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1 DAY 12 SESSION 9 MARCH 20, 2001
2 ---oOo---
3 VADM NATHMAN: But you testified
4 that Papa Hotel didn't really -- time didn't really
5 matter.
6 So is this consistent -- what you just said
7 with that, because it seems to me like if Papa Hotel
8 was really important, was it important to get the
9 officer of the deck on the bridge 30 minutes or 40
10 minutes from now -- so what's the rush?
11 THE WITNESS: I am not trying to
12 communicate that there was a rush.
13 My desire was to get the submarine through the
14 scheduled events and back on the surface, and do that
15 in a manner where we didn't waddle. I didn't want to
16 delay or waste any more time. I wanted to get the
17 submarine back to the surface.
18 VADM NATHMAN: I'll leave it at
19 that.
20 RADM SULLIVAN: Commander, during
21 this portion of the chain of events, did you have any
22 discussions with your XO -- did he give you any
23 counsel, other than I believe early on he mentioned
24 you were running late, in his unsworn something --
25 something to the effect -- this is you speaking --
183
1 I've got a handle on it, don't worry, or something
2 like that -- did you have any communications with him
3 or anything like that?
4 THE WITNESS: I remember the XO --
5 and I don't remember the exact time -- but when we
6 were having lunch, between the 10:45 and 11:45
7 period, I don't remember if someone came in to speak
8 for him, but it was kind of like a cue, Captain, make
9 sure you move the meal along, you know, you are at
10 the coffee at the dessert point, and really, we
11 should be at the point where the second seating is
12 started.
13 I didn't meet with the XO to discuss the events
14 that afternoon, but when I did leave the state room,
15 he did express concern over us getting back to Pearl
16 Harbor on time and completing the afternoon agenda.
17 And it was at that point where I may have said
18 to him, hey, I've got it under control, or I know
19 what I am doing -- I don't remember the words that I
20 said -- but I do know that I wanted to get the
21 photographs signed. I had 17 of them to take care
22 of, and each one took, you know, more than five
23 minutes. So my desire was to do that during the
24 second sitting before we commenced the afternoon
25 events.
184
1 RADM SULLIVAN: Back to the
2 periscope search, and your use of the periscope.
3 As a submariner, both of us know that one of
4 the marks of a commanding officer is his ability to
5 operate the periscope.
6 And it isn't until you are fairly senior that
7 you are really efficient at operating the periscope
8 because it's a difficult instrument, and particularly
9 in the light that you are looking through the
10 periscope, as a commanding officer your crew and
11 anyone else that is on board -- their safety is in
12 your hands through your eyes.
13 You are the only one that can see.
14 And the evolution that you are about ready to
15 execute here, you are doing an emergency blow -- you
16 are in a way almost obligated to take it a step
17 further, because you have to worry about the safety
18 of any surface contact that might be within the
19 area.
20 And one of the things I'd like you to try to
21 help me with is -- and certainly you are the skipper
22 at the time -- is based on what the search that you
23 did -- I don't quite understand how that could be
24 considered adequate to allow you to leave periscope
25 depth even rapidly as you did, to come back up to the
185
1 surface with an emergency blow, knowing that it was
2 safe to do so, that you had no contacts that were
3 endangered.
4 Can you shed some light on that -- why you
5 didn't come up higher, why didn't you search longer?
6 This is an obligation that you, as the commanding
7 officer, before executing this maneuver have had to
8 have thought through.
9 THE WITNESS: I did think through
10 it, sir. With the report that sonar held two
11 contacts to the northwest and the northeast, and I
12 held no visual contacts when I did my search, and
13 that sonar did not hold contacts to the south of our
14 position, and also from historical experience,
15 knowing that if a sailboat is in the area, and could
16 I call or have the other exhibit brought up, please,
17 that shows the navigation chart?
