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The Honolulu Advertiser

         1             DAY 12   SESSION 5     MARCH 20, 2001
         2     BY VADM NATHMAN:    
         3     Q     As I recall, Mr. Coen didn't visit sonar from 
         4     the time you came to the conn, in the testimony, he 
         5     never went into sonar. 
         6           So the whole time you're doing angles and 
         7     dangles, you are getting through the stuff, there is 
         8     no evidence of Mr. Coen going to conn.  Now, those 
         9     are your standards, right, captain?
        10     A     Sir, I can't again tell you what Mr. Coen did 
        11     or did not do during that period of time that I was 
        12     in the control room.  Again, if we can pull up the 
        13     exhibit, please, that shows the control room area. 
        14           After the lunch period on my first visit to 
        15     sonar, here on Exhibit 6, I entered the forward door, 
        16     paused, discussed the contact picture with Petty 
        17     Officer McGiboney, observed the passive broad band 
        18     display, entered the control room, stopped 
        19     approximately here to discuss with the officer of the 
        20     deck my intentions to prepare the submarine for 
        21     angles and dangles and the afternoon's events. 
        22           Mr. Coen acknowledged my intent and my plan 
        23     for that afternoon, and I continued to remain in this 
        24     area of the control room looking at the navigation 
        25     plots.  I didn't focus on Mr. Coen's actions.  



         1           I can't tell you if he did not exit the conn 
         2     and enter the sonar room, which would have been 
         3     customary for him to do so prior to the conduct of 
         4     those evolutions.  I can't tell you if he did or did 
         5     not, sir.  I was looking elsewhere.  I was walking 
         6     around the control room to enhance my situational 
         7     awareness, my understanding of the contact pictures, 
         8     looking over the Mark 812 to see what we had on time 
         9     bearing displays, see what the Fire Control 
        10     Technician of the Watch Seacrest was doing, and 
        11     engaging the quarter master as to our current ships 
        12     position to help me under what our situational 
        13     awareness was, because I had lost that during the 
        14     period of time I was dining with the distinguished 
        15     and in my state room the area here on Exhibit 6 just 
        16     forward of the conn. 
        17     Q     Since you don't recall hearing that it was out 
        18     of order, what was your reaction when you went into 
        19     the control room and saw the ASVDU out of commission?
        20     A     Sir, I was frustrated as I have been frustrated 
        21     by a lot of the (indiscernable) on the BSY1 system.  
        22     They happen at what I consider never an opportune 
        23     time, but I consider the failure of the ASVDU again 
        24     something that happens with the BSY1 system that I 
        25     knew I could have repaired or have my sonarman repair 



         1     when he we got into port, or compensated by 
         2     cold-starting fire control and turning it back on -- 
         3     but that wasn't the case.
         4     Q     Did you use your frustration to reinforce your 
         5     high standards -- the high standard of compensation 
         6     for the loss of that display?
         7     A     I had no discussion with the officer of the 
         8     deck regarding the failure of the ASVDU or to 
         9     increase his visits into sonar.
        10                     MR. GITTINS:   Sir, I have something 
        11     that may shed some light on it.  
        12                     VADM NATHMAN:   Well, I think we're 
        13     shedding a lot of light on it right now, but I would 
        14     be happy to see the information. 
        15                     THE CLERK:   This will be marked as 
        16     Exhibit 80. 
        17                     MR. GITTINS:   Sir, Exhibit 80 is 
        18     called the Trouble Log on the USS Greenville. 
        19                     VADM NATHMAN:   It says 2901 
        20     (indiscernable) anything screen completely dark and 
        21     it's initialed by the sonar officer.  It's initialed 
        22     by the chief of the boat, by the officer of the deck, 
        23     the XO, and the CO.
        24                     MR. GITTINS:   Yes, sir. 
        25                     VADM NATHMAN:   Okay, so -- is there 



