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The Honolulu Advertiser

         1        DAY 12  SESSION 7    MARCH 20, 2001   1:00 p.m.   

         2                           ---oOo---

         3                     VADM NATHMAN:   This court is now in 

         4     session.  Counsel for the court.

         5                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Let the record 

         6     reflect that all members, parties, and counsel are 

         7     again present.  The court has no procedural matters, 

         8     sir. 

         9                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel for the 

        10     parties, procedural matters?

        11                     MR. GITTINS:   No, sir.

        12                     LCDR STONE:   No, sir.

        13                     LCDR FILBERT:   No, sir. 

        14                     VADM NATHMAN:   Commander Waddle, 

        15     before we begin questioning, earlier you stated that 

        16     your requested testimonial immunity has taken -- and 

        17     I will quote -- "reasonable precautions in the event 

        18     that the international and political environment 

        19     dictated that I be sacrificed to an unwarranted 

        20     court-martial."  Unquote.  

        21           I want to be clear. 

        22           Our mandate is contained in the charge to the 

        23     members of the appointing order given by Admiral 

        24     Fargo.  That order is to investigate, fairly and 

        25     impartially, all the facts and circumstances in this 

         1     case.  That is the only thing that matters to this 

         2     court. 

         3           You also stated that the court felt your 

         4     testimony was not essential or material to the 

         5     conclusion of this court's investigation. 

         6           That comment misses the point as to why the 

         7     court recommended its granting you immunity.  You 

         8     were given the unique privilege to command the USS 

         9     Greenville.  As stated in its recommendations to 

        10     Admiral Fargo, the court does not support the setting 

        11     of either a precedent or a perception that commanding 

        12     officers will only provide a full and accurate 

        13     accounting for mishaps at sea unless they had been 

        14     granted immunity.  

        15           Admiral Sullivan. 

        16                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Commander, what I 

        17     want to do is pick up where we left off and just to 

        18     get us all on the same page, we're trying to -- I was 

        19     trying to walk you through the evolutions of that 

        20     afternoon of the 9th, and we had gone through the 

        21     point where we're at high speed doing angles and 

        22     followed by high changes in rudder and high speed. 

        23           And part of our discussion was the SA or the 

        24     situational awareness that you felt you had, and 

        25     discussed somewhat about what your crew had at the 

         1     time. 

         2           During the evolutions of angles and high speed 

         3     turns, what I took from what you told me was that you 

         4     were giving pretty explicit direction to the officer 

         5     of the deck; is that correct?

         6                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, I didn't say 

         7     explicit direction.  I told Mr. Coen that he wanted 

         8     him to achieve a fifteen degree up-angle, a 20-degree 

         9     up-angle, and make his depth 165 or 175 feet, 

        10     whatever those orders were.  That's what I told him 

        11     to do.  

        12           I made it clear to Mr. Coen the angle, the tack 

        13     that I wanted placed on the submarine, as well as 

        14     what depth I wanted him to achieve. 

        15                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Did you feel that 

        16     you had the situational awareness to -- that your 

        17     officer of the deck had the situational awareness to 

        18     be able to follow that routine of, here is an order, 

        19     an ordered angle or an ordered course, or an ordered 

        20     rudder during this evolution? 

        21                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  I thought 

        22     that I had the situational awareness, and I also 

        23     thought that the officer of the deck had the 

        24     situational awareness.  

        25           In an earlier line of questioning referring to 

         1     Exhibit 4, you asked me if I thought that driving the 

         2     ship on a northerly course was good for resolving 

         3     target motion analysis.  I wanted to make it clear, 

         4     Admiral, that if that's all that we had done, then 

         5     no, sir, that wasn't adequate, and it would have been 

         6     prudent to drive in an easterly westerly direction, 

         7     putting that speed across the line of sight so you 

         8     get a better solution.

         9                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Okay, thank you.  

