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The Honolulu Advertiser

         1              DAY 12   SESSION 9   MARCH 20, 2001

         2                           ---oOo---

         3                     VADM NATHMAN:   But you testified 

         4     that Papa Hotel didn't really -- time didn't really 

         5     matter.  

         6           So is this consistent -- what you just said 

         7     with that, because it seems to me like if Papa Hotel 

         8     was really important, was it important to get the 

         9     officer of the deck on the bridge 30 minutes or 40 

        10     minutes from now -- so what's the rush? 

        11                     THE WITNESS:   I am not trying to 

        12     communicate that there was a rush.  

        13           My desire was to get the submarine through the 

        14     scheduled events and back on the surface, and do that 

        15     in a manner where we didn't waddle.  I didn't want to 

        16     delay or waste any more time.  I wanted to get the 

        17     submarine back to the surface.

        18                     VADM NATHMAN:   I'll leave it at 

        19     that. 

        20                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Commander, during 

        21     this portion of the chain of events, did you have any 

        22     discussions with your XO -- did he give you any 

        23     counsel, other than I believe early on he mentioned 

        24     you were running late, in his unsworn something -- 

        25     something to the effect -- this is you speaking -- 

         1     I've got a handle on it, don't worry, or something 

         2     like that -- did you have any communications with him 

         3     or anything like that? 

         4                     THE WITNESS:   I remember the XO -- 

         5     and I don't remember the exact time -- but when we 

         6     were having lunch, between the 10:45 and 11:45 

         7     period, I don't remember if someone came in to speak 

         8     for him, but it was kind of like a cue, Captain, make 

         9     sure you move the meal along, you know, you are at 

        10     the coffee at the dessert point, and really, we 

        11     should be at the point where the second seating is 

        12     started.  

        13           I didn't meet with the XO to discuss the events 

        14     that afternoon, but when I did leave the state room, 

        15     he did express concern over us getting back to Pearl 

        16     Harbor on time and completing the afternoon agenda. 

        17           And it was at that point where I may have said 

        18     to him, hey, I've got it under control, or I know 

        19     what I am doing -- I don't remember the words that I 

        20     said -- but I do know that I wanted to get the 

        21     photographs signed.  I had 17 of them to take care 

        22     of, and each one took, you know, more than five 

        23     minutes.  So my desire was to do that during the 

        24     second sitting before we commenced the afternoon 

        25     events.

         1                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Back to the 

         2     periscope search, and your use of the periscope. 

         3           As a submariner, both of us know that one of 

         4     the marks of a commanding officer is his ability to 

         5     operate the periscope.  

         6           And it isn't until you are fairly senior that 

         7     you are really efficient at operating the periscope 

         8     because it's a difficult instrument, and particularly 

         9     in the light that you are looking through the 

        10     periscope, as a commanding officer your crew and 

        11     anyone else that is on board -- their safety is in 

        12     your hands through your eyes. 

        13           You are the only one that can see. 

        14           And the evolution that you are about ready to 

        15     execute here, you are doing an emergency blow -- you 

        16     are in a way almost obligated to take it a step 

        17     further, because you have to worry about the safety 

        18     of any surface contact that might be within the 

        19     area. 

        20           And one of the things I'd like you to try to 

        21     help me with is -- and certainly you are the skipper 

        22     at the time -- is based on what the search that you 

        23     did -- I don't quite understand how that could be 

        24     considered adequate to allow you to leave periscope 

        25     depth even rapidly as you did, to come back up to the 

         1     surface with an emergency blow, knowing that it was 

         2     safe to do so, that you had no contacts that were 

         3     endangered. 

         4           Can you shed some light on that -- why you 

         5     didn't come up higher, why didn't you search longer?  

         6     This is an obligation that you, as the commanding 

         7     officer, before executing this maneuver have had to 

         8     have thought through.

         9                     THE WITNESS:   I did think through 

        10     it, sir.  With the report that sonar held two 

        11     contacts to the northwest and the northeast, and I 

        12     held no visual contacts when I did my search, and 

        13     that sonar did not hold contacts to the south of our 

        14     position, and also from historical experience, 

        15     knowing that if a sailboat is in the area, and could 

        16     I call or have the other exhibit brought up, please, 

        17     that shows the navigation chart? 

        18           I am talking about Exhibit 17. 

        19           Sailing vessels that operate in this area from 

        20     my experience are in the vicinity of Kaena Point and, 

        21     also operate sometimes over by Diamond Head, but that 

        22     is dependent on the time of year -- but with the ship 

        23     at periscope depth, in our operating area, I was able 

        24     to look down to the south -- southeast, southwest -- 

        25     as I am showing you here on Exhibit 17, and confirmed 

         1     that I held no contacts visually.  