18 I am talking about Exhibit 17.
19 Sailing vessels that operate in this area from
20 my experience are in the vicinity of Kaena Point and,
21 also operate sometimes over by Diamond Head, but that
22 is dependent on the time of year -- but with the ship
23 at periscope depth, in our operating area, I was able
24 to look down to the south -- southeast, southwest --
25 as I am showing you here on Exhibit 17, and confirmed
186
1 that I held no contacts visually.
2 I knew sonar had no indications of motor noise
3 or engine noise, so my threat access was to the north
4 in the direction of Oahu.
5 I did my visual search down the line of
6 bearings where I knew contacts to be.
7 Sailing vessels do in fact transit between
8 Molokai, Oahu, and from Oahu up to Kauai. But I saw
9 no sailing vessels on that day, on that Friday.
10 Most of them are out on weekends if they are
11 having regattas. So I focused my search area in the
12 area here through the Molokai Channel and Kaena
13 Point. I saw nothing and at the time. I saw it was
14 adequate.
15 To get to the second part, am I obligated to
16 take it a step further to ensure that the area is
17 safe and that there are no contacts?
18 I thought, Admiral, when I ordered the ship to
19 come shallow that that was adequate. Certainly, a
20 higher look, a higher look that is perhaps even
21 broaching the ship, in hindsight, would have been the
22 right thing to do.
23 In hindsight, the chances of me picking up the
24 Ehime Maru visually would have increased
25 significantly.
187
1 RADM SULLIVAN: One final question
2 before I turn it to Admiral Stone.
3 When you looked through the periscope on the
4 9th was your vision impaired?
5 THE WITNESS: No, sir. My vision
6 was not impaired.
7 RADM SULLIVAN: You were able to see
8 a clear picture?
9 THE WITNESS: Sir, I noticed a haze
10 -- again, I specified that when I looked up -- and I
11 am pointing here on Exhibit 17 in the direction of
12 Oahu -- I couldn't -- it was like if there was a
13 white belt along the land mass, and I could see the
14 prominent peaks of land here on Oahu, on the Waianae
15 Mountain range, and up here by the Koolaus, but I
16 couldn't see the airport, I couldn't see the Honolulu
17 buildings.
18 I did in fact see I think Diamond Head, if I
19 saw the -- the -- I can't remember if I saw that or
20 not.
21 But I do know that I saw land, the tops of the
22 peak, and the white belt around the island. I didn't
23 know if that was in and around my operating area but
24 I did notice what was a haze -- gray clouds almost a
25 hundred percent overcast.
188
1 RADM SULLIVAN: But your vision was
2 not an issue?
3 THE WITNESS: No, sir. When the
4 ship came up, a couple of feet -- oh, my actual
5 vision? No, sir. My vision wasn't impaired. I
6 could focus the diopter on the periscope and set it
7 to where I can see the radical. That's one of the
8 first things that I do when I take the scope, I look
9 and focus on the radical.
10 I look at it so that it's a sharp line -- that
11 I could see that. Knowing that, then I am focused
12 properly, and I can look out and see the field of
13 view.
14 RADM SULLIVAN: Thank you.
15 VADM NATHMAN: Admiral Stone.
16 RADM STONE: I will make a comment
17 before I get into my questions about the periscope
18 search.
19 And the comment is that when I evaluate or look
20 at how the boat proceeded to periscope depth, the
21 inadequate TMA legs, the abbreviated time frame to
22 get up to periscope depth -- we've heard that sort of
23 testimony over the last twelve days, and people will
24 occasionally end up by saying, oh well, we got there
25 safely.
189
1 Well, my comment to that would be, you're lucky
2 that you got there safely, based on the abbreviated
3 preparations that were made. And so that's the
4 context that I am going into now.
5 My questions concerning the periscope search
6 that followed getting up to periscope depth.
7 For me, personally, as a court member, this is
8 the most part for me is the periscope search,
9 because so many of the other things are based on the
10 chief of the boat, chopping the watch bill, other
11 folks providing you backup. But the periscope search
12 decision on the depth that the boat would be at for
13 it and the duration of the search -- those two items
14 -- as a court member -- are the focus of my concern
15 about the commanding officer's judgment on 9
16 February.
17 And I say that knowing that the FTOW had some
18 information available that would have cued you
19 towards what I will call an acoustic contact which
20 Ehime Maru was.
21 In other words, that is a factor that goes into
22 the search, the acoustic contacts that are shared, as
23 well as ESM, if there is radar once you get up to
24 periscope depth.
