Posted on: Sunday, January 13, 2002

ABM treaty withdrawal could undermine U.S.

By Ralph A. Cossa

Russian President Vladimir Putin called the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty a "mistake." Associated PRess library photo • Dec. 13, 2001

Earlier doomsday predictions notwithstanding, Washington's announcement last month that it intends to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (the required six months notice was given Dec. 13) is not expected to usher in a new Cold War between the United States and Russia.

It also isn't likely to undermine the other Soviet-era strategic arms reduction agreements or prompt a new arms race between the two nuclear giants. In fact, both sides have agreed to significant new reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Nonetheless, abrogating the ABM Treaty was a bad idea. While Moscow has little alternative but to accept Washington's decision and proceed with the crafting of a new, more positive relationship with Washington, this unilateral decision will damage Russian President Vladimir Putin's domestic credibility and make it harder for him to expand his level of cooperation with the United States.

While the Russians had initially been inflexible about amending the ABM Treaty, Putin had demonstrated a certain amount of political courage since Sept. 11 by announcing his willingness to adjust the treaty to consider Washington's security concerns.

The announcement comes across as an unnecessary snub to a new-found friend. Putin's critics in the Duma will take great delight in pointing out the foolishness of trying to cooperate with Washington.

The decision has also revitalized and reinforced earlier accusations of American unilateralism that the Bush administration, in its thus far skillful handling of the war on terrorism, had been slowly overcoming.

The man who promised the American people "leadership without arrogance" once again seems to have forgotten the second half of that pledge.

Reinforcing a unilateralist image hardly seems to be in America's best national interest when Washington is still attempting to hold together or build upon its coalition against international terrorism, especially after realizing that garnering international support for whatever step comes after Afghanistan will be even more difficult.

Washington's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty may also unnecessarily strain relations with its two key Northeast Asian allies: Japan and South Korea.

Tokyo has taken some giant leaps forward in its bilateral security cooperation with Washington, for the first time sending military forces abroad (albeit with severe restrictions) to support the war on terrorism.

But Tokyo remains deeply committed to global arms control efforts and sees the latest action (and Washington's continuing disdain for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) as evidence of a growing gap in strategic thinking between these two important allies. Likewise, Seoul worries about the impact this move will have on already strained relations between Washington and Pyongyang, and on North Korea's already growing hesitancy to negotiate in good faith with the South.

Ironically, the announcement could be a mixed blessing for Sino-U.S. relations. On one hand, Beijing was quick to express its condemnation, as it does for any decision that even remotely deals with missile defense.

On the other hand, it may finally prompt Beijing into serious dialogue with Washington; discussions that Beijing previously seemed to be avoiding, hoping instead that its strategic partner, Russia, would somehow be able to hold America's national missile defense program in check.

Of great significance in this regard was President Bush's decision to call Chinese President Jiang Zemin shortly after the ABM announcement, to reassure him that neither the treaty withdrawal nor America's missile defense plans (which could now more aggressively be pursued) were aimed at China.

Bush then repeated America's offer to engage China in a strategic dialogue that would address both nations' legitimate missile-related security concerns.

In my discussions with Chinese officials and other senior security specialists, I get the impression that China somehow feels that improved Sino-U.S. relations and cooperation on sensitive issues such as missile defense are primarily up to Washington.

It appears that China is like a willing maiden waiting to be seduced, if only Washington would come courting. At the risk of hopelessly overplaying this analogy, I would argue that the Bush phone call and offer of strategic dialogue is the diplomatic equivalent to Washington's knocking on China's door with bouquet in hand.

It's time for Beijing to stop playing hard-to-get. The best way for China to protect its own national security interests — i.e., to ensure that Bush's missile defense system will not negate China's strategic deterrent capability (as Washington promises) — is to sit down and discuss the issue while Washington is still willing to talk.

By the time Putin decided to talk about changing the ABM Treaty, Washington had decided to go in another direction. Beijing should not make the same mistake.