         2           I knew sonar had no indications of motor noise 

         3     or engine noise, so my threat access was to the north 

         4     in the direction of Oahu. 

         5           I did my visual search down the line of 

         6     bearings where I knew contacts to be. 

         7           Sailing vessels do in fact transit between 

         8     Molokai, Oahu, and from Oahu up to Kauai.  But I saw 

         9     no sailing vessels on that day, on that Friday. 

        10           Most of them are out on weekends if they are 

        11     having regattas.  So I focused my search area in the 

        12     area here through the Molokai Channel and Kaena 

        13     Point.  I saw nothing and at the time.  I saw it was 

        14     adequate.  

        15           To get to the second part, am I obligated to 

        16     take it a step further to ensure that the area is 

        17     safe and that there are no contacts? 

        18           I thought, Admiral, when I ordered the ship to 

        19     come shallow that that was adequate.  Certainly, a 

        20     higher look, a higher look that is perhaps even 

        21     broaching the ship, in hindsight, would have been the 

        22     right thing to do.  

        23           In hindsight, the chances of me picking up the 

        24     Ehime Maru visually would have increased 

        25     significantly. 

         1                     RADM SULLIVAN:   One final question 

         2     before I turn it to Admiral Stone.  

         3           When you looked through the periscope on the 

         4     9th was your vision impaired?

         5                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  My vision 

         6     was not impaired.

         7                     RADM SULLIVAN:   You were able to see 

         8     a clear picture?

         9                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, I noticed a haze 

        10     -- again, I specified that when I looked up -- and I 

        11     am pointing here on Exhibit 17 in the direction of 

        12     Oahu -- I couldn't -- it was like if there was a 

        13     white belt along the land mass, and I could see the 

        14     prominent peaks of land here on Oahu, on the Waianae 

        15     Mountain range, and up here by the Koolaus, but I 

        16     couldn't see the airport, I couldn't see the Honolulu 

        17     buildings.  

        18           I did in fact see I think Diamond Head, if I 

        19     saw the -- the -- I can't remember if I saw that or 

        20     not. 

        21           But I do know that I saw land, the tops of the 

        22     peak, and the white belt around the island.  I didn't 

        23     know if that was in and around my operating area but 

        24     I did notice what was a haze -- gray clouds almost a 

        25     hundred percent overcast. 

         1                     RADM SULLIVAN:   But your vision was 

         2     not an issue? 

         3                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  When the 

         4     ship came up, a couple of feet -- oh, my actual 

         5     vision?  No, sir.  My vision wasn't impaired.  I 

         6     could focus the diopter on the periscope and set it 

         7     to where I can see the radical.  That's one of the 

         8     first things that I do when I take the scope, I look 

         9     and focus on the radical.  

        10           I look at it so that it's a sharp line -- that 

        11     I could see that.  Knowing that, then I am focused 

        12     properly, and I can look out and see the field of 

        13     view. 

        14                     RADM SULLIVAN:   Thank you.

        15                     VADM NATHMAN:   Admiral Stone.

        16                     RADM STONE:   I will make a comment 

        17     before I get into my questions about the periscope 

        18     search.  

        19           And the comment is that when I evaluate or look 

        20     at how the boat proceeded to periscope depth, the 

        21     inadequate TMA legs, the abbreviated time frame to 

        22     get up to periscope depth -- we've heard that sort of 

        23     testimony over the last twelve days, and people will 

        24     occasionally end up by saying, oh well, we got there 

        25     safely. 

         1           Well, my comment to that would be, you're lucky 

         2     that you got there safely, based on the abbreviated 

         3     preparations that were made.  And so that's the 

         4     context that I am going into now.  

         5           My questions concerning the periscope search 

         6     that followed getting up to periscope depth. 

         7           For me, personally, as a court member, this is 

         8     the most part for me is the periscope search,  

         9     because so many of the other things are based on the 

        10     chief of the boat, chopping the watch bill, other 

        11     folks providing you backup.  But the periscope search 

        12     decision on the depth that the boat would be at for 

        13     it and the duration of the search -- those two items 

        14     -- as a court member -- are the focus of my concern 

        15     about the commanding officer's judgment on 9 

        16     February. 

        17           And I say that knowing that the FTOW had some 

        18     information available that would have cued you 

        19     towards what I will call an acoustic contact which 

        20     Ehime Maru was. 

        21           In other words, that is a factor that goes into 

        22     the search, the acoustic contacts that are shared, as 

        23     well as ESM, if there is radar once you get up to 

        24     periscope depth. 