        10     You just mentioned that you thought in your mind -- 

        11     and this is really what I am trying to get from you 

        12     -- not commenting if it's right or wrong -- but you 

        13     thought your officer of the deck had the situational 

        14     awareness he required to do his job.  

        15           What led you to that conclusion? 

        16                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, I base that 

        17     on prior experience with Mr. Coen having watched him 

        18     operate as an officer of the deck, and I have always 

        19     been confident in the past that he has maintained 

        20     that situational awareness. 

        21                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Did he ever question 

        22     you or -- the word "object" is too strong -- but say, 

        23     sir, I think we need to do such-and-such prior to the 

        24     next step -- did any of that type of interchange with 

        25     you? 

         1                     THE WITNESS:   No sir.  No dialogue, 

         2     not pertaining to ship maneuvers which would have 

         3     enhanced target. 

         4                     RADM SULLIVAN:   I am just talking 

         5     about during the evolution itself of angles and 

         6     dangles. 

         7                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  No 

         8     discussion. 

         9     BY RADM SULLIVAN:   

        10     Q     I would like to continue to walk down the 

        11     timeline.  

        12           After the high speed maneuvers, which ended 

        13     with you, I believe, being at 400 feet coming up to 

        14     prepare to clear baffles at 150 feet. 

        15           Can you give me what -- or I will ask it this 

        16     way.  Can you describe what direction you gave Mr. 

        17     Coen at this point? 

        18     A     Yes, sir.  I told Mr. Coen that I wanted him to 

        19     make preparations to proceed to periscope depth and 

        20     get to periscope depth in five minutes.  

        21           I told him that knowing that that would be a 

        22     goal, an objective for him. 

        23           He's a very thorough officer, and if I had left 

        24     it to his own accord without giving him an objective 

        25     to work towards, which was brief, I understand that 

         1     -- and facts have also shown that he didn't achieve 

         2     that accomplishment, he didn't make it to periscope 

         3     depth in five minutes, but I was trying to convey to 

         4     Mr. Coen my desire to move through this evolution 

         5     efficiently. 

         6     Q     To get from 400 feet to periscope depth, in 

         7     five minutes it's certainly achievable, but how 

         8     difficult is that to do?

         9     A     Sir, it wasn't 400 feet, we were at 150 feet, 

        10     when I gave that order.  I didn't time him.  I want 

        11     you to get to periscope depth -- I don't recall 

        12     telling him, I want you to get to periscope depth in 

        13     five minutes with the ship at 400 feet. 

        14     Q     But even so, let's take it from there -- during 

        15     that five minutes, how hard is that to do?

        16     A     That's aggressive, sir. 

        17     Q     For someone of his seniority, I would -- I 

        18     don't think -- or at least in my opinion I will ask 

        19     you yours -- his ability to be able to perform that 

        20     after having just slowed down, after reestablishing 

        21     his situational awareness, your ship's situational 

        22     awareness, how difficult is that? 

        23     A     For this scenario, Admiral, I considered that 

        24     to be achievable, and that was based on, I need to 

        25     give you a little bit more information here. 

         1           When we performed the large angles and dangles, 

         2     I explained to the visitors and passed on the 1MC the 

         3     importance of having the ship stowed for sea.  

         4     Unfortunately, the little can that I had that my 

         5     daughter made in my state room -- (indiscernable)  -- 

         6     so after we secured from the angles and dangles, I 

         7     told Mr. Coen, come up to 150 feet, and slow down.  

         8     He ordered full bell, and I said, no, ring up ahead 

         9     two-thirds.        

        10           I went into my state room, put them back in the 

        11     can, and put it on the shelf adjacent to my desk.  

        12           At that point, I walked forward in the main 

        13     passageway, and I am pointing here to Exhibit 6, and 

        14     entered the sonar room as I had done, prior to the 

        15     angles and dangles, entered through the forward door, 

        16     stopped by again and inquired as to the contact 

        17     picture, and observed that Petty Officer Bowie was 

        18     making his record to Petty Officer McGiboney that 

        19     they were regaining the previous contacts.  

