Ehime Maru: a year later

By Mike Gordon
Advertiser Staff Writer

Every prospective captain and executive officer in the Navy's submarine fleet now receives a case study of an infamous accident that occurred off O'ahu a year ago tomorrow, killing nine people and destroying the careers of some of the service's most promising officers.

A remotely operated vehicle, foreground, was used in the Ehime Maru recovery effort, in which the Japanese fisheries training vessel was lifted from the ocean floor to shallower water. The bodies of eight of the nine victims eventually were recovered from the vessel. Advertiser library photo

Among them are the need for submarine crews to follow existing safe navigation practices when surfacing, resist the temptation to cut corners and, perhaps most crucially, the need to have subordinates speak out against an action that appears unsafe, a process called "forceful backup."

"I guess if there was going to be an attitudinal shift we were trying to instill in everybody, it was: Just because you are a subordinate it doesn't mean you can't speak up if you see something that doesn't look right to you," said Rear Adm. John Padgett III, the Pearl Harbor-based commander of the Pacific submarine fleet.

"In fact, exactly the opposite is true," he said. "We expect you to speak up."

In the year since the accident, which occurred during a surfacing drill, Pacific submarine commanders have implemented widespread changes and now say their sophisticated nuclear warships operate more safely than ever before.

As friends and relatives of the dead arrive in Hawai'i tomorrow to see a memorial unveiled, Padgett said his submariners are not dwelling on the events of Feb. 9, 2001. But they have learned their lessons well, he said.

"I think that the performance standards in the submarine force are higher than they have ever been," Padgett said. "I think that in almost every case, ships are out there meeting those standards and submarine crews out there meeting those standards are taking pride in that."

More accidents

It's a bold statement belied by just one fact: A year later, the Greeneville remains a vessel dogged by trouble. Last week it bumped into a transport ship in the Arabian Sea and last August, it briefly ran aground off Saipan, leading some to suspect that either the Greeneville crew either had not learned its lessons or that it was somehow a jinxed ship incapable of escaping bad luck.

Both those incidents were overshadowed by the sinking of the Ehime Maru, which plunged the Navy into an international crisis.

Relations between the United States and Japan were strained after the Navy revealed that the Greeneville had aboard 16 civilians as part of a public relations program to show off the sub's capabilities.

Although the Navy concluded the civilians were not directly at fault, Japanese officials were furthered angered when they learned that three of the guests were at the controls when the Greeneville crashed into the Ehime Maru during an emergency surfacing drill.

The practice of playing host to civilians remains an active Navy program. Even last March, when the Navy convened a rare court of inquiry to investigate the collision, a trio of admirals defended their "distinguished visitors" program at the same time they were questioning the Greeneville captain.

The Navy found Cmdr. Scott Waddle, one of three officers who faced the court of inquiry, guilty of negligent hazarding a vessel and dereliction of duty. It forced him to retire.

Because the submarine was running late that day, Waddle took the brunt of the blame. He had created an artificial sense of urgency to get his guests back to port, the Navy concluded.

"The commander had allowed himself to be distracted by the guests," Padgett said. "It seems to me he might have been trying to be a little more enthusiastic than he should have been."

Shortly after the collision, the secretary of defense ordered a ban on civilian operation of controls that could affect the safety of a submarine. Civilian guests, however, can still participate in the supervised use of periscopes and activities not tied to the running of the vessel.

Still, Padgett has told his submarine captains that any proposed use of equipment by civilians must first be approved by commanders with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

But the surfacing drill that got the Greeneville into trouble — an "emergency main ballast blow" — remains a maneuver a submarine captain can demonstrate for guests, although Padgett said he doubts any current commanding officer would make that choice without having very good reason.

"In training, we have reinforced that there are very few things on a submarine that can be approached in a cavalier fashion," Padgett said.

Critical mistakes

Civilians who were aboard the USS Greeneville when it collided with Ehime Maru were taken to Pearl Harbor on another Navy vessel. Advertiser library photo

Waddle was criticized for creating a "command climate" that discouraged officers from challenging his decisions, even though his motto was "safety, efficiency, back-up."