        25           But to me, those are all lesser included cases 

         1     of the requirement for the commanding officer to 

         2     search for items that are not acoustic, as well and 

         3     the requirement to look out to a range that is safe 

         4     and prudent.  And it's for the court to decide 

         5     whether that meets criteria whether that is reckless 

         6     or negligent, and that is for further discussion and 

         7     deliberation, but it's an important aspect for me as 

         8     a court member is was that a safe and prudent 

         9     judgment for the commanding officer of Greenville to 

        10     come to 58 feet and search for approximately 80 

        11     seconds, when in fact, there could have been a 

        12     sailboat out there half the size of Ehime Maru with 

        13     35 to 50 people on board, going on a course of 166 or 

        14     11 knots only 24 hundred yards away, and the search 

        15     is inadequate for that.  

        16           And so, it causes me to think very deeply about 

        17     what sort of prudent and safe search is that by a CO 

        18     of a submarine, if you can't even pick up the Ehime 

        19     Maru at 24 hundred yards, that doesn't relieve that 

        20     CO the responsibility to come to a depth to look at a 

        21     great range for other non-acoustic contacts that are 

        22     carrying human beings on board. 

        23           And so I say to you, I am very interested in 

        24     your comment on prudent and safety searches, and this 

        25     coming to only 58 feet for 80 seconds, because it's 

         1     not registering for me in how you can assure yourself 

         2     that there is no sailboat out there with 50 people on 

         3     board prior to hurling a 69 hundred ton submarine 

         4     through the ocean. 

         5                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, the question 

         6     that I take away from your comment there addresses 

         7     the issue of prudent and safety searches, and the 

         8     issue of 58 feet for 80 seconds.  Is that correct, 

         9     sir?

        10                     RADM STONE:   And particularly, this 

        11     issue of the sailboat the fifty people -- you didn't 

        12     meet my criteria -- if you think that's an unfair 

        13     criteria you need to take measures to see those types 

        14     of contacts, and therefore, if you were doing that 

        15     you would see the Ehime Maru.

        16                     THE WITNESS:   Sir, I will say that I 

        17     focused my sector search in the direction I knew I 

        18     would turn the ship to perform the emergency blow.    

        19           When I conducted the emergency deep or ordered 

        20     the emergency deep, it was my intent -- I didn't 

        21     vocalize that -- to reverse course, to go back in the 

        22     area where I had just completed my dedicated search, 

        23     I am pointing to Exhibit 17.                   

        24           When the ship came shallow up to 58 feet and it 

        25     actually came shallower to that -- at least what I 

         1     thought I saw on the periscope -- the periscope is at 

         2     64 feet, and the keel depth is 60.  I know what four 

         3     feet looks like when the ship surged up as we rose up 

         4     through 58 feet, I don't recall what the diving 

         5     officer recalled, but I remember thinking to myself, 

         6     oh, this is a good look, I can look down and see the 

         7     wave tops. 

         8           When that occurred, I panned to the right.  

         9           I didn't see any of the contacts that I thought 

        10     I would see or that I expected to see. 

        11           In my mind, I had conducted an adequate sector 

        12     search looking for non-acoustic contacts, that was in 

        13     fact in the back of my mind, and when I satisfied 

        14     myself that I met that requirement, I moved on with 

        15     the evolution. 

        16                     VADM NATHMAN:   Did you want to 

        17     proceed to DV?  I have some distinguished visitor 

        18     questions for you.  

        19           In your opinion, did the distinguished visitors 

        20     impact your ability to safely complete your mission 

        21     on 9 February?

        22                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  They did 

        23     not. 

        24                     RADM STONE:   Do you have any 

        25     comments that you think should be known to the court 

         1     concerning the role of the DVs on 9 February? 

         2                     THE WITNESS:   No, sir.  I do not. 

         3                     RADM STONE:   No further questions. 

         4                     VADM NATHMAN:   The court will recess 

         5     until 14:45

         6                     (Short recess taken.)

         7                     VADM NATHMAN:   This court is now in 

         8     session.  Counsel for the court. 

         9                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Let the record 

        10     reflect that the members, counsel and the parties are 

        11     again present.  

        12                     CAPT MACDONALD:     The court has no 

        13     procedural matters.

