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1 DAY 12 SESSION 5 MARCH 20, 2001
2 BY VADM NATHMAN:
3 Q As I recall, Mr. Coen didn't visit sonar from
4 the time you came to the conn, in the testimony, he
5 never went into sonar.
6 So the whole time you're doing angles and
7 dangles, you are getting through the stuff, there is
8 no evidence of Mr. Coen going to conn. Now, those
9 are your standards, right, captain?
10 A Sir, I can't again tell you what Mr. Coen did
11 or did not do during that period of time that I was
12 in the control room. Again, if we can pull up the
13 exhibit, please, that shows the control room area.
14 After the lunch period on my first visit to
15 sonar, here on Exhibit 6, I entered the forward door,
16 paused, discussed the contact picture with Petty
17 Officer McGiboney, observed the passive broad band
18 display, entered the control room, stopped
19 approximately here to discuss with the officer of the
20 deck my intentions to prepare the submarine for
21 angles and dangles and the afternoon's events.
22 Mr. Coen acknowledged my intent and my plan
23 for that afternoon, and I continued to remain in this
24 area of the control room looking at the navigation
25 plots. I didn't focus on Mr. Coen's actions.
89
1 I can't tell you if he did not exit the conn
2 and enter the sonar room, which would have been
3 customary for him to do so prior to the conduct of
4 those evolutions. I can't tell you if he did or did
5 not, sir. I was looking elsewhere. I was walking
6 around the control room to enhance my situational
7 awareness, my understanding of the contact pictures,
8 looking over the Mark 812 to see what we had on time
9 bearing displays, see what the Fire Control
10 Technician of the Watch Seacrest was doing, and
11 engaging the quarter master as to our current ships
12 position to help me under what our situational
13 awareness was, because I had lost that during the
14 period of time I was dining with the distinguished
15 and in my state room the area here on Exhibit 6 just
16 forward of the conn.
17 Q Since you don't recall hearing that it was out
18 of order, what was your reaction when you went into
19 the control room and saw the ASVDU out of commission?
20 A Sir, I was frustrated as I have been frustrated
21 by a lot of the (indiscernable) on the BSY1 system.
22 They happen at what I consider never an opportune
23 time, but I consider the failure of the ASVDU again
24 something that happens with the BSY1 system that I
25 knew I could have repaired or have my sonarman repair
90
1 when he we got into port, or compensated by
2 cold-starting fire control and turning it back on --
3 but that wasn't the case.
4 Q Did you use your frustration to reinforce your
5 high standards -- the high standard of compensation
6 for the loss of that display?
7 A I had no discussion with the officer of the
8 deck regarding the failure of the ASVDU or to
9 increase his visits into sonar.
10 MR. GITTINS: Sir, I have something
11 that may shed some light on it.
12 VADM NATHMAN: Well, I think we're
13 shedding a lot of light on it right now, but I would
14 be happy to see the information.
15 THE CLERK: This will be marked as
16 Exhibit 80.
17 MR. GITTINS: Sir, Exhibit 80 is
18 called the Trouble Log on the USS Greenville.
19 VADM NATHMAN: It says 2901
20 (indiscernable) anything screen completely dark and
21 it's initialed by the sonar officer. It's initialed
22 by the chief of the boat, by the officer of the deck,
23 the XO, and the CO.
24 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir.
25 VADM NATHMAN: Okay, so -- is there
91
1 a time of this, so I should know --
2 MR. GITTINS: It says 08-10
3 VADM NATHMAN: So he initialed it,
4 so he was aware?
5 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir.
6 VADM NATHMAN: So it goes back to my
7 point. The discussion of what kind of compensation
8 for the loss of such an important instrument. That
9 was what I was trying to understand. He was aware
10 early in the morning.
11 MR. GITTINS: The suggestion was
12 that he was not aware, and it's clear he was. He
13 said he did not recall, sir.