         1     a time of this, so I should know -- 
         2                     MR. GITTINS:   It says 08-10
         3                     VADM NATHMAN:   So he initialed it, 
         4     so he was aware?
         5                     MR. GITTINS:   Yes, sir.
         6                     VADM NATHMAN:   So it goes back to my 
         7     point.  The discussion of what kind of compensation 
         8     for the loss of such an important instrument.  That 
         9     was what I was trying to understand.  He was aware 
        10     early in the morning.
        11                     MR. GITTINS:   The suggestion was 
        12     that he was not aware, and it's clear he was.  He 
        13     said he did not recall, sir.
        14                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, if I may, I 
        15     don't recall Lieutenant Sloan specifically telling me 
        16     that morning before the ship got underway that the 
        17     ASVDU had failed.  I acknowledged that based on the 
        18     trouble record, or we call it the Green Book, that I 
        19     was aware that the ASVDU had failed. 
        20           Prior to getting the ship underway -- and again 
        21     in the harness I am thinking about how we are going 
        22     to orchestrate visitors -- if the report was received 
        23     zero 800, I had other things on my mind.  And I say I 
        24     can't specifically recall that he told me it was out 
        25     of commission.  If he did, I wouldn't consider it to 



         1     be an underway-limiting item, or something I had to 
         2     give the officer of the deck additional instruction.  
         3     I expect they would take compensating action.
         4     BY VADM NATHMAN:    
         5     Q     One of the reasons I have asked -- the court 
         6     has taken a lot of testimony about the importance of 
         7     this display.  So it's kind of imprinted in my mind 
         8     as an aviator, which is my warfare specialty, that 
         9     this is a very important instrument.  
        10           In my experience with flying aircraft, when I 
        11     lose an instrument, whether it's limiting item or not 
        12     -- I would be aware that it was out of order, and I 
        13     know you are busy, I know you have a lot of things to 
        14     do, I know you have a lot of priorities, but since it 
        15     seemed to have such a high importance placed on it, I 
        16     think the fact that you are aware would have been 
        17     elevated, and you seem to indicate that it seemed to 
        18     reach no threshhold where it reached -- no value 
        19     where you would remember it was out of commission 
        20     until you got on the conn that day and you noticed it 
        21     was no longer in commission.  
        22           And the reason -- you didn't have any threshold 
        23     about awareness, then you weren't going to ask about 
        24     any compensation for it, and it didn't get that, it 
        25     didn't get the positive backup because it was out of 



         1     commission.  That's why I was asking those questions, 
         2     captain, to be fair. 
         3     Q     I understand your questions now sir.  
         4           The BSY1 system has two fathometers.  
         5           Here on Exhibit 6, on the port side, aft corner 
         6     is one such location where a sonarman, qualified 
         7     sonarman, stands his watch.  
         8           There have been circumstances where the 
         9     fathometer in the control room has failed, and I've 
        10     had to relocate the petty officer to operate or stand 
        11     his fathometer watch in the sonar shack.  
        12           As equipment fails, I expect my subordinates to 
        13     carry out actions to compensate for it.  I did not 
        14     give clear instruction to the OOD that day or the 
        15     contact coordinator.  
        16           Was I aware when I saw the ASVDU screen blank 
        17     that that was a problem?  Yes, sir, I did.  But I was 
        18     confident my men, knowing that that was out of 
        19     commission, would compensate for it without me having 
        20     to tell them. 
        21     Q     But your confidence is not backed up by fact.   
        22           The fact is Mr. Coen doesn't have any 
        23     documentation as the officer of the deck to go and 
        24     visit sonar as a result of the ASVDU being out of 
        25     commission.  So it's an oxymoron for me here 