        14                     MR. GITTINS:   No, sir.

        15                     LCDR STONE:   No, sir.

        16                     LCDR FILBERT:   No, sir. 

        17                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel for Lt. Cmdr 

        18     Pfeifer.

        19                     LCDR STONE:   Sir, we have no 

        20     questions.

        21                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel for Mr. Coen.

        22                     LCDR FILBERT:   Thank you, sir. 

        23              CROSS-EXAMINATION BY LCDR FILBERT:

        24     Q     Commander Waddle, I would like to begin by 

        25     asking you some questions about the training of 

         1     Lieutenant Coen.  

         2           Now, it's my understanding that you and 

         3     Lieutenant Coen were both on board Greenville at 

         4     roughly the same time; is that correct?

         5     A     I took command of Greenville on March 19th of 

         6     1999, and had the opportunity to welcome Lieutenant 

         7     Coen and his wife, Wendy, newlyweds, about a month or 

         8     two after my assumption of command. 

         9     Q     For the time then that Lieutenant Coen reported 

        10     on board until the time of the unfortunate collision, 

        11     you would have been responsible for his training his 

        12     overall training during that period? 

        13     A     That is correct. 

        14     Q     And so, the process of qualifying as an officer 

        15     of the deck, you were overseeing that as the 

        16     commanding officer during that period?

        17     A     I would like to think of myself as well as the 

        18     executive officer who served almost a year of that 

        19     time, as well as his mentor. 

        20     Q     Okay.  And then, ultimately, of course, you had 

        21     to sign off, certify him as a qualified OOD?

        22     A     I did. 

        23     Q     And the same for when he was awarded his 

        24     dolfins, as well?

        25     A     That is correct. 

         1     Q     Now -- 

         2     A     --  Clarifying that I certified that Mr. Coen 

         3     has completed the prerequisites for being awarded the 

         4     covetted submarine dolfins, and make that 

         5     recommendation to my boss the Commodore of Submarine 

         6     Squadron One, who then in forwards that to the Type 

         7     Commander.  It's ultimately the Type Commander that 

         8     awards the submarine dolfins to Lieutenant Coen.

         9     Q     I understand.  

        10           Now, I wanted to ask you some questions about 

        11     after Lieutenant Coen became qualified.  I guess even 

        12     before -- when he was standing watch as a junior 

        13     officer of the deck, or any kind of UI watch in 

        14     control, are you aware of any time where he was on 

        15     watch in control when the ASVDU was out of 

        16     commission?

        17     A     No, I am not.  I can't recollect or recall 

        18     whether that condition existed. 

        19     Q     Do you recall any specific discussions with 

        20     Lieutenant Coen at any time regarding what should be 

        21     done if the ASVDU were to be out of commission? 

        22     A     No, I did not specifically address that.  

        23           I would like to preface it though by saying 

        24     that in the course of Lt Coen's training, as well as 

        25     that of other officers, he has been exposed to ship's 

         1     casualties and drills, which would cause him to 

         2     exercise judgment and demonstrate that he could 

         3     overcome obstacles. 

         4     Q     I understand.  But specifically, the ASVDU was 

         5     never brought up by you? 

         6     A     No, not the ASVDU. 

         7     Q     Now, I wanted to ask you some questions moving 

         8     on to another area, regarding the time leading up to 

         9     periscope depth. 

        10           Now, I believe you testified -- and we've heard 

        11     from several people -- that Lieutenant Coen was a 

        12     methodical and meticulous watchstander?

        13     A     He was and is. 

        14     Q     Now, we know that Lieutenant Coen did not have 

        15     his pre-brief with the watchstanders that is I 

        16     believe in your standing orders. 

        17           Let's say that you had not given this 

        18     five-minute goal for Lieutenant Coen to get to 

        19     periscope depth.  Do you think that Lieutenant Coen 

        20     -- and he was the one -- let's say he was the one 

        21     running the show and in control -- you believe that 

        22     Lieutenant Coen would have conducted that brief?

        23     A     Yes. 

        24     Q     And the report that's given to you by the 

        25     officer of the deck regarding coming to periscope 

         1     depth that contains information regarding contacts 

         2     and bearings and that sort of thing -- you believe 

         3     Lieutenant Coen would have given that report?

         4     A     Yes, I do. 

         5     Q     And regarding the periscope search that was 

         6     done, if you had not stepped in and taken the scope, 

         7     would it be your belief, based upon Lieutenant Coen 

         8     and what you know about him, that he would have 

         9     conducted the search in accordance with your standing 

        10     orders? 