14 THE WITNESS: Admiral, if I may, I
15 don't recall Lieutenant Sloan specifically telling me
16 that morning before the ship got underway that the
17 ASVDU had failed. I acknowledged that based on the
18 trouble record, or we call it the Green Book, that I
19 was aware that the ASVDU had failed.
20 Prior to getting the ship underway -- and again
21 in the harness I am thinking about how we are going
22 to orchestrate visitors -- if the report was received
23 zero 800, I had other things on my mind. And I say I
24 can't specifically recall that he told me it was out
25 of commission. If he did, I wouldn't consider it to
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1 be an underway-limiting item, or something I had to
2 give the officer of the deck additional instruction.
3 I expect they would take compensating action.
4 BY VADM NATHMAN:
5 Q One of the reasons I have asked -- the court
6 has taken a lot of testimony about the importance of
7 this display. So it's kind of imprinted in my mind
8 as an aviator, which is my warfare specialty, that
9 this is a very important instrument.
10 In my experience with flying aircraft, when I
11 lose an instrument, whether it's limiting item or not
12 -- I would be aware that it was out of order, and I
13 know you are busy, I know you have a lot of things to
14 do, I know you have a lot of priorities, but since it
15 seemed to have such a high importance placed on it, I
16 think the fact that you are aware would have been
17 elevated, and you seem to indicate that it seemed to
18 reach no threshhold where it reached -- no value
19 where you would remember it was out of commission
20 until you got on the conn that day and you noticed it
21 was no longer in commission.
22 And the reason -- you didn't have any threshold
23 about awareness, then you weren't going to ask about
24 any compensation for it, and it didn't get that, it
25 didn't get the positive backup because it was out of
93
1 commission. That's why I was asking those questions,
2 captain, to be fair.
3 Q I understand your questions now sir.
4 The BSY1 system has two fathometers.
5 Here on Exhibit 6, on the port side, aft corner
6 is one such location where a sonarman, qualified
7 sonarman, stands his watch.
8 There have been circumstances where the
9 fathometer in the control room has failed, and I've
10 had to relocate the petty officer to operate or stand
11 his fathometer watch in the sonar shack.
12 As equipment fails, I expect my subordinates to
13 carry out actions to compensate for it. I did not
14 give clear instruction to the OOD that day or the
15 contact coordinator.
16 Was I aware when I saw the ASVDU screen blank
17 that that was a problem? Yes, sir, I did. But I was
18 confident my men, knowing that that was out of
19 commission, would compensate for it without me having
20 to tell them.
21 Q But your confidence is not backed up by fact.
22 The fact is Mr. Coen doesn't have any
23 documentation as the officer of the deck to go and
24 visit sonar as a result of the ASVDU being out of
25 commission. So it's an oxymoron for me here
94
1 commander. Here you tell me this that you expect
2 compensation, but then it doesn't happen.
3 Or this is important, but you are not going to
4 ask for any positive backup. It concerns you, it
5 frustrates you. But you don't follow that
6 frustration up with a specific positive action.
7 There is no documents of the loss of ASVDU.
8 That's what I am trying to understand. So I am
9 stating incorrectly, you can tell me I am, but I
10 don't think I am, based on what I've heard in
11 testimony the last two weeks.
12 A No, sir. I can't tell you that there was
13 written compensation and verbal compensation. I
14 didn't get it, and I didn't sign a piece of paper.
15 And if I had been operating the submarine at sea for
16 a period of time where I could not restore the ASVDU
17 to service, I would have written the sample standing
18 order -- I would have had the weapons officer write
19 it, and signed it, and had it put into place.
20 But for this day, I considered that the
21 experience of my qualified OODs, including Mr. Coen,
22 would take the action to compensate for it.
23 I did not provide anything written, sir. I did
24 not give any verbal direction. That is correct.
25 RADM SULLIVAN: To follow up on
95
1 Admiral Nathman's questioning, I find what you are
2 saying -- I just don't believe it. And I don't
3 believe it for the following reasons.
4 THE WITNESS: What part don't you
5 believe, Admiral? Because we discussed a lot.