25 But to me, those are all lesser included cases
190
1 of the requirement for the commanding officer to
2 search for items that are not acoustic, as well and
3 the requirement to look out to a range that is safe
4 and prudent. And it's for the court to decide
5 whether that meets criteria whether that is reckless
6 or negligent, and that is for further discussion and
7 deliberation, but it's an important aspect for me as
8 a court member is was that a safe and prudent
9 judgment for the commanding officer of Greenville to
10 come to 58 feet and search for approximately 80
11 seconds, when in fact, there could have been a
12 sailboat out there half the size of Ehime Maru with
13 35 to 50 people on board, going on a course of 166 or
14 11 knots only 24 hundred yards away, and the search
15 is inadequate for that.
16 And so, it causes me to think very deeply about
17 what sort of prudent and safe search is that by a CO
18 of a submarine, if you can't even pick up the Ehime
19 Maru at 24 hundred yards, that doesn't relieve that
20 CO the responsibility to come to a depth to look at a
21 great range for other non-acoustic contacts that are
22 carrying human beings on board.
23 And so I say to you, I am very interested in
24 your comment on prudent and safety searches, and this
25 coming to only 58 feet for 80 seconds, because it's
191
1 not registering for me in how you can assure yourself
2 that there is no sailboat out there with 50 people on
3 board prior to hurling a 69 hundred ton submarine
4 through the ocean.
5 THE WITNESS: Sir, the question
6 that I take away from your comment there addresses
7 the issue of prudent and safety searches, and the
8 issue of 58 feet for 80 seconds. Is that correct,
9 sir?
10 RADM STONE: And particularly, this
11 issue of the sailboat the fifty people -- you didn't
12 meet my criteria -- if you think that's an unfair
13 criteria you need to take measures to see those types
14 of contacts, and therefore, if you were doing that
15 you would see the Ehime Maru.
16 THE WITNESS: Sir, I will say that I
17 focused my sector search in the direction I knew I
18 would turn the ship to perform the emergency blow.
19 When I conducted the emergency deep or ordered
20 the emergency deep, it was my intent -- I didn't
21 vocalize that -- to reverse course, to go back in the
22 area where I had just completed my dedicated search,
23 I am pointing to Exhibit 17.
24 When the ship came shallow up to 58 feet and it
25 actually came shallower to that -- at least what I
192
1 thought I saw on the periscope -- the periscope is at
2 64 feet, and the keel depth is 60. I know what four
3 feet looks like when the ship surged up as we rose up
4 through 58 feet, I don't recall what the diving
5 officer recalled, but I remember thinking to myself,
6 oh, this is a good look, I can look down and see the
7 wave tops.
8 When that occurred, I panned to the right.
9 I didn't see any of the contacts that I thought
10 I would see or that I expected to see.
11 In my mind, I had conducted an adequate sector
12 search looking for non-acoustic contacts, that was in
13 fact in the back of my mind, and when I satisfied
14 myself that I met that requirement, I moved on with
15 the evolution.
16 VADM NATHMAN: Did you want to
17 proceed to DV? I have some distinguished visitor
18 questions for you.
19 In your opinion, did the distinguished visitors
20 impact your ability to safely complete your mission
21 on 9 February?
22 THE WITNESS: No, sir. They did
23 not.
24 RADM STONE: Do you have any
25 comments that you think should be known to the court
193
1 concerning the role of the DVs on 9 February?
2 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I do not.
3 RADM STONE: No further questions.
4 VADM NATHMAN: The court will recess
5 until 14:45
6 (Short recess taken.)
7 VADM NATHMAN: This court is now in
8 session. Counsel for the court.
9 CAPT MACDONALD: Let the record
10 reflect that the members, counsel and the parties are
11 again present.