         1     commander.  Here you tell me this that you expect 
         2     compensation, but then it doesn't happen.  
         3           Or this is important, but you are not going to 
         4     ask for any positive backup.  It concerns you, it 
         5     frustrates you.  But you don't follow that 
         6     frustration up with a specific positive action.       
         7           There is no documents of the loss of ASVDU.  
         8     That's what I am trying to understand.  So I am 
         9     stating incorrectly, you can tell me I am, but I 
        10     don't think I am, based on what I've heard in 
        11     testimony the last two weeks. 
        12     A     No, sir.  I can't tell you that there was 
        13     written compensation and verbal compensation.  I 
        14     didn't get it, and I didn't sign a piece of paper.  
        15     And if I had been operating the submarine at sea for 
        16     a period of time where I could not restore the ASVDU 
        17     to service, I would have written the sample standing 
        18     order -- I would have had the weapons officer write 
        19     it, and signed it, and had it put into place.  
        20           But for this day, I considered that the 
        21     experience of my qualified OODs, including Mr. Coen, 
        22     would take the action to compensate for it.  
        23           I did not provide anything written, sir.  I did 
        24     not give any verbal direction.  That is correct. 
        25                     RADM SULLIVAN:   To follow up on 



         1     Admiral Nathman's questioning, I find what you are 
         2     saying -- I just don't believe it.  And I don't 
         3     believe it for the following reasons. 
         4                     THE WITNESS:   What part don't you 
         5     believe, Admiral?  Because we discussed a lot.
         6                     RADM SULLIVAN:   That you, as a 
         7     successful commanding officer of a submarine, would 
         8     not give your officer of the deck some direction, or 
         9     even go to him and say, Lieutenant so-and-so, this is 
        10     out of commission, tell me what you are going to do 
        11     to compensate.  And back him up.  
        12           Where is the backup that you as a commanding 
        13     officer provided your watch team for the loss of this 
        14     piece of equipment?  I don't see it. 
        15                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, I think I 
        16     made it clear that I didn't give any verbal direction 
        17     or I didn't give any written direction regarding 
        18     this. 
        19                     RADM SULLIVAN:   When Lieutenant 
        20     Sloan told you it was out of commission, your 
        21     reaction was, fine, not a problem?
        22                     THE WITNESS:   I didn't say that,  
        23     Admiral.  I said, I have no recollection of him 
        24     giving me that report.  I just don't remember him 
        25     telling me that the ASVDU was out of commission.



         1                     VADM NATHMAN:   That indicates to us 
         2     that you don't have any positive reaction to it.  
         3           You don't remember the conversation.  You don't 
         4     remember the initial.  So it indicates to us that you 
         5     are not reacting positively -- it's not of 
         6     significance to you, of any source.  So if you don't 
         7     remember it -- to us, it means it's not important to 
         8     you.
         9                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, I would 
        10     disagree that you are really stating here that I 
        11     would consider that to be not of significance.  
        12     That's not true.  
        13           The ASVDU is a significant piece of equipment, 
        14     and I understand that.  My point is is that I don't 
        15     recall that verbal report from the navigator.  I 
        16     receive a lot of reports prior to the ship getting 
        17     underway, and I hear a lot of things over that open 
        18     microphone in my state room, which is not shown her 
        19     on Exhibit 6, there is background noise, the reports 
        20     that are coming.  I can't tell you what I was focused 
        21     on at the time -- whether I was writing something, I 
        22     may have said, okay, nav, dismissed him, and not 
        23     listened to what he said.  That is a possibility 
        24     there.  
        25           But I do know that when I returned to the 



         1     control room following my time on the bridge, and I 
         2     saw that the ASVDU was out of commission, I was 
         3     disappointed.  But I did not say anything in -- 
         4     saying verbally to my OOD's or given them written -- 
         5                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Your chief of the 
         6     watch weren't even aware that the equipment was out 
         7     of commission when they assumed the watch.  
         8           Or how your FTOW didn't know it was out of 
         9     commission when he assumed the watch.  
        10           The chief of staff of SUBPAC on board your ship 
        11     did not realize it was out of commission until he 
        12     happened to walk in and see it.  I get this feeling 
        13     like no one who normally tracks this type of ship's 
        14     status was aware. 
        15                     THE WITNESS:   May I have that 
        16     exhibit -- the Trouble Log, please?  
        17           And I am referring to Exhibit 80 here, 
        18     Admiral.  When you say that no one that was 
        19     responsible was aware -- and I want to point -- I 
        20     know you can't see it, but the OOD is initialed, and 
        21     that looks like -- I can't tell if that's Lieutenant 
        22     Sloan's initial, but the XO's initialed it, I've 
        23     initialed it, the chief of the boat has initialed it. 
        24          The only two -- if you want to take that to the 
        25     admiral -- 