        20           I then exited the sonar room and came back into 

        21     the control room, and assumed the position here on 

        22     the forward starboard side of the conn, and gave Mr. 

        23     Coen that direction. 

        24     Q     So when you were in sonar, that was when the 

        25     ship was regained its ability to see the contacts? 

         1     A     Yes, sir.  That's when we were slowing and 

         2     coming shallower to 150 feet. 

         3     Q     And no maneuvers had been conducted other than 

         4     a change in depth?

         5     A     No, no, maneuvers other than slowing and 

         6     changing depth to 150 feet. 

         7     Q     I certainly think, through, this reading your 

         8     standing orders which are standard standing orders 

         9     for the Type Commander -- it certainly -- it's 

        10     guidance for you and direction for your juniors -- 

        11     that talk about legs, baffle clearing legs on the 

        12     order of three to five minutes.  

        13           So if I do the math, I get -- I come to the 

        14     conclusion that you put your officer of the deck in a 

        15     situation that he can't possibly do, following your 

        16     direction.  

        17           Is that a wrong assumption? 

        18     A     Sir, based on the information in my standing 

        19     orders which does say -- it's in Standing Order 6,  

        20     TMA leg should be three to five minutes, there is no 

        21     way he could have achieved that five-minute goal -- I 

        22     gave him five minutes as an incentive, as an 

        23     objective for him to work his preparatory events in 

        24     getting the ship to periscope depth so he would make 

        25     a more efficient effort in achieving that objective.  

         1           I knew that Mr. Coen couldn't get to PD in five 

         2     minutes.  I doubt that any of my experienced officer 

         3     of the decks could have gotten to PD in five 

         4     minutes. 

         5                     VADM NATHMAN:   To ask a follow-up on 

         6     that.  If Mr. Coen's reputation as being very 

         7     thorough and meticulous -- and sometimes we read 

         8     between the lines and we take that to be slow 

         9     sometimes -- I mean, its implied, it was implied by 

        10     other watchstanders -- but how is that consistent 

        11     then with, you know, you had the TMA leg 

        12     requirement.  He's obviously meticulous.  He 

        13     understands exactly your standing orders.  

        14           Did he try and reconcile your goal, and the 

        15     standing orders that he's working under because he 

        16     still has the deck, right?  He's still the officer of 

        17     the deck.  That's one question. 

        18           Then the other one is, how do you take 

        19     advantage, then, of a watchstander, particularly an 

        20     officer of the deck that is thorough, if you don't 

        21     give him the time to be thorough? 

        22                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral, Lieutenant 

        23     Coen maintained the conn and the deck throughout this 

        24     whole evolution.  He did not relinquish conn to me.   

        25          When I gave him that order to get to periscope 

         1     depth, this in that abbreviated period of time, it 

         2     was my objective to give him a goal to work towards, 

         3     knowing that that was not achievable. 

         4           How did I take advantage of Mr. Coen?  It was 

         5     not my intent to take advantage of Mr. Coen, but to 

         6     move the evolution along.  

         7           I wanted to get the ship to periscope depth to 

         8     prepare us to the MBT blow, and in hindsight, had I 

         9     given Mr. Coen and the ship control party that time, 

        10     it would have made a difference.  

        11           But at the time, in my judgment, with my 

        12     situational awareness, and what I knew the contact 

        13     position to be, or positions to be, I thought it was 

        14     a correct -- correct action. 

        15                     VADM NATHMAN:   We've had that 

        16     discussion about when you -- I thought we had this 

        17     discussion when we come out of angles and dangles, 

        18     there is a period of time to build situational 

        19     awareness.  