12 CAPT MACDONALD: The court has no
13 procedural matters.
14 MR. GITTINS: No, sir.
15 LCDR STONE: No, sir.
16 LCDR FILBERT: No, sir.
17 VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for Lt. Cmdr
18 Pfeifer.
19 LCDR STONE: Sir, we have no
20 questions.
21 VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for Mr. Coen.
22 LCDR FILBERT: Thank you, sir.
23 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY LCDR FILBERT:
24 Q Commander Waddle, I would like to begin by
25 asking you some questions about the training of
194
1 Lieutenant Coen.
2 Now, it's my understanding that you and
3 Lieutenant Coen were both on board Greenville at
4 roughly the same time; is that correct?
5 A I took command of Greenville on March 19th of
6 1999, and had the opportunity to welcome Lieutenant
7 Coen and his wife, Wendy, newlyweds, about a month or
8 two after my assumption of command.
9 Q For the time then that Lieutenant Coen reported
10 on board until the time of the unfortunate collision,
11 you would have been responsible for his training his
12 overall training during that period?
13 A That is correct.
14 Q And so, the process of qualifying as an officer
15 of the deck, you were overseeing that as the
16 commanding officer during that period?
17 A I would like to think of myself as well as the
18 executive officer who served almost a year of that
19 time, as well as his mentor.
20 Q Okay. And then, ultimately, of course, you had
21 to sign off, certify him as a qualified OOD?
22 A I did.
23 Q And the same for when he was awarded his
24 dolfins, as well?
25 A That is correct.
195
1 Q Now --
2 A -- Clarifying that I certified that Mr. Coen
3 has completed the prerequisites for being awarded the
4 covetted submarine dolfins, and make that
5 recommendation to my boss the Commodore of Submarine
6 Squadron One, who then in forwards that to the Type
7 Commander. It's ultimately the Type Commander that
8 awards the submarine dolfins to Lieutenant Coen.
9 Q I understand.
10 Now, I wanted to ask you some questions about
11 after Lieutenant Coen became qualified. I guess even
12 before -- when he was standing watch as a junior
13 officer of the deck, or any kind of UI watch in
14 control, are you aware of any time where he was on
15 watch in control when the ASVDU was out of
16 commission?
17 A No, I am not. I can't recollect or recall
18 whether that condition existed.
19 Q Do you recall any specific discussions with
20 Lieutenant Coen at any time regarding what should be
21 done if the ASVDU were to be out of commission?
22 A No, I did not specifically address that.
23 I would like to preface it though by saying
24 that in the course of Lt Coen's training, as well as
25 that of other officers, he has been exposed to ship's
196
1 casualties and drills, which would cause him to
2 exercise judgment and demonstrate that he could
3 overcome obstacles.
4 Q I understand. But specifically, the ASVDU was
5 never brought up by you?
6 A No, not the ASVDU.
7 Q Now, I wanted to ask you some questions moving
8 on to another area, regarding the time leading up to
9 periscope depth.
10 Now, I believe you testified -- and we've heard
11 from several people -- that Lieutenant Coen was a
12 methodical and meticulous watchstander?
13 A He was and is.
14 Q Now, we know that Lieutenant Coen did not have
15 his pre-brief with the watchstanders that is I
16 believe in your standing orders.
17 Let's say that you had not given this
18 five-minute goal for Lieutenant Coen to get to
19 periscope depth. Do you think that Lieutenant Coen
20 -- and he was the one -- let's say he was the one
21 running the show and in control -- you believe that
22 Lieutenant Coen would have conducted that brief?
23 A Yes.
24 Q And the report that's given to you by the
25 officer of the deck regarding coming to periscope
197
1 depth that contains information regarding contacts
2 and bearings and that sort of thing -- you believe
3 Lieutenant Coen would have given that report?
4 A Yes, I do.
5 Q And regarding the periscope search that was
6 done, if you had not stepped in and taken the scope,
7 would it be your belief, based upon Lieutenant Coen
8 and what you know about him, that he would have
9 conducted the search in accordance with your standing
10 orders?