6 RADM SULLIVAN: That you, as a
7 successful commanding officer of a submarine, would
8 not give your officer of the deck some direction, or
9 even go to him and say, Lieutenant so-and-so, this is
10 out of commission, tell me what you are going to do
11 to compensate. And back him up.
12 Where is the backup that you as a commanding
13 officer provided your watch team for the loss of this
14 piece of equipment? I don't see it.
15 THE WITNESS: Admiral, I think I
16 made it clear that I didn't give any verbal direction
17 or I didn't give any written direction regarding
18 this.
19 RADM SULLIVAN: When Lieutenant
20 Sloan told you it was out of commission, your
21 reaction was, fine, not a problem?
22 THE WITNESS: I didn't say that,
23 Admiral. I said, I have no recollection of him
24 giving me that report. I just don't remember him
25 telling me that the ASVDU was out of commission.
96
1 VADM NATHMAN: That indicates to us
2 that you don't have any positive reaction to it.
3 You don't remember the conversation. You don't
4 remember the initial. So it indicates to us that you
5 are not reacting positively -- it's not of
6 significance to you, of any source. So if you don't
7 remember it -- to us, it means it's not important to
8 you.
9 THE WITNESS: Admiral, I would
10 disagree that you are really stating here that I
11 would consider that to be not of significance.
12 That's not true.
13 The ASVDU is a significant piece of equipment,
14 and I understand that. My point is is that I don't
15 recall that verbal report from the navigator. I
16 receive a lot of reports prior to the ship getting
17 underway, and I hear a lot of things over that open
18 microphone in my state room, which is not shown her
19 on Exhibit 6, there is background noise, the reports
20 that are coming. I can't tell you what I was focused
21 on at the time -- whether I was writing something, I
22 may have said, okay, nav, dismissed him, and not
23 listened to what he said. That is a possibility
24 there.
25 But I do know that when I returned to the
97
1 control room following my time on the bridge, and I
2 saw that the ASVDU was out of commission, I was
3 disappointed. But I did not say anything in --
4 saying verbally to my OOD's or given them written --
5 RADM SULLIVAN: Your chief of the
6 watch weren't even aware that the equipment was out
7 of commission when they assumed the watch.
8 Or how your FTOW didn't know it was out of
9 commission when he assumed the watch.
10 The chief of staff of SUBPAC on board your ship
11 did not realize it was out of commission until he
12 happened to walk in and see it. I get this feeling
13 like no one who normally tracks this type of ship's
14 status was aware.
15 THE WITNESS: May I have that
16 exhibit -- the Trouble Log, please?
17 And I am referring to Exhibit 80 here,
18 Admiral. When you say that no one that was
19 responsible was aware -- and I want to point -- I
20 know you can't see it, but the OOD is initialed, and
21 that looks like -- I can't tell if that's Lieutenant
22 Sloan's initial, but the XO's initialed it, I've
23 initialed it, the chief of the boat has initialed it.
24 The only two -- if you want to take that to the
25 admiral --
98
1 VADM NATHMAN: Commander, can you
2 explain, then -- there are several others initialed
3 there. There is a particular billet, right?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That's the
5 STOPO -- I will bring it over to you admiral -- and
6 again, I am talking about Exhibit 80 it has the
7 STOPO, which would have been Chief Gross who was left
8 behind that day as well as the CSO. The Combat
9 Systems Officer Van Winkle, and that's why you don't
10 see initials there. They certainly would have been
11 made aware of the material failure, following the
12 ship's return to port.
13 VADM NATHMAN: Was there someone
14 standing in for the weapons officer acting for him
15 while you were underway?
16 THE WITNESS: Lieutenant Mahoney, as
17 the sonar officer -- I don't recall if the executive
18 officer had observed the turnover between the two.
19 But Lieutenant Mahoney as the senior officer would
20 have been my acting weapons officer that day, sir.
21 I want to address your earlier question --
22 Admiral Sullivan -- why the chief of staff, the
23 diving officer of the watch, the chief of the watch,
24 and the fire patrol technician of the watch were not
25 aware of the fact that the ASVDU was out of
99
1 commission.
