The rig for dive watch bill, it was something that I 


 1   looked at carefully as well, because watertight integrity of 

 2   the ship is something that the submarine force has made 

 3   mistakes over the number of years.  When you get an 

 4   inexperienced Petty Officer who is submarine qualified to do 

 5   the initial check, and then maybe a junior officer to follow 

 6   it up.  And so I always made it a point -- I wouldn't say 

 7   always, I made an effort to communicate to my Diving Officer 

 8   the importance of having some balance there so that we had an 

 9   experienced officer with maybe a not quite experienced Petty 

10   Officer, and the same thing was true in the watch teams.  When 

11   I take a look at this watch bill, as I did on a number of 

12   occasions, I would look to see if there was balance.   

13         If I knew that I had an Officer of the Deck that wasn't 

14   particularly strong, and what I mean by that is he was newly 

15   qualified and didn't have the experience, the Chief of the 

16   Boat and the XO took great effort to ensure that we gave him a 

17   good Diving Officer, a strong Chief of the Watch so that a 

18   young Officer of the Deck, one that didn't have the experience 

19   such as the engineer, my weapons officer or navigator would 

20   have some balance in that watch team.   

21         And I know my subordinates looked for that.   

22         Admiral, I don't know if I answered your question fully, 

23   but I'll tell you that I didn't have a checklist, and the 

24   Navy's effort to reduce the paperwork, instructions and 

25   processes that we have, I didn't make a checklist.  I didn't 


 1   think it was necessary to have something in place.  But I 

 2   think there's some valuable lessons learned that have come out 

 3   of this accident, and the watch bill is one of 'em.   

 4         It's a message that needs to be communicated, to not 

 5   only the submarine community, but every other community in our 

 6   Navy.  That it's not just a piece of paper, it in fact is an 

 7   order, whether it comes from me as the Captain or from the 

 8   Executive Officer if he chooses to be the approving authority 

 9   on another submarine.  And the crew should comply with it.  

10   It's not an option.   

11         And when the crew doesn't, measures should be taken to 

12   provide adequate administrative support to ensure that the 

13   process works.   

14         Admiral, in this case the process broke.   

15                 RDML STONE:  I have no further questions, just 

16   to note that that's not a new lesson.  Thank you.  

17                 THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  


19   Q     Captain, let's go to a different area here.   

20         We've gotten testimony from a number of folks, Chief of 

21   Staff, SUBPAC, your crew, that on the day of 9 February that 

22   you went out and the submarine -- your submarine went to test 

23   depth, and it exceeded classified speed limits for submarine 

24   operations for distinguished visitor embarkations.  Why did 

25   you do that?  


 1   A     To fully demonstrate the capabilities of the submarine, 

 2   Admiral.   

 3   Q     Would they know any better, -- would they know the 

 4   difference between the classified depth and the unclassified 

 5   depth?  Is it that significant that they -- what's the value 

 6   to the DVs in terms of actually taking the boat to that 

 7   particular depth?  

 8   A     There's something special about that number.  And in 

 9   this particular case I didn't think about it.  I didn't put 

10   the fact that I was taking distinguished visitors to that 

11   particular depth, or that particular speed.  It wasn't in the 

12   forefront of my mind as an intentional act to compromise 

13   information.  But I do know that testimony in demonstrating 

14   that act to the visitors, that it's something special to say 

15   that you have observed the operational abilities of this ship.   

16         I'm not trying to give you an excuse.  I didn't think 

17   about it, sir.  

18   Q     Well, it's classified, right?  

19   A     Yes, it is.  

20   Q     It's a classified manner to exceed the -- a certain 

21   depth, which I recall is eight hundred feet and 25 knots.  So, 

22   are you just -- you don't think about partaking classified 

23   matters?  

24   A     Admiral, I didn't think about that issue, but yes, I 

25   think about the (indiscernible) classified information, and 


 1   knowing that any time a submarine crew embarks visitors, that 

 2   they are going to see information other than a ship perhaps 

 3   achieving a speed greater than 25 knots or going deeper than 

 4   eight hundred feet.   

 5         They have access to indications, they have access to 

 6   information, unknowingly.  They may not recognize or fully 

 7   understand what they see, but Admiral, there are those that 

 8   embark on unclassified distinguished visitor cruises that do 

 9   see classified displays, such as the Fire Control displays 

10   that we showed in closed session.  Those displays were clearly 

11   in full view of the distinguished visitors that were in the 

12   control room at the time preceding the collision.   