        11     A     No doubt in my mind. 

        12     Q     Now, as far as the way things went with 

        13     Lieutenant Coen from angles and dangles up to the 

        14     time of the collision -- I believe you said when you 

        15     were being asked questions earlier, that when you 

        16     came into control before angles and dangles, that you 

        17     told Lieutenant Coen what you wanted to do, which was 

        18     to conduct angles and dangles; is that right? 

        19     A     That is correct.  

        20           I told Lieutenant Coen shortly after arriving 

        21     in the control room from sonar that I wanted him to 

        22     ensure the ship was stowed and rigged to support 

        23     angles and dangles.  

        24           And I asked him -- and I may have directed it 

        25     to the chief of the watch -- to make sure that the 

         1     galley was properly stowed.  So I certainly 

         2     communicated to him that the next event that I was 

         3     looking toward was ship's angles and dangles. 

         4     Q     Now after that time, once the angles began, I 

         5     think you said earlier that from then on, really your 

         6     relationship with Lieutenant Coen was directive in 

         7     nature, that you would tell him what you wanted, and 

         8     that he would carry out that order?

         9     A     That's correct.  As I was standing on the conn 

        10     -- could we pull up the other exhibit please that 

        11     shows the orientation of the control room? 

        12           I am talking about Exhibit 6.  

        13           I positioned myself in between Number 1 and 

        14     Number 2 periscopes, right here behind, the stand.  

        15     Lieutenant Coen positioned himself on the port side 

        16     of the conn where he would have direct view of the 

        17     ship control party in that evolution.  I am talking 

        18     again about Exhibit 6. 

        19     Q     Right.  Well, let's talk overall.  

        20           From the time that the angles began until the 

        21     time of collision -- that was my question -- that you 

        22     were -- that this directive relationship between you 

        23     and Lieutenant Coen existed? 

        24     A     I communicated to Lieutenant Coen what I 

        25     desired, as far as ship maneuvers and changing 

         1     course, speed, and depth. 

         2     Q     And then he would carry out that order by 

         3     issuing to the watchstander? 

         4     A     He did, indeed. 

         5     Q     So during this period up to the time of the 

         6     collision, there weren't any discussions between you 

         7     and Lieutenant Coen about, this is what I want to do, 

         8     and then later on to give him the order or conferring 

         9     with him about what he thought should happen -- it 

        10     was simply you telling him what you wanted to have 

        11     done, and then he would issue the order? 

        12     A     I gave no other direction to Lieutenant Coen 

        13     other than to change your depth, with this angle, 

        14     come left or right at this speed or at this ordered 

        15     bell -- but an opportunity existed for Mr. Coen to 

        16     provide me with any concern that he may have had, but 

        17     it was very clear from my perspective that I told Mr. 

        18     Coen what I wanted him to do as far as employing the 

        19     ship. 

        20     Q     My question was you weren't conferring with 

        21     him, though, about what you thought should be done or 

        22     you didn't ask him for an input on what should be 

        23     done?

        24     A     Correct.  There was no discussion or request 

        25     for that information.

         1     Q     And that existed even after the time that you 

         2     gave him this five-minute goal to get to periscope 

         3     depth? 

         4     A     That is correct. 

         5                     LCDR FILBERT:   Thank you, sir.  I 

         6     don't have any other questions.

         7                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel for Commander 

         8     Waddle, redirect?

         9                     MR. GITTINS:   I just have one 

        10     question, sir. 

        11           Commander Waddle, the bottles of salt water, 

        12     sea water that were retrieved on this DV cruise -- 

        13     did you have an indication of test depth line?

        14                     THE WITNESS:   That's correct. 

        15                     MR. GITTINS:   Was it words or number 

        16     that was indicated on that?

        17                     THE WITNESS:   Words, no numbers.  

        18     And I can't even recall on this particular incident 

        19     if the word "test depth" was on there.  I just don't 

        20     remember.  It may have been, the date, and that a 

        21     water sample was collected.  

        22           For that matter of fact, I can't -- I can't 

        23     confirm that we had the word "test depth."  I think 

        24     we had the word "test depth" on a prior DV cruise, 

        25     but I know that numbers were not annotated on the 

         1     bottom. 

         2                     MR. GITTINS:   That's all I have, 

         3     sir. 

         4                     VADM NATHMAN:   Before the court 

         5     hears arguments, does counsel for the court have any 

         6     additional evidence to present?

         7                     CAPT MACDONALD:   No, sir. 

         8                     VADM NATHMAN:   Do any of the parties 

         9     have any additional evidence to be presented? 

