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Sending troops into Philippines dangerous
By Homer A. Mabale
If we go by what is popular and expedient, the presence of the American troops in the southern Philippines, particularly on the island of Basilan and in the Zamboanga peninsula, poses no problem. It is widely supported by the Filipino public and the Philippine government, most especially by the people in Zamboanga, a predominantly Christian city.
Associated Press
The coming of the Americans is seen by many as a general solution to the peace problem in the southern Philippines and the lawlessness perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and other Muslim groups. Only a month before the U.S. troops arrived in Zamboanga City, a hostage-taking occurred. More than a hundred hostages including children and old women were forced out of their homes and formed into a human shield by the escaping Moro National Liberation Front guerrillas. That hostage-taking came as a surprise to Zamboanga residents who thought that the war was confined to the rural provinces.
A Filipino boy watches U.S. troops passing by on Basilan island: In the long run, the combination of U.S. and Philippine troops in the Muslim south may lead to a very bloody process.
Subsequently, when the U.S. troops came in, the people were overjoyed. Convinced that the Philippine military failed to protect them, the people saw the U.S. troops as saviors who would quickly bring peace and order.
Politically the U.S. troops' arrival was advantageous for the Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, whose popular rating was declining. The arrival of the American troops assuaged the Christian population in the southern Philippines and restored her popularity. People in the Philippines' "Christian north" always see the Muslim rebels as a serious threat and dramatic military action is for them always a welcome development.
Moreover, the U.S. troops were seen as advantageous because of the perception that Arroyo can neither discipline nor command respect among the politically powerful Philippine generals. She had to play sweetheart with them to avoid their turning against her.
For example, late last year, the Rev. Cirilo Nacorda, a Catholic priest in Lamitan, Basilan, offered a staggering expose about the military's conspiratorial role in the escape of Abu Sayyaf fighters who had been surrounded by the Philippine armed forces in a municipal hospital. The Abu Sayyaf fighters' escape wasn't due to their art-of-war skills or agility. The escape was made possible, said Nacorda, because of the help of two ranking generals and the governor of the province who, in exchange for millions of pesos, agreed to quietly let them go.
After these revelations, the military top brass dismissed the story as a product of a "psychologically disturbed mind" and even went further by claiming that Nacorda is an Abu Sayyaf asset. Arroyo downplayed the story by her silence.
Arroyo may have thought that having the Americans would ease the coup threat posed by her own military forces. Now she has the U.S. Special Forces to help her watch over the Philippine military's shoulders. However, this does not mean that the presence of the U.S. troops will solve the crime problem caused by Abu Sayyaf.
The Abu Sayyaf is a small group of about a hundred members. They are extremely mobile and do not have permanent camps. Time and again, the military claims that the Abu Sayyaf will be soon wiped out or that it has been substantially weakened. Wave and wave of military operations have not wiped out the Abu Sayyaf. On the contrary, it is becoming more notorious and lethal.
Could it be because some military and government officials are also profiting from Abu Sayyaf's criminal enterprise?
America's role
The U.S. troops in the southern Philippines are said to be there to train Filipino soldiers to fight the Abu Sayyaf, which is alleged to have links with international terrorists. But a Filipino commanding officer told me when I asked whether the American soldiers are solely there for the training: "You don't go to Basilan for a training."
A key related query is whether the Abu Sayyaf group has connections with terrorists abroad. Its founder Ustadz Janjalani may have had some acquaintances in Afghanistan, but he is long dead. Personalities now at the top of the Abu Sayya suggest it is very unlikely they have operational linkages to the known terrorists. Their actions are largely commercial in character — kidnap-for-profit. Osama bin Laden does not need their money.
After they kidnapped tourists from Sipadan, Malaysia, they first asked for rice, then they demanded that screen actor Robin Padilla visit them, then they asked that foreign fishing vessels not be allowed in the Basilan and Sulu seas. Aside from the desire for cash, the Abu Sayyaf group does not really know what it wants.