         1                     VADM NATHMAN:   Commander, can you 
         2     explain, then -- there are several others initialed 
         3     there.  There is a particular billet, right? 
         4                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  That's the 
         5     STOPO -- I will bring it over to you admiral -- and 
         6     again, I am talking about Exhibit 80 it has the 
         7     STOPO, which would have been Chief Gross who was left 
         8     behind that day as well as the CSO.  The Combat 
         9     Systems Officer Van Winkle, and that's why you don't 
        10     see initials there.  They certainly would have been 
        11     made aware of the material failure, following the 
        12     ship's return to port. 
        13                     VADM NATHMAN:   Was there someone 
        14     standing in for the weapons officer acting for him 
        15     while you were underway?
        16                     THE WITNESS:   Lieutenant Mahoney, as 
        17     the sonar officer -- I don't recall if the executive 
        18     officer had observed the turnover between the two.  
        19     But Lieutenant Mahoney as the senior officer would 
        20     have been my acting weapons officer that day, sir.  
        21           I want to address your earlier question -- 
        22     Admiral Sullivan -- why the chief of staff, the 
        23     diving officer of the watch, the chief of the watch, 
        24     and the fire patrol technician of the watch were not 
        25     aware of the fact that the ASVDU was out of 



         1     commission.  
         2           The diving officer of the watch stands his 
         3     watch here on Exhibit 6 in this chair at the ship's 
         4     control panel. 
         5           He does not have a clear view.  And bailiff, 
         6     could I get you to move this stand?  The diving 
         7     officer of the watch does not have a clear view to 
         8     the ASVDU which is located here on the forward part 
         9     of the conn, up in the overhead.  He can't see it.  
        10     Furthermore, he doesn't use it. 
        11           The chief of the watch, which is located here 
        12     on the forward port corner of Exhibit 6, again, has 
        13     his back -- it's clearly obvious I think -- to the 
        14     conn, and it's another piece of equipment that the 
        15     chief of the watch does not use to carry out and 
        16     conduct his duties as a watchstander.  
        17           The fire control technician of the watch -- 
        18     again, I am talking here about Exhibit 6 on the 
        19     starboard side of the control room sitting in one of 
        20     the four chairs here at the 818, two, fire control 
        21     displays is facing outboard to the starboard side.  
        22     His back is to the ASVDU.  It's not a piece of gear 
        23     that he uses. 
        24           So with those three watchstanders, I think I 
        25     can explain that the ASVDU, a piece of equipment not 



         1     part of their watch station or associated with their 
         2     watch station is something they may not have been 
         3     aware of.  
         4           As far as the chief of staff goes, Admiral, I 
         5     didn't give him a report that it was out of 
         6     commission.  But it's something that he would have 
         7     seen if he toured the control room and saw the 
         8     display blank.  It was clear it wasn't working.
         9                     RADM SULLIVAN:   I'd like to move on, 
        10     but I don't have an objection or even -- I understand 
        11     what you just said. 
        12           But it tells me a lot about the professionalism 
        13     of your crew in their turnover as a watch.  This is 
        14     something that every submarine experience I have ever 
        15     had -- these people would know these things.  
        16           One, the chief of the watch, he's the one that 
        17     tracks these things, and just watch-to-watch 
        18     turnover.  I just don't understand. 
        19                     THE WITNESS:   If I may have the 
        20     exhibit of the Trouble Log back again, please?
        21                     VADM NATHMAN:   Captain -- while you 
        22     are getting this trouble log back -- you know in your 
        23     pre-watch turnover, or your walk around these are 
        24     folks that are in control, so it's a critical part of 
        25     the ship's control team.  So there is an 