        10                     LCDR STONE:   No, sir.

        11                     LCDR FILBERT:   No, sir. 

        12                     VADM NATHMAN:   Are there any other 

        13     procedural matters to discuss before hearing 

        14     arguments?

        15                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Sir, could we have 

        16     Commander Waddle step down off the witness stand?

        17                     VADM NATHMAN:   Sure. 

        18                     THE WITNESS:   Thank you, sir.

        19                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Thank you, 

        20     Commander Waddle. 

        21                     VADM NATHMAN:   Very well.  The 

        22     court is now ready for arguments from the parties.    

        23           We are going to proceed in the same manner in 

        24     which the court received evidence from the parties.   

        25           Counsel for Mr. Coen will be given the first 

         1     opportunity to give arguments, followed by counsel 

         2     for Commander Pfeifer and counsel for Commander 

         3     Waddle.

         4                     LCDR FILBERT:   I would like to 

         5     present argument at this time, but I want to make 

         6     sure that if we begin argument today that we will -- 

         7     does it look realistic to complete all the arguments 

         8     before we close for today? 

         9                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel do you have 

        10     any comments?

        11                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Why don't we just 

        12     go around to the parties.  And Commander Filbert, how 

        13     long do you think your argument is going to take?

        14                     LCDR STONE:   Half an hour, sir, no 

        15     more than that, sir.

        16                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Mr. Gittins?  

        17                     MR. GITTINS:   Half, to an hour.  I 

        18     would be hard pressed to give an exact time.

        19                     CAPT MACDONALD:   Mr. President, I 

        20     would recommend that we simply continue, and take all 

        21     arguments today.

        22                     VADM NATHMAN:   Counsel for Mr. Coen.

        23                     LCDR FILBERT:   Thank you. 

        24               FINAL ARGUMENTS BY LCDR FILBERT:

        25           Members of the court.  

         1           This Court of Inquiry  was convened primarily 

         2     to answer two questions -- and I don't know if there 

         3     were other questions presented, but really two 

         4     questions for this Court of Inquiry.  

         5           And the first was, why did USS Greenville 

         6     collide with Ehime Maru on 9 February?  Why did this 

         7     tragic thing happen where lives were lost?  That's 

         8     the first question. 

         9           And the second question is, what should happen 

        10     to these officers, to the parties named in this Court 

        11     of Inquiry?  

        12           Those are the two central questions. 

        13           Now, with regard to the first question, with 

        14     regard to the first question -- why the ships 

        15     collided -- we've heard a fair amount of complicated 

        16     testimony over the last two and-a-half weeks 

        17     regarding submarine operations.  

        18           But the question really has a very simple 

        19     answer.  It has a human answer.  And the answer to 

        20     that question is, the commanding officer, Commander 

        21     Waddle, rushed himself and he rushed his crew, and 

        22     every factor that directly contributed to the 

        23     collision comes back to that very basic fact. 

        24           Now I say that -- I say that, but I don't mean 

        25     in saying that that Lieutenant Coen didn't make some 

         1     mistakes, because he did.  And the evidence showed 

         2     that.  

         3           And in saying that, I also don't mean that 

         4     Commander Waddle was a bad commanding officer.  It's 

         5     not my place to discuss that.  And what I say is not 

         6     meant to disparage him in any way in a personal 

         7     manner, but looking at the evidence that was 

         8     presented during this court, during this Court of 

         9     Inquiry, the evidence was clear that Commander Waddle 

        10     rushed himself, he rushed his crew, he got ahead of 

        11     his crew, including Lieutenant Coen, and the crew 

        12     couldn't catch up, and they couldn't provide the 

        13     fundamental backup that is expected for safe 

        14     submarine operations. 

        15           And that's essentially what caused this 

        16     collision. 

        17           Now, what were the events leading up to the 

        18     collision with respect to Lieutenant Coen?  

        19           We know that he assumed the watch as officer of 

        20     the deck at about 11:45. 

        21           And from that time forward, until angles began, 

        22     it was a fairly uneventful watch, and that's not to 

        23     say that he didn't have responsibilities regarding 

        24     contacts and that sort of thing, because obviously he 

        25     did.  But the contact picture was light.  There were 

         1     three contacts held during that period -- Sierra 10, 

         2     Sierra 12, and Sierra 13. 

         3           For most of that time, those three contacts 

         4     were held.  The contacts were considered to be 

         5     distant by fire control and by sonar.  And the ship 

         6     was operating at a depth -- at a depth of 400 feet or 

         7     below, primarily heading north during that time. 