Waddle's sailors believed in him so much they would not question a decision, even if the captain was breaking one of his own rules. If he said the surface was clear of obstacles, it was clear of obstacles.

"This accident could and should have been avoided by simply following existing Navy procedures in bringing the submarine to the surface," Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said after he punished Waddle in April.

In every submarine in the fleet, commanders and crews have been reminded that they must follow existing guidelines for surfacing a submarine and keeping track of ships on the surface.

They also have been told to be sure that all personnel are qualified before taking on new jobs or properly supervised until they are.

And the Greeneville accident, and the lessons to be learned from it, are part of the case study given Navywide to every prospective commanding officer and executive officer.

"In our training, we tried awfully hard to emphasize that, as a commanding officer, your prime focus is the safety of the ship and the safety of the people on the ship and that there is no urgency associated with anything that would violate that focus on safety," Padgett said.

Many of the problems that were addressed had nothing to do with the events that put the Greeneville on a collision course. They were discovered as officers and chiefs reviewed practically everything associated with the way they drive submarines.

"We found that some of the basic things we do, we aren't doing so well," he said.

Now submariners have higher standards for the most basic of tasks, such as working with tug boats, using fire hoses, rescuing people who fall overboard and getting submarines under way, Padgett said.

In the public eye

Military observers and retired Navy officers have watched the year-long saga with unflagging interest. It was a highly public story that refused to go away as the Navy spent more than $60 million last summer and fall to recover bodies from the Ehime Maru.

But such an open-door effort served served the Navy well, said Honolulu attorney Michael Lilly, one of the Navy League's national judge advocates and a retired Navy captain.

Lilly said many within the Navy had argued to keep the investigation behind closed doors.

"That argument was proved wrong, and the Navy has learned what everyone else has learned: When you screw up, confess it right away and don't try to cover it up," Lilly said. "It means you are more forthright, more honest, more willing to stand up to criticism and are willing to take your lumps."

Eugene Carroll, a retired Navy admiral affiliated with the Center for Defense Information, took special interest in the Greeneville's most recent collision. From 1968 to 1969, Carroll was the captain of the USS Ogden, the same transport ship struck by the Greeneville on Jan. 27.

"It brings the whole issue fresh into the public's eye, and that is not healthy for the Navy," he said. "And then you hear 'jinxed ship' and that is unfair and without merit."

The latest incident suggests problems still exist, but Carroll said there is no way to evaluate the Navy's list of changes. It is something the public has to take on faith.

"There is no way in the world for an outsider to validate those statements," he said. "I hope that every word is correct."

Dissenting voices do exist, however. Clay Moltz, a research analyst at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif., said Navy submarines still engage in dangerous and unnecessary maneuvers.

Moltz said the Greeneville collision with the Ehime Maru should have prompted the Navy to mandate the use of active sonar. While the practice can identify ships on the surface, it also gives away a submarine's position.

"They had an opportunity to make a very significant change, but they fumbled it ... and I think it is unfortunate," Moltz said.

It was not a new issue, either. In 1990, the National Transportation Safety Board urged the Navy to use active sonar after a submarine snagged a tugboat's submerged cable. The Navy said no.

Although the NTSB has not issued its findings in the Greeneville case, Moltz said the Navy should have made this decision on its own.

"To me, it is one of the most disappointing failures of this incident," he said. "These incidents are eminently avoidable."

The Greeneville remains on deployment in the war on terrorism and will not be in Pearl Harbor for the anniversary.

While the collision remains a tragedy that should not be forgotten, the Navy has to move forward in a professional manner, Padgett said. For him, that means focusing on the needs of the Greeneville crew; they are "the soul of the ship."

Every one of the submariners still assigned to the Greeneville feels a measure of responsibility, he said.

Their role in the tragedy cannot be understated. His, too, he said.

"I think my responsibility is to return the Greeneville to wholeness," he said. "I have every confidence it can be done. A jinxed ship? Nonsense."

Reach Mike Gordon at mgordon@honoluluadvertiser.com or 525-8012.