        20           Now, let's -- just so I can understand -- there 

        21     is a period of time then to build situational 

        22     awareness whether you are going to periscope depth or 

        23     not out of angles and dangles.  But there is also the 

        24     standing requirement to do two TMA legs in your 

        25     standing orders of three to five minutes.  So let's 

         1     go to the minimum of that.  

         2           That's three minutes on each leg, and it goes 

         3     to Admiral Sullivan's point, that is six minutes, but 

         4     that's still while you were at 150 feet.  It doesn't 

         5     include the ascent to periscope depth -- which I 

         6     don't know how long that takes -- a minute, a minute 

         7     and-a-half -- I am not sure -- a minute and-a-half?

         8                     THE WITNESS:   It could, sir.  It 

         9     could take longer depending on the ballasting of the 

        10     ship. 

        11                     VADM NATHMAN:   So I think the 

        12     minimum we are talking about there is 7 and-a-half to 

        13     8 minutes. 

        14                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir. 

        15                     VADM NATHMAN:   So can you explain to 

        16     me -- it seems like the conflict again, you have a 

        17     thorough officer of the deck that is -- you put him 

        18     into conflict with your own standing orders, although 

        19     you, as the commanding officer, can choose to 

        20     override your own standing orders, but this is a DV 

        21     embark.  This is not a tactical situation.  

        22           And so I am trying to understand what the goal 

        23     is going to do for the officer of the deck, and did 

        24     he try and reconcile what is a five-minute goal with 

        25     a easily 7 and-a-half to 8-minute evolution to do it 

         1     properly and thoroughly, which was his reputation?

         2                     THE WITNESS:   Clearly, doing the 

         3     math, not achievable.  It couldn't be done.  And I 

         4     agree with you, Admiral.  

         5           But as I stated, when I exited the sonar room 

         6     and sonar was regaining the two contacts that we had 

         7     previously held, and I addressed the fact that I had 

         8     front-loaded that situational awareness prior to the 

         9     conduct of the angles and dangles here on Exhibit 4 

        10     starting at 1316, and concluding with the end of the 

        11     large rudder turns at 1331 -- that fifteen minute 

        12     period, I considered that the contact picture had not 

        13     changed from the brief period I was in sonar.  

        14           I was wrong, Admiral.  I was wrong. 

        15                     VADM NATHMAN:   Let's go back to the 

        16     contact picture here.  You were never aware of a 

        17     course and speed of Sierra 13, right?

        18                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  Well, I was 

        19     aware of the contact range.  I tell you I can't 

        20     recall the exact course and speed, but I do remember 

        21     when I looked at the fire control display from the 

        22     line of sight diagram, that the arrow was going up.  

        23     It showed something driving towards or parallel to 

        24     the coast.  I can't tell you that I remembered it was 

        25     11 knots.  I just don't remember.

         1                     VADM NATHMAN:   Okay, but to go back 

         2     there.  I don't recall any report by the FTOW or 

         3     validation or a team -- sonar FTOW/OOD description of 

         4     the course and speed, because there was no plot on 

         5     the CEP at that time.  

         6           And I am trying to understand, so that we 

         7     haven't really reconciled or we hadn't resolved 

         8     Sierra 13's course and speed?

         9                     THE WITNESS:   That's true, Admiral.  

        10     There was no open discussion that I heard while I was 

        11     in control between the FTOW and the OOD or myself 

        12     regarding that solution. 

        13                     VADM NATHMAN:   Okay. 

        14                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Commander, to follow 

        15     on with this discussion, again, I'm trying to 

        16     understand what was going through your mind.  

        17           What was your rush?  You talked earlier about 

        18     you knew you were late, but it didn't seem to bother 

        19     you that much.  What was your rush? 

        20                     THE WITNESS:   No rush, Admiral.      

        21           Again, I gave Mr. Coen what I considered to be 

        22     a goal.  I didn't question it's achievability in 

        23     doing the math, Admiral.  But I gave him a goal, I 

        24     want you to get to periscope depth in five minutes.   