         8           Now, could Lieutenant Coen have done a better 

         9     job of staying on top of the contact picture and 

        10     making sure that he knew -- had a better idea about 

        11     the range and course of those contacts?  

        12           And the answer to that question is yes.  He 

        13     could have done a better job during that period. 

        14           But a couple of things are important to 

        15     remember about that.  One is the sense of urgency 

        16     while the submarine was going north, as far as the 

        17     contacts wasn't there at that point.  

        18           They are at a depth of 400 feet below, 

        19     Lieutenant Coen knows they are going to be coming to 

        20     periscope depth at some later point, and assume they 

        21     are going to do a sufficient TMA to get a good 

        22     contact picture.  He knows that's going to happen.    

        23           We also know that he was aware that regarding 

        24     angles, he needed to be on top of the contacts 

        25     because before the angles began, he went to Petty 

         1     Officer Brown and said, Petty Officer Brown, you need 

         2     to let me know if any of these contacts are getting 

         3     close.  And he did that -- if you look at Lieutenant 

         4     Coen's statement -- shortly before angles began.  

         5           So he's aware yes, I need to know if any of 

         6     these contacts are getting close if my SA changes 

         7     regarding the contacts, so he's thinking about it 

         8     during the time leading up to the angles. 

         9           Could have done a better job, yes. 

        10           But at this time, the watch is quiet, and it's 

        11     not like what would happen later on with regard to 

        12     coming to periscope depth and the things that 

        13     happened there. 

        14           Now, it was during this time that the CEP began 

        15     to fall apart, and I want to talk about just for a 

        16     moment.  Based on the evidence presented regarding 

        17     the CEP, we know that shortly before 13:00 that the 

        18     last contact was put on the CEP.  And the last course 

        19     was put on about 1306.  And I think as the members go 

        20     back and look at the CEP, that will become very 

        21     clear.  

        22           So at that time, Petty Officer Seacrest really 

        23     starts falling off the job, as far as that goes.  

        24           Now was it lieutenant Coen's responsibility to 

        25     monitor the CEP?  Absolutely, yes.  Absolutely, a 

         1     hundred percent.  

         2           But it's important to remember what was going 

         3     on during that time in control. 

         4           At that time, at that time in control, that's 

         5     when the civilians are coming in.  And as you can see 

         6     from Exhibit 6, they are starting to get right in 

         7     front of the CEP, starting to get right in front of 

         8     the CEP.  So it would be difficult for Lieutenant 

         9     Coen to have seen what was going on, particularly as 

        10     we are getting near the angles, and his attention is 

        11     more over by the ship's control party, and during 

        12     angles, he's going to be over there, and during the 

        13     high-speed turn, the same thing.  

        14           And I think if the members assess the type 

        15     officer Lieutenant Coen is -- methodical, meticulous, 

        16     on top of the books -- that if he saw the CEP, he 

        17     would have corrected it, and we heard that from the 

        18     witnesses who testified in court, including Petty 

        19     Officer Seacrest, who said, absolutely, he would have 

        20     corrected that.  

        21           And Petty Officer Seacrest -- his explanation 

        22     was not good enough, but from Lieutenant Coen, where 

        23     while he's responsible, there are some reasons that 

        24     didn't happen. 

        25           So we know what happened after that.  

         1           The commanding officer -- Commander Waddle who 

         2     just testified -- comes in and says, we are going to 

         3     do angles.  And then, from that point forward, when 

         4     he comes and says, we're going to do angles, the 

         5     relationship or what Lieutenant Coen is doing really 

         6     changes. 

         7           He is directed from that point forward until 

         8     the time of that collision -- he's directed from that 

         9     time forward to the time of the collision, and that's 

        10     important to remember because Lieutenant Coen -- it's 

        11     a tough position for a junior officer to be in, and 

        12     the thing that has to be running through his mind 

        13     during that time is, where exactly do I fit in here?  

        14     Where do I fit in?  

        15           I know I am supposed to be giving the orders to 

        16     the officer of the deck, and I know that I am trained 

        17     to analyze that, and do the best I can, but it's 

        18     tough.  It's a tough position for a junior officer, 

        19     and there is no conferring, no discussions, none of 

        20     those things are going on.  

        21           He is simply waiting for the next order.  He 

        22     needs to be ready for it -- he probably needs to be 

        23     pretty close to the CO to make sure he understands 

        24     what is going on with regard to the borders. 