2 The diving officer of the watch stands his
3 watch here on Exhibit 6 in this chair at the ship's
4 control panel.
5 He does not have a clear view. And bailiff,
6 could I get you to move this stand? The diving
7 officer of the watch does not have a clear view to
8 the ASVDU which is located here on the forward part
9 of the conn, up in the overhead. He can't see it.
10 Furthermore, he doesn't use it.
11 The chief of the watch, which is located here
12 on the forward port corner of Exhibit 6, again, has
13 his back -- it's clearly obvious I think -- to the
14 conn, and it's another piece of equipment that the
15 chief of the watch does not use to carry out and
16 conduct his duties as a watchstander.
17 The fire control technician of the watch --
18 again, I am talking here about Exhibit 6 on the
19 starboard side of the control room sitting in one of
20 the four chairs here at the 818, two, fire control
21 displays is facing outboard to the starboard side.
22 His back is to the ASVDU. It's not a piece of gear
23 that he uses.
24 So with those three watchstanders, I think I
25 can explain that the ASVDU, a piece of equipment not
100
1 part of their watch station or associated with their
2 watch station is something they may not have been
3 aware of.
4 As far as the chief of staff goes, Admiral, I
5 didn't give him a report that it was out of
6 commission. But it's something that he would have
7 seen if he toured the control room and saw the
8 display blank. It was clear it wasn't working.
9 RADM SULLIVAN: I'd like to move on,
10 but I don't have an objection or even -- I understand
11 what you just said.
12 But it tells me a lot about the professionalism
13 of your crew in their turnover as a watch. This is
14 something that every submarine experience I have ever
15 had -- these people would know these things.
16 One, the chief of the watch, he's the one that
17 tracks these things, and just watch-to-watch
18 turnover. I just don't understand.
19 THE WITNESS: If I may have the
20 exhibit of the Trouble Log back again, please?
21 VADM NATHMAN: Captain -- while you
22 are getting this trouble log back -- you know in your
23 pre-watch turnover, or your walk around these are
24 folks that are in control, so it's a critical part of
25 the ship's control team. So there is an
101
1 expectation -- and I will ask you as an aviator --
2 but there is an expectation that in their pre-watch
3 turnover, they would be more observant or look at the
4 out of commission log or do these things to make
5 themselves aware of the ship's ability to control
6 itself, and that's an obligation of these seniors --
7 whether it's fire control technician of the watch or
8 chief of the watch or diving officer of the watch --
9 and yet you seemed to give us an excuse why they are
10 not aware of these particular items, and they all
11 testified to the fact that they were not aware.
12 THE WITNESS: Sir, they testified to
13 the fact that they are not aware, and I agree, in the
14 normal function of their duties as the chief of the
15 watch, diving officer of the watch, and fire control
16 technician of the watch, it's not a piece of gear
17 that they would routinely use.
18 Now the chief of the watch, whoever was
19 standing it at zero 8-10 in the maneuvering watch
20 would have been responsible for making this entry
21 into the trouble log and directing the message to
22 route it and get the Trouble Log delivered to the
23 captain so he would sign this.
24 I can't tell you why the ASVDU was not
25 discussed by the chief of the watch, the diving
102
1 officer of the watch, or the fire control of the
2 watch, but if it was a piece of equipment that
3 impacted their watch station, I would expect them to
4 discuss that.
5 Looking back on it, would this have helped the
6 situational awareness of the group? I can only
7 speculate and say, yes.
8 VADM NATHMAN: And give you more
9 backup.
10 THE WITNESS: And give me more
11 backup. But there is a checklist, Admirals, that is
12 in the standing order, my CO's standing order, that
13 clearly delineates what I expect my officers of the
14 deck to do. They use that checklist to ensure, such
15 a officer as Lieutenant Coen, if he takes a deck on
16 the conn understands what equipment failures have
17 occurred on board that ship, how it becomes
18 operationally limiting, and how it impacts him.