Can the U.S. troops eliminate them? Perhaps. But the first problem is how to identify an Abu Sayyaf. The group has the cunning ability to blend with civilians. During operations, they'll just go down and live in the lowland areas where most of the civilians reside. The second problem is the jungle terrain which Abu Sayyaf fighters know intimately. The third would be the support that Abu Sayyaf enjoys because they distribute a portion of their kidnapping proceeds.
Military force may eventually subdue the kidnappers and free the captives. But that would not mean the end of Abu Sayyaf. The social environment that these people find themselves in — paralyzing poverty, constant threat of militarization, disempowered village life — is a natural niche for future Janjalanis.
For the American government, aside from getting its forces into the region for the security and protection of its political and economic interests, it is also trying to make a statement about its war against terror in Southeast Asia. President Bush needs a quick victory to boost his campaign. The capture and defeat of Abu Sayyaf leaders may not be as difficult as catching the elusive Osama bin Laden.
The U.S. troops' victory may serve as an example to other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Indonesia, which don't want U.S. troops in their countries.
For the Philippine government, it is an opportunity to get more investment from the United States, more aid programs, war equipment, a quick boost for the economy and sense of security, however temporary and superficial.
The danger
What makes the U.S. troops' presence in Southern Philippines dangerous and problematic?
First, it is not contributing to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to peace negotiations. Before the U.S. troops arrived in Zamboanga City, the Muslim representatives together with several peace organizations and nongovernment organizations convened for a formulation of a peace agenda. One of the things that was brought out by the Muslim leaders was its objection to sending U.S. troops into the region.
Second, it undermines the Philippines' diplomatic relationships with other countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The Philippines has trade relations and diplomatic ties with these countries as well as millions of overseas Filipino workers there.
Third, the unintended damages will be costly. As of today hundreds of Subanens, an indigenous people of Zamboanga, were displaced and deprived of their ancestral homes because the U.S. troops and the Philippine armed forces were putting their training camps and training infrastructure there. The number of internal refugees in Basilan increases each day because of the constant military operations. Caught in the crossfire are innocent civilians, among whom the toll of war is heaviest.
Fourth, it undermines Christian-Muslim relations. The coming of the American troops is seen by many Muslims as reinforcements for the Christians. And for many Christians, the American presence seems likely to be the solution of the disorder created by the Muslims, particularly the Abu Sayyaf. The U.S. troops' presence may once more ignite a dangerous spark between Muslims and Christians.
Fifth, the escalation of war. Other militant groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Misuari Renegade Group have vowed to shoot any American soldier who enters into their guarded territory. And as was expressed during the Peace Agenda conference, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is wary about the American troops' involvement in the Philippine domestic matter.
The situation is unpredictable and volatile. What if the Burnhams, the American missionary couple held by Abu Sayyaf, were killed during the rescue operations? What if an American soldier is killed or taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf? Or during the operations, the Americans inadvertently find themselves in the Moro militants' territory leading to further escalation? Or if the Misuari renegades ambush U.S. soldiers, killing them to create a scenario favorable for their jailed leader Nur Misuari?
The consequences can be very scary. The last time we had full-scale war was in 1970s. The number of people killed then was only about 50,000.The most recent war was just two years ago under former president Joseph Estrada's command. The whole of the Cotabato area and Maguindanao virtually became a huge refugee camp.
The problem in the southern Philippines is a complex one. It is a web of multi-faceted issues ranging from cultural to political to social and back to ethnic relationships of people and society, state and culture. The oversimplification of issues affecting the region will not untangle the complexity. The solution that says "U.S. troops + Philippine armed forces = peace" implies a very bloody process.
Homer A. Mabale is a faculty member of the Ateneo de Zamboanga University and a practicing lawyer in the Philippines. He has been visiting at the East -West Center in Honolulu.