13   Q     But there's no specific guidelines or -- so it's just a 

14   habit of yours then, if it's classified then you can choose?  

15   A     No, sir.  

16   Q     No, you can choose that you can violate the guidelines 

17   on classified material because you feel it's important to show 

18   the DVs, even though you have guidance not to do it, the full 

19   operational capability or envelope of the U.S. submarine?  

20   A     Admiral, I made a decision to take the submarine to test 

21   depth, and to operate the ship and demonstrate its full 

22   capabilities.  I did not think about exposing the 

23   distinguished visitors to classified information.  That was a 

24   mistake.  

25   Q     Have you done it before?  


 1   A     Yes, I have.   

 2   Q     You didn't think about it then either?  

 3   A     No, sir, I did not.  

 4   Q     Did you think back on why you're doing something like 

 5   that?  I mean, it was a deliberate act, something you did to 

 6   demonstrate to DVs you have done it before, so obviously you 

 7   had to consider why you were doing it.  How did you reconcile 

 8   that with the fact that it's classified?  

 9   A     Sir, I didn't reconcile that knowing the fact that it 

10   was classified, that it was an issue.   

11         There's something special about taking the ship to its 

12   deepest depth capability.  I was demonstrating to the 

13   distinguished visitors what our submarines, these wonderful 

14   engineering pieces of marvel can do.  The same thing is true 

15   with the large rudder turns.   

16         If you order a full bell at 10 knots, it's like watching 

17   the grass grow.  But if you ordered full bell at a speed of 27 

18   knots -- excuse me, speed of 25 knots your guests get a full 

19   understanding of the impact and the capability of the ship.  

20   Q     Another conclusion would be that you're giving them 

21   an e-ticket ride at Disneyland on a submarine.  

22   A     No, I'm not trying to give anybody a ride or thrill, I 

23   want to clearly demonstrate to the distinguished visitors what 

24   the warship and what a trained crew can do.  That was the 

25   intent of those acts.  


 1   Q     Tell me about deep water samples on Greeneville for DVs?  

 2   A     Deep water samples?   

 3   Q     Uh-huh.   

 4   A     When the submarine was operating at test depth I asked 

 5   the torpedomen to collect salt water and put it in oil sample 

 6   bottles to commemorate the event.  And I would give these 

 7   water samples to the guests as a memento to provide them with 

 8   something that they could remember their tour and their 

 9   embark.  On those bottles we would put the Greeneville sticker 

10   and the statement that they'd been at test depth and perhaps a 

11   date.  

12   Q     So there's a correlation between their visit with a 

13   bottle of water and the test depth of the ship, something 

14   they're not likely to forget?  

15   A     To commemorate the event along with a signed photograph 

16   that I would give 'em, sir.  

17   Q     But they're not likely to forget that they have deep 

18   water samples from a classified test depth of a U.S. 

19   submarine, they're not likely to forget that number.   

20   A     Sir, the -- whether they're likely to forget or not, I 

21   can't speculate.  But I do know that the bottle of water, salt 

22   water with a Greeneville submarine sticker on it was to serve 

23   as a reminder of that day's events, of their time on board the 

24   ship where they had example pour you're to the submarine 

25   force.  


 1   Q     Reminding them of how deep it went.  So when they -- I 

 2   assume when they have it on their coffee table and other 

 3   friends come over, from who knows where, and they're asked 

 4   about that, they'll explain what it was and they'll tell 

 5   people about the test depth capability of the U.S. submarines.  

 6   You don't feel like you should safeguard that information, 

 7   Captain?  

 8   A     Sir, I can't speculate what the visitors would do, or 

 9   what they wouldn't do with the bottles of salt water.   

10   Q     Did you give -- tell me about the mementos you gave your 

11   DV, did you give 'em styrofoam cups that were crushed at 

12   depth?  

13   A     On this particular trip, sir, I don't recall if we had 

14   given the distinguished visitors styrofoam cups or not, but I 

15   do recall during a family cruise where we took crew member 

16   families to Lahaina, those that had flown in from the 

17   mainland, that some styrofoam cups had been put in a mesh bag 

18   in -- I don't remember the area, but it was exposed to 

19   submergence pressure such that as the boat went deeper the 

20   styrofoam cups were crushed and it afforded the kids the 

21   opportunity to write their names or the date that they had 

22   been on board the submarine so that when the thing got 

23   squished it was a memento that they could take with them.  

24   On that particular day, 9 February, Admiral, I don't recall 

25   giving any of the distinguished visitors styrofoam cups.(next)