19 He's the one that I know has the checklist and
20 addresses the list of material failures. Good watch
21 standing practice, Admiral, I agree would incorporate
22 equipment that was out of commission, that would
23 enhance the operational awareness of the crew, and I
24 am disappointed that was not done.
25 RDML STONE: You state that you
103
1 asked the XO, the sonar --
2 THE WITNESS: What interview is
3 this -- unsworn testimony?
4 RDML STONE: Is that, in fact, the
5 case that you asked the XO to remain in sonar through
6 the PD evolution?
7 THE WITNESS: Sir, that statement
8 was incorrect on that fact.
9 RDML STONE: You did not ask him?
10 THE WITNESS: I did not have a
11 conversation with the XO at all. What I had was
12 non-verbal communication. I worked very closely with
13 Cmdr Pfeifer, as he has with me in the past year, and
14 the non-verbal communication that we had was -- he
15 looked at me, did one of these things, thumb up,
16 going into sonar. I looked, and I noticed. And that
17 was my agreement.
18 I have worked with him long enough to know
19 exactly what that meant he was going into sonar to be
20 my eyes, because I could not see where I was standing
21 on the conn through the sonar room, and I am talking
22 about Exhibit 6 here when I am standing here forward
23 of the Number 1 periscope -- through this curtain
24 drawn door or a door that has a curtain drawn which
25 would provide me with visibility of the sonar
104
1 display, which is located a third aft starboard side
2 passive broad band -- I wouldn't have been able to
3 see that.
4 RADM SULLIVAN: Okay, I would like
5 to move on. During the lunch period, where the ship
6 basically was deep and awaiting the afternoon events,
7 you were not, as I understand it, on the conn.
8 But when you walked into the control room --
9 can you tell me about what time you walked into the
10 control room and started the evolutions of angles?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I remember
12 the XO coming to my state room and saying, we need to
13 move on, because we're not going to make Papa Hotel.
14 I don't recall the specific time, but it was sometime
15 after 1:00 o'clock.
16 I was signing photographs for the distinguished
17 visitors, I wasn't hurried. I wanted to get the
18 photographs signed. So it was sometime after 13:00
19 -- and I can't tell you exactly when that was.
20 RADM SULLIVAN: What did you say to
21 his question about, or his comment about we need to
22 move on -- what did you say to him?
23 THE WITNESS: I don't recall what I
24 said, but my response to him would have been -- I am
25 going to finish the pictures, and if we're going to
105
1 be late, we're going to be late. You know, the Papa
2 Hotel time is plus or minus fifteen minutes. So if I
3 arrived at 1415, I didn't consider that to be an
4 issue. Or once I got the ship on the surface, it's
5 easy to call in on Channel 69 with Pearl Harbor
6 Control and say, I'm a half an hour late.
7 VADM NATHMAN: Were you working then
8 just to make sure it's clear -- since you hadn't been
9 surfaced yet except for a short time at PD -- were
10 you working to be at Papa Hotel at 1415 the whole
11 time?
12 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I wasn't
13 shooting for any particular time. The admiral asked
14 me what I was doing after lunch. I was signing
15 photographs. And as soon as I finished signing
16 pictures for all the guests, then I got up and I
17 walked into the sonar room to determine the contact
18 picture.
19 VADM NATHMAN: Okay.
20 RADM SULLIVAN: Your testimony --
21 you were running 45 minutes behind your schedule --
22 recognizing that they are not cast in stone. Why was
23 your ship running behind schedule?
24 THE WITNESS: I think it was because
25 a number of events, Admiral, and not just one single
106
1 one.
2 I don't recall what time we dove the boat, but
3 I remember when we submerged it took a little bit
4 longer to get the boat down below periscope depth.
5 I think the submarine was light -- if I were to
6 take a look back at the compensation, that might shed
7 some light. The other fact is -- and I am not
8 ashamed to say this -- I am long-winded, and during
9 that lunch hour, I engaged the distinguished
10 visitors. This was the opportunity for me to talk to
11 them.