         1     expectation --  and I will ask you as an aviator -- 
         2     but there is an expectation that in their pre-watch 
         3     turnover, they would be more observant or look at the 
         4     out of commission log or do these things to make 
         5     themselves aware of the ship's ability to control 
         6     itself, and that's an obligation of these seniors -- 
         7     whether it's fire control technician of the watch or 
         8     chief of the watch or diving officer of the watch --  
         9     and yet you seemed to give us an excuse why they are 
        10     not aware of these particular items, and they all 
        11     testified to the fact that they were not aware.  
        12                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, they testified to 
        13     the fact that they are not aware, and I agree, in the 
        14     normal function of their duties as the chief of the 
        15     watch, diving officer of the watch, and fire control 
        16     technician of the watch, it's not a piece of gear 
        17     that they would routinely use.  
        18           Now the chief of the watch, whoever was 
        19     standing it at zero 8-10 in the maneuvering watch 
        20     would have been responsible for making this entry 
        21     into the trouble log and directing the message to 
        22     route it and get the Trouble Log delivered to the 
        23     captain so he would sign this. 
        24           I can't tell you why the ASVDU was not 
        25     discussed by the chief of the watch, the diving 



         1     officer of the watch, or the fire control of the 
         2     watch, but if it was a piece of equipment that 
         3     impacted their watch station, I would expect them to 
         4     discuss that. 
         5           Looking back on it, would this have helped the 
         6     situational awareness of the group?  I can only 
         7     speculate and say, yes.
         8                     VADM NATHMAN:   And give you more 
         9     backup. 
        10                     THE WITNESS:   And give me more 
        11     backup.  But there is a checklist, Admirals, that is 
        12     in the standing order, my CO's standing order, that 
        13     clearly delineates what I expect my officers of the 
        14     deck to do.  They use that checklist to ensure, such 
        15     a officer as Lieutenant Coen, if he takes a deck on 
        16     the conn understands what equipment failures have 
        17     occurred on board that ship, how it becomes 
        18     operationally limiting, and how it impacts him.  
        19           He's the one that I know has the checklist and 
        20     addresses the list of material failures.  Good watch 
        21     standing practice, Admiral, I agree would incorporate 
        22     equipment that was out of commission, that would 
        23     enhance the operational awareness of the crew, and I 
        24     am disappointed that was not done.
        25                     RDML STONE:   You state that you 



         1     asked the XO, the sonar --
         2                     THE WITNESS:   What interview is 
         3     this -- unsworn testimony?
         4                     RDML STONE:   Is that, in fact, the 
         5     case that you asked the XO to remain in sonar through 
         6     the PD evolution?
         7                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, that statement 
         8     was incorrect on that fact.  
         9                     RDML STONE:   You did not ask him?
        10                     THE WITNESS:   I did not have a 
        11     conversation with the XO at all.  What I had was 
        12     non-verbal communication.  I worked very closely with 
        13     Cmdr Pfeifer, as he has with me in the past year, and 
        14     the non-verbal communication that we had was -- he 
        15     looked at me, did one of these things, thumb up, 
        16     going into sonar.  I looked, and I noticed.  And that 
        17     was my agreement.  
        18           I have worked with him long enough to know 
        19     exactly what that meant he was going into sonar to be 
        20     my eyes, because I could not see where I was standing 
        21     on the conn through the sonar room, and I am talking 
        22     about Exhibit 6 here when I am standing here forward 
        23     of the Number 1 periscope -- through this curtain 
        24     drawn door or a door that has a curtain drawn which 
        25     would provide me with visibility of the sonar 