        25           I wasn't rushed.  If I had been rushed, I would 

         1     have put the photographs I signed, the DV pictures I 

         2     signed, aside.  I would have said to the XO that we 

         3     can't afford to be late, we have to hurry up and do 

         4     -- none of that was ever discussed.  I didn't say 

         5     those words.  I was not rushed, Admiral.

         6                     RADM SULLIVAN:   But commander, as a 

         7     CO of the submarine, if you say you want, you know, a 

         8     compartment painted, you know, blue and white, the 

         9     next day, it's going to be blue and white.  

        10           You know that. 

        11                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir. 

        12                     RADM SULLIVAN:   And when you say to 

        13     a young officer and his team, give him that 

        14     challenge, what I see is all the things that are only 

        15     done on Greenville according to the testimony we've 

        16     heard -- the brief, watchstanders going to periscope 

        17     depth -- was that done?

        18                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  That was not 

        19     done.  The watchstander brief was not performed. 

        20                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Was there a -- we 

        21     already discussed the lack of -- of time on each of 

        22     the TMA legs.  That wasn't done, correct?

        23                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, we didn't spend a 

        24     full three minutes on each TMA leg.  I agree with 

        25     that. 

         1                     RADM SULLIVAN:   But as Captain Kyle 

         2     showed, if you had stayed on that, the fact that you 

         3     had a fairly close contact, his bearing rate I 

         4     believe was over 10.  That would have been easily 

         5     distinguishable by anyone who was a party of your 

         6     party, correct?

         7                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.  And if I 

         8     had stayed on that leg for three minutes, and if I 

         9     had seen that leg, I would have known what that 

        10     meant, and would have taken action to respond to 

        11     that, as would have my watchstanders. 

        12                     RADM SULLIVAN:   And so your standing 

        13     orders which are from the Type Commander, both 

        14     fleets, no matter where you go in your submarine that 

        15     the United States has -- we all do it the same way.  

        16     Why did you set aside these principles that have been 

        17     founded in blood, lesons learned by people ahead of 

        18     us -- what was the rush?  Why did you give that type 

        19     of word that caused indisputably to have your watch 

        20     team forego -- not do the type of things they are 

        21     used to doing? 

        22                     THE WITNESS:   The five minute time 

        23     limit was artificially imposed by me on Mr. Coen.  

        24     Looking back at it, Admiral, that was wrong.  

        25           The second thing, as I mentioned when I exited 

         1     the sonar room and came into control, knowing that we 

         2     had regained what I thought were the two previously 

         3     held contacts to the northwest and northeast, I 

         4     didn't think that the contact picture had changed.  

         5           I was confident that those contacts remained 

         6     close along the Oahu coast, operating in that 

         7     vicinity.  And as such, I didn't have the ASVDU to 

         8     look at, and I thought that the leg that we were on, 

         9     the 340 course was long enough. 

        10           When I considered that it was long enough, it 

        11     was at that time when I told Mr. Coen, conduct your 

        12     baffle clear maneuver.  Let's come right to -- I 

        13     think I told him come right, to course 120. 

        14                     RADM SULLIVAN:   You went into sonar 

        15     and looked at the sonar display, which as we've 

        16     discussed a number of times was the only place that 

        17     was available -- you looked at it when the picture 

        18     was just starting to develop. 

        19           I thought as a commanding officer or conning 

        20     officer going to periscope depth -- the purpose of a 

        21     baffle clear was to change course to, one, unmask 

        22     possible contacts on your baffles; or second, to 

        23     force a change in bearing rate so you could see it.   

        24           And so if you didn't go back -- I am having a 

        25     hard time with this -- if you didn't go back and look 

         1     at sonar after you conducted the maneuver, what value 

         2     was it to even look at sonar? 

         3                     THE WITNESS:   The value of looking 

         4     at sonar or stopping by in sonar was to determine 

         5     what contacts sonar had.  