11 A No doubt in my mind.
12 Q Now, as far as the way things went with
13 Lieutenant Coen from angles and dangles up to the
14 time of the collision -- I believe you said when you
15 were being asked questions earlier, that when you
16 came into control before angles and dangles, that you
17 told Lieutenant Coen what you wanted to do, which was
18 to conduct angles and dangles; is that right?
19 A That is correct.
20 I told Lieutenant Coen shortly after arriving
21 in the control room from sonar that I wanted him to
22 ensure the ship was stowed and rigged to support
23 angles and dangles.
24 And I asked him -- and I may have directed it
25 to the chief of the watch -- to make sure that the
198
1 galley was properly stowed. So I certainly
2 communicated to him that the next event that I was
3 looking toward was ship's angles and dangles.
4 Q Now after that time, once the angles began, I
5 think you said earlier that from then on, really your
6 relationship with Lieutenant Coen was directive in
7 nature, that you would tell him what you wanted, and
8 that he would carry out that order?
9 A That's correct. As I was standing on the conn
10 -- could we pull up the other exhibit please that
11 shows the orientation of the control room?
12 I am talking about Exhibit 6.
13 I positioned myself in between Number 1 and
14 Number 2 periscopes, right here behind, the stand.
15 Lieutenant Coen positioned himself on the port side
16 of the conn where he would have direct view of the
17 ship control party in that evolution. I am talking
18 again about Exhibit 6.
19 Q Right. Well, let's talk overall.
20 From the time that the angles began until the
21 time of collision -- that was my question -- that you
22 were -- that this directive relationship between you
23 and Lieutenant Coen existed?
24 A I communicated to Lieutenant Coen what I
25 desired, as far as ship maneuvers and changing
199
1 course, speed, and depth.
2 Q And then he would carry out that order by
3 issuing to the watchstander?
4 A He did, indeed.
5 Q So during this period up to the time of the
6 collision, there weren't any discussions between you
7 and Lieutenant Coen about, this is what I want to do,
8 and then later on to give him the order or conferring
9 with him about what he thought should happen -- it
10 was simply you telling him what you wanted to have
11 done, and then he would issue the order?
12 A I gave no other direction to Lieutenant Coen
13 other than to change your depth, with this angle,
14 come left or right at this speed or at this ordered
15 bell -- but an opportunity existed for Mr. Coen to
16 provide me with any concern that he may have had, but
17 it was very clear from my perspective that I told Mr.
18 Coen what I wanted him to do as far as employing the
19 ship.
20 Q My question was you weren't conferring with
21 him, though, about what you thought should be done or
22 you didn't ask him for an input on what should be
23 done?
24 A Correct. There was no discussion or request
25 for that information.
200
1 Q And that existed even after the time that you
2 gave him this five-minute goal to get to periscope
3 depth?
4 A That is correct.
5 LCDR FILBERT: Thank you, sir. I
6 don't have any other questions.
7 VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for Commander
8 Waddle, redirect?
9 MR. GITTINS: I just have one
10 question, sir.
11 Commander Waddle, the bottles of salt water,
12 sea water that were retrieved on this DV cruise --
13 did you have an indication of test depth line?
14 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
15 MR. GITTINS: Was it words or number
16 that was indicated on that?
17 THE WITNESS: Words, no numbers.
18 And I can't even recall on this particular incident
19 if the word "test depth" was on there. I just don't
20 remember. It may have been, the date, and that a
21 water sample was collected.
22 For that matter of fact, I can't -- I can't
23 confirm that we had the word "test depth." I think
24 we had the word "test depth" on a prior DV cruise,
25 but I know that numbers were not annotated on the
201
1 bottom.
2 MR. GITTINS: That's all I have,
3 sir.
4 VADM NATHMAN: Before the court
5 hears arguments, does counsel for the court have any
6 additional evidence to present?
7 CAPT MACDONALD: No, sir.
8 VADM NATHMAN: Do any of the parties
9 have any additional evidence to be presented?