         1     display, which is located a third aft starboard side 
         2     passive broad band -- I wouldn't have been able to 
         3     see that. 
         4                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Okay, I would like 
         5     to move on.  During the lunch period, where the ship 
         6     basically was deep and awaiting the afternoon events, 
         7     you were not, as I understand it, on the conn. 
         8           But when you walked into the control room -- 
         9     can you tell me about what time you walked into the 
        10     control room and started the evolutions of angles?
        11                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  I remember 
        12     the XO coming to my state room and saying, we need to 
        13     move on, because we're not going to make Papa Hotel.  
        14     I don't recall the specific time, but it was sometime 
        15     after 1:00 o'clock.  
        16           I was signing photographs for the distinguished 
        17     visitors, I wasn't hurried.  I wanted to get the 
        18     photographs signed.  So it was sometime after 13:00 
        19     -- and I can't tell you exactly when that was. 
        20                     RADM SULLIVAN:   What did you say to 
        21     his question about, or his comment about we need to 
        22     move on -- what did you say to him?
        23                     THE WITNESS:   I don't recall what I 
        24     said, but my response to him would have been -- I am 
        25     going to finish the pictures, and if we're going to 



         1     be late, we're going to be late.  You know, the Papa 
         2     Hotel time is plus or minus fifteen minutes.  So if I 
         3     arrived at 1415, I didn't consider that to be an 
         4     issue.  Or once I got the ship on the surface, it's 
         5     easy to call in on Channel 69 with Pearl Harbor 
         6     Control and say, I'm a half an hour late. 
         7                     VADM NATHMAN:   Were you working then 
         8     just to make sure it's clear -- since you hadn't been 
         9     surfaced yet except for a short time at PD -- were 
        10     you working to be at Papa Hotel at 1415 the whole 
        11     time?
        12                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  I wasn't 
        13     shooting for any particular time.  The admiral asked 
        14     me what I was doing after lunch.  I was signing 
        15     photographs.  And as soon as I finished signing 
        16     pictures for all the guests, then I got up and I 
        17     walked into the sonar room to determine the contact 
        18     picture. 
        19                     VADM NATHMAN:   Okay. 
        20                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Your testimony -- 
        21     you were running 45 minutes behind your schedule -- 
        22     recognizing that they are not cast in stone.  Why was 
        23     your ship running behind schedule? 
        24                     THE WITNESS:   I think it was because 
        25     a number of events, Admiral, and not just one single 



         1     one. 
         2           I don't recall what time we dove the boat, but 
         3     I remember when we submerged it took a little bit 
         4     longer to get the boat down below periscope depth.  
         5           I think the submarine was light -- if I were to 
         6     take a look back at the compensation, that might shed 
         7     some light.  The other fact is -- and I am not 
         8     ashamed to say this -- I am long-winded, and during 
         9     that lunch hour, I engaged the distinguished 
        10     visitors.  This was the opportunity for me to talk to 
        11     them.  
        12           So the lunch ran a little bit long, my first 
        13     sitting.  I didn't spend an hour and 45 minutes.  I 
        14     dined about about 10:45 to 11:45.
        15                     RADM SULLIVAN:   There has been 
        16     testimony that due to water chemistry sampling in the 
        17     reactor plant, that that also delayed you.  
        18           Can you comment on that?  
        19                     THE WITNESS:   I don't know that that 
        20     delayed the event, admiral.  I do know that after 
        21     lunch time at about 13:00 I -- and you know -- you 
        22     and I both know with an open mike, you can hear what 
        23     the officer of the deck is doing.  He picked up the 
        24     1MJ, I believe to (indiscernable) the engineering 
        25     officer the watch what the primary samples were.  