         6           I agree, it did not stay in sonar and pause on 

         7     that initial TMA leg.  I paused to check to see how 

         8     the sonar picture looked, to see what the sonar 

         9     supervisor and broad band operator were regaining.    

        10           They were regaining contact as the ship was 

        11     coming shallow to 150 feet, one at 150 feet, and I 

        12     considered for the time lapse -- and I can't tell you 

        13     exactly how many minutes it was -- but my gut feel 

        14     was that it had been long enough -- I then gave Mr. 

        15     Coen to come to 120 to perform the baffle clear so we 

        16     could see what was behind us.  

        17           And by coming right to course 120, it was also 

        18     my intent, Admiral, if we look at Exhibit 4, that I 

        19     provide speed across the line of sight.  Granted, not 

        20     all my speed is across the line of sight.  If I 

        21     stayed on course 90 -- 100 -- would have been or 

        22     initially being on a 340 leg, but I chose to come 

        23     right to 120.  And in doing so, I thought at the time 

        24     that I was providing an adequate speed across the 

        25     line of sight to drive any visible (?) bearing right 

         1     to the contacts that were to the northwest and to the 

         2     northeast. 

         3     Q     If you were trying to -- again, I will go back 

         4     before we proceed here. 

         5           Certainly, there are times when you have to 

         6     get to periscope depth quickly, nobody who has had 

         7     command of a submarine would disagree with that.  

         8           But I don't understand why didn't you just take 

         9     the conn from the officer of the deck if you felt you 

        10     needed to get up that quickly. 

        11     A     Sir, when a commanding officer takes the conn 

        12     from a officer of the deck, that causes embarrassment 

        13     to that officer if it's not an emergency or a 

        14     tactical problem.  

        15           I've had the conn taken away from me as a 

        16     junior officer, and that caused me great 

        17     embarrassment.  I would not do that to Mr. Coen if I 

        18     -- I would do it if I felt it was necessary, and I've 

        19     done that on one occasion in command, and once only, 

        20     where I've taken the conn, and that was to get the 

        21     ship to the surface to preclude an out-of-area 

        22     incident.  

        23           But in this case, Admiral, Mr. Coen in my mind, 

        24     watching him, was doing his job.  I unfortunately and 

        25     regrettably gave him that artificial time limit.  

         1           And knowing what I know now, if I hadn't done 

         2     that, we won't be here today having this 

         3     conversation. 

         4                     RADM SULLIVAN:   But captain, I 

         5     think I agree with what you said, but there is more 

         6     to it.  When you put your officer of the deck, your 

         7     representative, in a situation that's over his head, 

         8     or he's incapable you have an obligation as a 

         9     commanding officer to assume that responsibility, and 

        10     as Admiral Konetzni talked about a few days ago, when 

        11     you decided to put it on your shoulders, you'd better 

        12     be right.

        13                     THE WITNESS:   And Admiral, I was 

        14     wrong. 

        15                     RADM SULLIVAN:   During this baffle 

        16     clear a new contact emerged near the end of the 340 

        17     leg, as I recall.  Sierra 14.  

        18           Based on your ship's track, there was no 

        19     further analysis other than continuing to -- which 

        20     you had directed as a course to clear baffles at 120 

        21     -- can you shed some light on why you wouldn't have 

        22     done extra TMA to resolve that target's ranging?

        23                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, Admiral, it 

        24     wasn't clear to me that Sierra 14 was a new contact.  

        25     And the reason for it is -- and again, you know, if I 

         1     had had the ASVDU on the conn, I could have seen 12, 

         2     13 -- all the other numbers. 

         3           You know, because I didn't have that, I didn't 

         4     have that Sierra number ingrained in my brain.  I 

         5     remembered here, pointing to Exhibit 4, before we 

         6     commenced the angles and dangles.  I had two 

         7     contacts -- one in the northwest and you one in the 

         8     northeast.  If I had the ASVDU, I would have known 

         9     those Sierra numbers.  But I didn't.  