        25           So the angles and high speed maneuvers are 

         1     completed, and coming out of that, the CO says to the 

         2     -- to Lieutenant Coen -- I want to be at PD in five 

         3     minutes.  I want to be at PD in five minutes, and as 

         4     we've heard today, an impossible role to meet for an 

         5     officer of the deck. 

         6           Now, we heard Commander Waddle say that the 

         7     reason that he said that was for training purposes 

         8     for Lieutenant Coen, to make him more efficient, and 

         9     I guess the assumption is Lieutenant Coen as Admiral 

        10     Nathman said between the lines is, this is a guy who 

        11     takes his time, and may be a little bit slower than 

        12     the other OD in doing things, so this goal was put 

        13     out there.  

        14           But members of the court, if you look at what 

        15     actually happened as far as that goal goes, this was 

        16     not very good training, because it wasn't Lieutenant 

        17     Coen who took the ship to periscope depth, really, it 

        18     was the commanding officer. 

        19           He's the one who issued all the orders, really 

        20     generated all the orders that led to going to 

        21     periscope depth.  So any training value for 

        22     Lieutenant Coen during that period wasn't there, and 

        23     it tells you what was really going on, which was the 

        24     commanding officer was rushing.  He was pushing for 

        25     whatever reason, he was pushing to get things 

         1     done, and leaving behind people like Lieutenant 

         2     Coen.  

         3           The most important person during this evolution 

         4     as far as what's going on with the commanding 

         5     officer.  So this idea of this is a goal for 

         6     training, doesn't make any sense.  And the commanding 

         7     officer got the ship to periscope depth, and 

         8     obviously, I am not qualified in submarines, but six 

         9     minutes sounds awfully fast.  It sounds awful fast. 

        10           And we know what happened from there. 

        11           Periscope depth.  Emergency deep.  Emergency 

        12     blow.  And the collision occurs. 

        13           So, I said at the beginning when I started 

        14     talking, that the commanding officer rushed.  

        15           Well, how do we know the commanding officer 

        16     rushed?  How do we know he was rushing and he left 

        17     his crew behind as far as what kind of backup they 

        18     could provide?  

        19           Well, Commander Waddle talked about there was 

        20     no reason for him to rush.  No purpose.  None of 

        21     that. 

        22           And in a way, he's right, because it doesn't 

        23     make any difference why he was rushing.  What's 

        24     important is that he was, just objectively on the 

        25     facts we know, he was.  Maybe it was Papa Hotel, 

         1     maybe it was the chief of staff, and he wanted the 

         2     chief of staff to see he could do things quickly and 

         3     efficiently, and that sort of thing.  

         4           We don't know. 

         5           But we do know that based upon the objective 

         6     facts, he was rushing -- five reasons. 

         7           First cancelling the samples down in the engine 

         8     room to save how much time?  Twelve minutes, 

         9     according to Lieutenant Mahoney, a half an hour, 

        10     according to the commanding officer.  And this was 

        11     something that has to be approved by the commanding 

        12     officer first, and we heard Lieutenant Mahoney who 

        13     said, you know, that's abnormal.  I have never seen 

        14     that happen before. 

        15           That's Number 1 canceling those samples. 

        16           Number 2.  Periscope depth in five minutes.  

        17           As Admiral Nathman pointed out, this was not a 

        18     tactical situation at all.  There would be no reason 

        19     to get the ship to periscope depth in five minutes, 

        20     and in fact, for training purposes, if the purpose 

        21     here was training, well, it would have made a lot 

        22     more sense as to let Lieutenant Coen do it to get 

        23     that experience to get that ship up to periscope 

        24     depth, and the ship had been at SRA, and had not had 

        25     a lot of underway time, so Lieutenant Coen needed 

         1     that experience in doing that, but that didn't 

         2     happen.  

         3           The third reason, how things actually unfolded 

         4     when the CO said, I want to be at periscope depth in 

         5     five minutes, to the ship getting to periscope 

         6     depth. 

         7           The CO took over.  Originated all the orders.  

         8     Everything came from his mind -- not disclosed to 

         9     anybody around him -- it's just, I want this, I want 

        10     this, I want this, and now we're at periscope depth.  

        11           Well, why did he do that? 

        12           Well, he did that because Lieutenant Coen was a 

        13     methodical, meticulous, and read-between-the-lines, a 

        14     little bit slower at getting the ship through 

        15     evolutions like this.  So he does it, it's fifteen 

        16     twenty minutes, and it's losing time. 

        17           Number 4.  The TMA leg -- 

        18     (Proceed to Session 10