         1           So I picked up the hand set, listened to the 
         2     conversation, and when I heard them say that it would 
         3     take a half an hour, half an hour longer from the 
         4     current point, I knew that that was not acceptable.   
         5           I didn't have another half an hour to expend on 
         6     a primary sample.  So I gave direction to the officer 
         7     of the deck to have the sample secured so the ELT 
         8     could get out of the primary sample sync, get the 
         9     equipment in nucleonic stowed, and help ready the 
        10     ship for large angles.
        11                     VADM NATHMAN:   When you gave 
        12     permission to sample, did you have this in your 
        13     calculus -- this timing issue in your calculus?
        14                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  The 
        15     permission had been granted earlier in the morning.  
        16     I don't recall the specific time, but I remember 
        17     being contacted by the officer of the deck on the 
        18     JXs -- it's a buzzer in the ward room -- and I 
        19     granted that permission.
        20                     VADM NATHMAN:   That was sometime 
        21     between 10:45 and 11:45?
        22                     THE WITNESS:   I don't recall the 
        23     exact time, but that's when I was sitting in the 
        24     chair dining with my guests -- and yes, sir, it would 
        25     have more than likely have been requested at that 



         1     time.  The best source of information would be to 
         2     review the engineering logs which would clearly state 
         3     the time that the primary sample sink was prepared 
         4     for the chemistry sample that day.
         5                     VADM NATHMAN:   I was trying to 
         6     understand from you, commander, what was your 
         7     calculus in terms of when that sample would be done 
         8     and when your expectations of when it would be done 
         9     because it does seem like -- it does seem like you 
        10     secured it prematurely.  
        11           You secured it -- you positively secured it 
        12     before it was completed?
        13                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir, I did.  
        14     Because I didn't want to spend another half an hour 
        15     with the ELT, and the primary sample sink -- and know 
        16     that he took another hour after that to do the radio 
        17     chemistry analysis -- an hour and-a-half after that 
        18     would have put me at 1430, and he would be --
        19                     VADM NATHMAN:   So when you gave him 
        20     permission -- 
        21                     THE WITNESS:   --  I understand your 
        22     question now.  Excuse me.  It's difficult, I 
        23     apologize. 
        24           The permission that I gave though in the 
        25     morning for this special sample would have required 



         1     the ELT to draw samples from various parts of the 
         2     primary and that evolution, in itself, would take 
         3     about a half an hour to complete the sample. 
         4           Maybe less, actually.  I don't exactly recall 
         5     the total time.  But then the analysis in the 
         6     chemistry lab is about an hour once he transports 
         7     that.  
         8           So if you take a look at the time, you know, 
         9     from early in lunch, until after his analysis was 
        10     complete, I would have expected him to have been done 
        11     to support the angles.  I didn't sit at lunch and go 
        12     through and factor twenty minutes here, and an hour 
        13     here -- it seemed reasonable at the time when I was 
        14     sitting having lunch that the request could be or 
        15     that the evolution could be accomplished by the time 
        16     the second sitting was done.  
        17           That was an hour and-a-half to two hours, I 
        18     felt comfortable we could do that. 
        19           I was frankly surprised, though Admiral, when I 
        20     heard that the ELT still had another half an hour in 
        21     the sink, and that's when I said, no, we're not doing 
        22     this. 
        23                     RADM SULLIVAN:   All right.  To get 
        24     back on our track that you initiated or conducted 
        25     this day, you go up to the control room, the way I 



         1     understand it, get ready to do angles and dangles 
         2     followed by high speed turns.  And as you already 
         3     testified this morning, there is always a risk of 
         4     depth excursions -- that due to the nature of this 
         5     training or this evolution, correct? 
         6                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  There is 
         7     always an element of risk in what we do. 
         8                     RADM SULLIVAN:   So again, I put 
         9     myself in your shoes.  I walk into the control room.  
        10     I hear about -- I am not sure exactly when, but say 
        11     right before you start into this evolution, which I 
        12     believe is 1316, when you started coming up in speed 
        13     -- and I look at this track, and I look at the sonar 
        14     picture, which I recall the number of contacts was 
        15     three to the northwest, north -- 
        16           How did you feel about -- what was your 
        17     thoughts on your ship, your watch team's situational 
        18     awareness of the surrounding contact situation and 
        19     ability to execute these maneuvers which could end up 
        20     with the submarine on the surface if not conducted 
        21     correctly? 
        22                     THE WITNESS:   I had no situational 
        23     awareness before I walked into sonar.  I stated 
        24     that.  When I went into sonar, this area on Exhibit 
        25     6, through the starboard door and paused and talked 