        10           As such, when we made the maneuver on the 

        11     course at 120, and sonar reported I had two contacts, 

        12     and from the testimony I heard Sierra 14 Sierra 13 --  

        13     it was two contacts, and I didn't recognize it as a 

        14     new number.  And that's the problem.  If I had 

        15     recognized it, I would have acted upon it, and I 

        16     don't think it was clear to the officer of the deck 

        17     either.  Why, because not having the ASVDU, it 

        18     handicapped us.

        19                     VADM NATHMAN:   You've testified 

        20     before that you've had problems with the ASVDU 

        21     before, it's gone out of commission?

        22                     THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir. 

        23                     VADM NATHMAN:   So I assume it's 

        24     happened to you while you were underway doing 

        25     training, you're being tactical, and I assume you've 

         1     also had a lot more contacts than three at a time.    

         2           So there is something about you know the way 

         3     you are brought up -- you are brought up as a 

         4     submariner, you have had a lot of experience as 

         5     officer of the deck, experiences at XO, experiences 

         6     at department head, experiences at junior officer, 

         7     and one of the things -- anyone that on a bridge or 

         8     has the deck, works a lot -- when you get a new 

         9     contact, particularly in your world -- that Sierra 14 

        10     is like a bell going off.  It's like a gong.  It's 

        11     got to go -- a gong going off in the head of the 

        12     people in control.  So when that gong goes off, it 

        13     seems to me that that doesn't quite reconcile the 

        14     fact that, well, I don't have the ASVDU.  I've 

        15     operated without the ASVDU before, and high density 

        16     contacts before without the ASVDU.  

        17           Now you are in low contact density.  Now you 

        18     got a contact, and no bell goes off?

        19                     THE WITNESS:   Admiral -- I stated 

        20     that the ASVDU has failed before.  When that occurs, 

        21     the ship does two things.  You remain deep and repair 

        22     it, or you come to periscope depth where you have 

        23     your ability to determine your contacts and fix it 

        24     there.  

        25           I can't tell you exactly what we did when it 

         1     broke the previous time.  It may have happened when 

         2     we were in port.  But your point is well made.  

         3           When the new contacts Sierra 14 was gained, the 

         4     sonar supervisor knew that, the broad band operator 

         5     knew that.  I dare say that that unqualified 

         6     under-instruction watch knew that, as well as my 

         7     FTOW.  The teamwork broke.  No one raised the flag.  

         8     No one said, hey, we need to get another leg of data 

         9     on this guy.

        10                     VADM NATHMAN:   Let me understand the 

        11     teamwork here then.  

        12           Sonar made that report -- that's part of the -- 

        13     so they made a report.  The FTOW acted on it, in 

        14     terms of -- you said he got distracted trying to 

        15     prosecute Sierra 14 -- yesterday in his testimony, 

        16     spent a lot of time, we were trying to work out that 

        17     fire control solution.

        18           He spent less and less time on Sierra 13.  

        19           So what was the conn doing?  What was the 

        20     officer of the deck and you doing with Sierra 14? 

        21           I'm sure -- Lieutenant Junior Coen heard it.  

        22     You said you didn't hear it.  But how did the conn 

        23     react to the new report?  Did he mention to you, 

        24     captain, we've got a new contact, we need another 

        25     leg?

         1                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  The officer 

         2     of the deck didn't mention that I recognize the new 

         3     contact and we need another leg.  What I know I 

         4     thought -- two contacts going into the baffle clear 

         5     maneuver, two contacts coming out, the same guys.  

         6           I was wrong.  

         7           If the fire control technician of the watch had 

         8     recognized this as a new contact, as well as the 

         9     sonar supervisor, I would have expected some backup 

        10     when the next conn proceed to periscope depth, 

        11     knowing we've done no TMA maneuver on this guy to 

        12     determine the contact range and whether or not this 

        13     guy is close or far away.