10 LCDR STONE: No, sir.
11 LCDR FILBERT: No, sir.
12 VADM NATHMAN: Are there any other
13 procedural matters to discuss before hearing
14 arguments?
15 CAPT MACDONALD: Sir, could we have
16 Commander Waddle step down off the witness stand?
17 VADM NATHMAN: Sure.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
19 CAPT MACDONALD: Thank you,
20 Commander Waddle.
21 VADM NATHMAN: Very well. The
22 court is now ready for arguments from the parties.
23 We are going to proceed in the same manner in
24 which the court received evidence from the parties.
25 Counsel for Mr. Coen will be given the first
202
1 opportunity to give arguments, followed by counsel
2 for Commander Pfeifer and counsel for Commander
3 Waddle.
4 LCDR FILBERT: I would like to
5 present argument at this time, but I want to make
6 sure that if we begin argument today that we will --
7 does it look realistic to complete all the arguments
8 before we close for today?
9 VADM NATHMAN: Counsel do you have
10 any comments?
11 CAPT MACDONALD: Why don't we just
12 go around to the parties. And Commander Filbert, how
13 long do you think your argument is going to take?
14 LCDR STONE: Half an hour, sir, no
15 more than that, sir.
16 CAPT MACDONALD: Mr. Gittins?
17 MR. GITTINS: Half, to an hour. I
18 would be hard pressed to give an exact time.
19 CAPT MACDONALD: Mr. President, I
20 would recommend that we simply continue, and take all
21 arguments today.
22 VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for Mr. Coen.
23 LCDR FILBERT: Thank you.
24 FINAL ARGUMENTS BY LCDR FILBERT:
25 Members of the court.
203
1 This Court of Inquiry was convened primarily
2 to answer two questions -- and I don't know if there
3 were other questions presented, but really two
4 questions for this Court of Inquiry.
5 And the first was, why did USS Greenville
6 collide with Ehime Maru on 9 February? Why did this
7 tragic thing happen where lives were lost? That's
8 the first question.
9 And the second question is, what should happen
10 to these officers, to the parties named in this Court
11 of Inquiry?
12 Those are the two central questions.
13 Now, with regard to the first question, with
14 regard to the first question -- why the ships
15 collided -- we've heard a fair amount of complicated
16 testimony over the last two and-a-half weeks
17 regarding submarine operations.
18 But the question really has a very simple
19 answer. It has a human answer. And the answer to
20 that question is, the commanding officer, Commander
21 Waddle, rushed himself and he rushed his crew, and
22 every factor that directly contributed to the
23 collision comes back to that very basic fact.
24 Now I say that -- I say that, but I don't mean
25 in saying that that Lieutenant Coen didn't make some
204
1 mistakes, because he did. And the evidence showed
2 that.
3 And in saying that, I also don't mean that
4 Commander Waddle was a bad commanding officer. It's
5 not my place to discuss that. And what I say is not
6 meant to disparage him in any way in a personal
7 manner, but looking at the evidence that was
8 presented during this court, during this Court of
9 Inquiry, the evidence was clear that Commander Waddle
10 rushed himself, he rushed his crew, he got ahead of
11 his crew, including Lieutenant Coen, and the crew
12 couldn't catch up, and they couldn't provide the
13 fundamental backup that is expected for safe
14 submarine operations.
15 And that's essentially what caused this
16 collision.
17 Now, what were the events leading up to the
18 collision with respect to Lieutenant Coen?
19 We know that he assumed the watch as officer of
20 the deck at about 11:45.
21 And from that time forward, until angles began,
22 it was a fairly uneventful watch, and that's not to
23 say that he didn't have responsibilities regarding
24 contacts and that sort of thing, because obviously he
25 did. But the contact picture was light. There were
205
1 three contacts held during that period -- Sierra 10,
2 Sierra 12, and Sierra 13.
3 For most of that time, those three contacts
4 were held. The contacts were considered to be
5 distant by fire control and by sonar. And the ship
6 was operating at a depth -- at a depth of 400 feet or
7 below, primarily heading north during that time.