         1     to Petty Officer McGiboney.  My understanding when I 
         2     left sonar is I had two contacts, not three.  They 
         3     were to the north, they reported distant.  I expect 
         4     my watchstanders to have excellent situational 
         5     awareness.  And if they don't when they leave the 
         6     watch, to acquire it.  I didn't question my 
         7     watchstanders' situational awareness when I walked 
         8     into conn. 
         9                     RADM SULLIVAN:   It solved this 
        10     master (indiscernable)  -- this set of maneuvers of 
        11     this track knowing what contacts were to the north, 
        12     nothing that the submarine has to be driven not only 
        13     to receive data, but receive data that you can 
        14     usefully use to solve solutions, that would bother 
        15     me.  Didn't it bother you? 
        16                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, I wasn't 
        17     bothered at all when I got into control room.  
        18           I had just received a report from a fully 
        19     qualified and competent supervisor, Petty Officer 
        20     McGiboney, who I had served with for two years -- and 
        21     he told me he had two contacts to the north and 
        22     another one to the northwest -- one was a merchant 
        23     and the other one he called a small craft.  And I 
        24     asked about the range.  He reported distant.  
        25           I looked at the 81, two, time bearing display, 



         1     and I saw that the bearing rate drift to the left was 
         2     what I saw, and the fire control solution that 
         3     Seacrest was referring to that the contact to the 
         4     northeast -- this turned out to be the Ehime Maru --  
         5     was at about a range of 7 nautical miles.  
         6           So I felt that my watch team had situational 
         7     awareness or SA for the contacts that they were 
         8     tracking.
         9                     VADM NATHMAN:   Captain, would you 
        10     say on that leg that it's time -- you have a report 
        11     that range was distant.  But you didn't get a report 
        12     on range on any contact but one that was from the 
        13     fire control solution on Sierra 13, which was about 
        14     15,000 yards or so, as I recall from testimony. 
        15           Now is that -- for three contacts -- is that a 
        16     very complete contact picture?  I mean, doesn't it 
        17     seem like that is sufficient time on a leg to build a 
        18     much more complete contact picture for the submarine, 
        19     other than just to say that it appears the range is 
        20     distant? 
        21                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, when I 
        22     entered the control room, I did not look at -- I 
        23     didn't have the luxury of this reconstructed plot 
        24     here, Exhibit 4. 
        25           I didn't see data on this plot that shows the 



         1     12:30 point, the 13:00 point, the 1316, commence the 
         2     large angles.  What I did see, Admiral, were alert 
         3     watchstanders.  My supervisor told me contacts were 
         4     distant.  When I looked the fire control display and 
         5     could see the op summary, it was clear that the two 
         6     contacts to the north were, in fact, distant.  
         7           At about the same range -- I know that it was a 
         8     merchant to the northwest.  It was going to the left, 
         9     and I considered it that was a guy that was leaving 
        10     town and was heading out to the Pacific, and the 
        11     contact to the northeast was in fact at 7 nautical 
        12     miles from what I saw on the fire control display.
        13                     VADM NATHMAN:   You said you looked 
        14     at the nav plot when you looked into control.  
        15           So you knew you were on this northerly track 
        16     for some time?
        17                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, when I looked 
        18     at the nav plot, it was to determine ship position.  
        19     I didn't look at the mylar overlay and see -- I asked 
        20     the quarter master or looked at his plot, and asked 
        21     him what is the bearing and distance to Papa Hotel.  
        22     I don't remember the number, but it was something 
        23     like fifteen miles.
        24                    (Proceed to Session 6)