12 So the lunch ran a little bit long, my first
13 sitting. I didn't spend an hour and 45 minutes. I
14 dined about about 10:45 to 11:45.
15 RADM SULLIVAN: There has been
16 testimony that due to water chemistry sampling in the
17 reactor plant, that that also delayed you.
18 Can you comment on that?
19 THE WITNESS: I don't know that that
20 delayed the event, admiral. I do know that after
21 lunch time at about 13:00 I -- and you know -- you
22 and I both know with an open mike, you can hear what
23 the officer of the deck is doing. He picked up the
24 1MJ, I believe to (indiscernable) the engineering
25 officer the watch what the primary samples were.
107
1 So I picked up the hand set, listened to the
2 conversation, and when I heard them say that it would
3 take a half an hour, half an hour longer from the
4 current point, I knew that that was not acceptable.
5 I didn't have another half an hour to expend on
6 a primary sample. So I gave direction to the officer
7 of the deck to have the sample secured so the ELT
8 could get out of the primary sample sync, get the
9 equipment in nucleonic stowed, and help ready the
10 ship for large angles.
11 VADM NATHMAN: When you gave
12 permission to sample, did you have this in your
13 calculus -- this timing issue in your calculus?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The
15 permission had been granted earlier in the morning.
16 I don't recall the specific time, but I remember
17 being contacted by the officer of the deck on the
18 JXs -- it's a buzzer in the ward room -- and I
19 granted that permission.
20 VADM NATHMAN: That was sometime
21 between 10:45 and 11:45?
22 THE WITNESS: I don't recall the
23 exact time, but that's when I was sitting in the
24 chair dining with my guests -- and yes, sir, it would
25 have more than likely have been requested at that
108
1 time. The best source of information would be to
2 review the engineering logs which would clearly state
3 the time that the primary sample sink was prepared
4 for the chemistry sample that day.
5 VADM NATHMAN: I was trying to
6 understand from you, commander, what was your
7 calculus in terms of when that sample would be done
8 and when your expectations of when it would be done
9 because it does seem like -- it does seem like you
10 secured it prematurely.
11 You secured it -- you positively secured it
12 before it was completed?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I did.
14 Because I didn't want to spend another half an hour
15 with the ELT, and the primary sample sink -- and know
16 that he took another hour after that to do the radio
17 chemistry analysis -- an hour and-a-half after that
18 would have put me at 1430, and he would be --
19 VADM NATHMAN: So when you gave him
20 permission --
21 THE WITNESS: -- I understand your
22 question now. Excuse me. It's difficult, I
23 apologize.
24 The permission that I gave though in the
25 morning for this special sample would have required
109
1 the ELT to draw samples from various parts of the
2 primary and that evolution, in itself, would take
3 about a half an hour to complete the sample.
4 Maybe less, actually. I don't exactly recall
5 the total time. But then the analysis in the
6 chemistry lab is about an hour once he transports
7 that.
8 So if you take a look at the time, you know,
9 from early in lunch, until after his analysis was
10 complete, I would have expected him to have been done
11 to support the angles. I didn't sit at lunch and go
12 through and factor twenty minutes here, and an hour
13 here -- it seemed reasonable at the time when I was
14 sitting having lunch that the request could be or
15 that the evolution could be accomplished by the time
16 the second sitting was done.
17 That was an hour and-a-half to two hours, I
18 felt comfortable we could do that.
19 I was frankly surprised, though Admiral, when I
20 heard that the ELT still had another half an hour in
21 the sink, and that's when I said, no, we're not doing
22 this.
23 RADM SULLIVAN: All right. To get
24 back on our track that you initiated or conducted
25 this day, you go up to the control room, the way I
110
1 understand it, get ready to do angles and dangles
2 followed by high speed turns. And as you already
3 testified this morning, there is always a risk of
4 depth excursions -- that due to the nature of this
5 training or this evolution, correct?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There is
7 always an element of risk in what we do.