8 Now, could Lieutenant Coen have done a better
9 job of staying on top of the contact picture and
10 making sure that he knew -- had a better idea about
11 the range and course of those contacts?
12 And the answer to that question is yes. He
13 could have done a better job during that period.
14 But a couple of things are important to
15 remember about that. One is the sense of urgency
16 while the submarine was going north, as far as the
17 contacts wasn't there at that point.
18 They are at a depth of 400 feet below,
19 Lieutenant Coen knows they are going to be coming to
20 periscope depth at some later point, and assume they
21 are going to do a sufficient TMA to get a good
22 contact picture. He knows that's going to happen.
23 We also know that he was aware that regarding
24 angles, he needed to be on top of the contacts
25 because before the angles began, he went to Petty
206
1 Officer Brown and said, Petty Officer Brown, you need
2 to let me know if any of these contacts are getting
3 close. And he did that -- if you look at Lieutenant
4 Coen's statement -- shortly before angles began.
5 So he's aware yes, I need to know if any of
6 these contacts are getting close if my SA changes
7 regarding the contacts, so he's thinking about it
8 during the time leading up to the angles.
9 Could have done a better job, yes.
10 But at this time, the watch is quiet, and it's
11 not like what would happen later on with regard to
12 coming to periscope depth and the things that
13 happened there.
14 Now, it was during this time that the CEP began
15 to fall apart, and I want to talk about just for a
16 moment. Based on the evidence presented regarding
17 the CEP, we know that shortly before 13:00 that the
18 last contact was put on the CEP. And the last course
19 was put on about 1306. And I think as the members go
20 back and look at the CEP, that will become very
21 clear.
22 So at that time, Petty Officer Seacrest really
23 starts falling off the job, as far as that goes.
24 Now was it lieutenant Coen's responsibility to
25 monitor the CEP? Absolutely, yes. Absolutely, a
207
1 hundred percent.
2 But it's important to remember what was going
3 on during that time in control.
4 At that time, at that time in control, that's
5 when the civilians are coming in. And as you can see
6 from Exhibit 6, they are starting to get right in
7 front of the CEP, starting to get right in front of
8 the CEP. So it would be difficult for Lieutenant
9 Coen to have seen what was going on, particularly as
10 we are getting near the angles, and his attention is
11 more over by the ship's control party, and during
12 angles, he's going to be over there, and during the
13 high-speed turn, the same thing.
14 And I think if the members assess the type
15 officer Lieutenant Coen is -- methodical, meticulous,
16 on top of the books -- that if he saw the CEP, he
17 would have corrected it, and we heard that from the
18 witnesses who testified in court, including Petty
19 Officer Seacrest, who said, absolutely, he would have
20 corrected that.
21 And Petty Officer Seacrest -- his explanation
22 was not good enough, but from Lieutenant Coen, where
23 while he's responsible, there are some reasons that
24 didn't happen.
25 So we know what happened after that.
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1 The commanding officer -- Commander Waddle who
2 just testified -- comes in and says, we are going to
3 do angles. And then, from that point forward, when
4 he comes and says, we're going to do angles, the
5 relationship or what Lieutenant Coen is doing really
6 changes.
7 He is directed from that point forward until
8 the time of that collision -- he's directed from that
9 time forward to the time of the collision, and that's
10 important to remember because Lieutenant Coen -- it's
11 a tough position for a junior officer to be in, and
12 the thing that has to be running through his mind
13 during that time is, where exactly do I fit in here?
14 Where do I fit in?
15 I know I am supposed to be giving the orders to
16 the officer of the deck, and I know that I am trained
17 to analyze that, and do the best I can, but it's
18 tough. It's a tough position for a junior officer,
19 and there is no conferring, no discussions, none of
20 those things are going on.
21 He is simply waiting for the next order. He
22 needs to be ready for it -- he probably needs to be
23 pretty close to the CO to make sure he understands
24 what is going on with regard to the borders.
25 So the angles and high speed maneuvers are
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1 completed, and coming out of that, the CO says to the
2 -- to Lieutenant Coen -- I want to be at PD in five
3 minutes. I want to be at PD in five minutes, and as
4 we've heard today, an impossible role to meet for an
5 officer of the deck.
6 Now, we heard Commander Waddle say that the
7 reason that he said that was for training purposes
8 for Lieutenant Coen, to make him more efficient, and
9 I guess the assumption is Lieutenant Coen as Admiral
10 Nathman said between the lines is, this is a guy who
11 takes his time, and may be a little bit slower than
12 the other OD in doing things, so this goal was put
13 out there.
14 But members of the court, if you look at what
15 actually happened as far as that goal goes, this was
16 not very good training, because it wasn't Lieutenant
17 Coen who took the ship to periscope depth, really, it
18 was the commanding officer.
19 He's the one who issued all the orders, really
20 generated all the orders that led to going to
21 periscope depth. So any training value for
22 Lieutenant Coen during that period wasn't there, and
23 it tells you what was really going on, which was the
24 commanding officer was rushing. He was pushing for
25 whatever reason, he was pushing to get things
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1 done, and leaving behind people like Lieutenant
2 Coen.
3 The most important person during this evolution
4 as far as what's going on with the commanding
5 officer. So this idea of this is a goal for
6 training, doesn't make any sense. And the commanding
7 officer got the ship to periscope depth, and
8 obviously, I am not qualified in submarines, but six
9 minutes sounds awfully fast. It sounds awful fast.
10 And we know what happened from there.
11 Periscope depth. Emergency deep. Emergency
12 blow. And the collision occurs.
13 So, I said at the beginning when I started
14 talking, that the commanding officer rushed.
15 Well, how do we know the commanding officer
16 rushed? How do we know he was rushing and he left
17 his crew behind as far as what kind of backup they
18 could provide?
19 Well, Commander Waddle talked about there was
20 no reason for him to rush. No purpose. None of
21 that.
22 And in a way, he's right, because it doesn't
23 make any difference why he was rushing. What's
24 important is that he was, just objectively on the
25 facts we know, he was. Maybe it was Papa Hotel,
211
1 maybe it was the chief of staff, and he wanted the
2 chief of staff to see he could do things quickly and
3 efficiently, and that sort of thing.
4 We don't know.
5 But we do know that based upon the objective
6 facts, he was rushing -- five reasons.
7 First cancelling the samples down in the engine
8 room to save how much time? Twelve minutes,
9 according to Lieutenant Mahoney, a half an hour,
10 according to the commanding officer. And this was
11 something that has to be approved by the commanding
12 officer first, and we heard Lieutenant Mahoney who
13 said, you know, that's abnormal. I have never seen
14 that happen before.
15 That's Number 1 canceling those samples.
16 Number 2. Periscope depth in five minutes.
17 As Admiral Nathman pointed out, this was not a
18 tactical situation at all. There would be no reason
19 to get the ship to periscope depth in five minutes,
20 and in fact, for training purposes, if the purpose
21 here was training, well, it would have made a lot
22 more sense as to let Lieutenant Coen do it to get
23 that experience to get that ship up to periscope
24 depth, and the ship had been at SRA, and had not had
25 a lot of underway time, so Lieutenant Coen needed
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1 that experience in doing that, but that didn't
2 happen.
3 The third reason, how things actually unfolded
4 when the CO said, I want to be at periscope depth in
5 five minutes, to the ship getting to periscope
6 depth.
7 The CO took over. Originated all the orders.
8 Everything came from his mind -- not disclosed to
9 anybody around him -- it's just, I want this, I want
10 this, I want this, and now we're at periscope depth.
11 Well, why did he do that?
12 Well, he did that because Lieutenant Coen was a
13 methodical, meticulous, and read-between-the-lines, a
14 little bit slower at getting the ship through
15 evolutions like this. So he does it, it's fifteen
16 twenty minutes, and it's losing time.
17 Number 4. The TMA leg --
18 (Proceed to Session 10
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