8 RADM SULLIVAN: So again, I put
9 myself in your shoes. I walk into the control room.
10 I hear about -- I am not sure exactly when, but say
11 right before you start into this evolution, which I
12 believe is 1316, when you started coming up in speed
13 -- and I look at this track, and I look at the sonar
14 picture, which I recall the number of contacts was
15 three to the northwest, north --
16 How did you feel about -- what was your
17 thoughts on your ship, your watch team's situational
18 awareness of the surrounding contact situation and
19 ability to execute these maneuvers which could end up
20 with the submarine on the surface if not conducted
21 correctly?
22 THE WITNESS: I had no situational
23 awareness before I walked into sonar. I stated
24 that. When I went into sonar, this area on Exhibit
25 6, through the starboard door and paused and talked
111
1 to Petty Officer McGiboney. My understanding when I
2 left sonar is I had two contacts, not three. They
3 were to the north, they reported distant. I expect
4 my watchstanders to have excellent situational
5 awareness. And if they don't when they leave the
6 watch, to acquire it. I didn't question my
7 watchstanders' situational awareness when I walked
8 into conn.
9 RADM SULLIVAN: It solved this
10 master (indiscernable) -- this set of maneuvers of
11 this track knowing what contacts were to the north,
12 nothing that the submarine has to be driven not only
13 to receive data, but receive data that you can
14 usefully use to solve solutions, that would bother
15 me. Didn't it bother you?
16 THE WITNESS: Admiral, I wasn't
17 bothered at all when I got into control room.
18 I had just received a report from a fully
19 qualified and competent supervisor, Petty Officer
20 McGiboney, who I had served with for two years -- and
21 he told me he had two contacts to the north and
22 another one to the northwest -- one was a merchant
23 and the other one he called a small craft. And I
24 asked about the range. He reported distant.
25 I looked at the 81, two, time bearing display,
112
1 and I saw that the bearing rate drift to the left was
2 what I saw, and the fire control solution that
3 Seacrest was referring to that the contact to the
4 northeast -- this turned out to be the Ehime Maru --
5 was at about a range of 7 nautical miles.
6 So I felt that my watch team had situational
7 awareness or SA for the contacts that they were
8 tracking.
9 VADM NATHMAN: Captain, would you
10 say on that leg that it's time -- you have a report
11 that range was distant. But you didn't get a report
12 on range on any contact but one that was from the
13 fire control solution on Sierra 13, which was about
14 15,000 yards or so, as I recall from testimony.
15 Now is that -- for three contacts -- is that a
16 very complete contact picture? I mean, doesn't it
17 seem like that is sufficient time on a leg to build a
18 much more complete contact picture for the submarine,
19 other than just to say that it appears the range is
20 distant?
21 THE WITNESS: Admiral, when I
22 entered the control room, I did not look at -- I
23 didn't have the luxury of this reconstructed plot
24 here, Exhibit 4.
25 I didn't see data on this plot that shows the
113
1 12:30 point, the 13:00 point, the 1316, commence the
2 large angles. What I did see, Admiral, were alert
3 watchstanders. My supervisor told me contacts were
4 distant. When I looked the fire control display and
5 could see the op summary, it was clear that the two
6 contacts to the north were, in fact, distant.
7 At about the same range -- I know that it was a
8 merchant to the northwest. It was going to the left,
9 and I considered it that was a guy that was leaving
10 town and was heading out to the Pacific, and the
11 contact to the northeast was in fact at 7 nautical
12 miles from what I saw on the fire control display.
13 VADM NATHMAN: You said you looked
14 at the nav plot when you looked into control.
15 So you knew you were on this northerly track
16 for some time?
17 THE WITNESS: Admiral, when I looked
18 at the nav plot, it was to determine ship position.
19 I didn't look at the mylar overlay and see -- I asked
20 the quarter master or looked at his plot, and asked
21 him what is the bearing and distance to Papa Hotel.
22 I don't remember the number, but it was something
23 like fifteen miles.
24 (Proceed to Session 6)
25
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