COMMENTARY
Prospect for serious talks with North Korea slim
By Ralph A. Cossa
SEOUL, South Korea — Despite Washington's July 2 cancellation of its talks with North Korea's leaders, odds are the two sides will sit down to talk sooner rather than later. Odds are equally big that if and when it happens, a dialogue of the deaf is likely.
The North-South naval skirmish off the Korean west coast on June 29, which resulted in five South Korean and as many as 30 North Korean sailors killed or missing, has delayed U.S.-North Korea talks that tentatively had been scheduled for July 10. It is worth noting that the naval clash was not the main reason given for the postponement.
The State Department announcement of July 2 rescinding Washington's offer to send James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, to Pyongyang cited the lack of a timely response to that offer, as well as the "unacceptable atmosphere" created by the North-South naval engagement.
This sent two clear signals: First, North Korea's behavior toward the South affects U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Second, Washington is not going to tolerate the unprofessional diplomatic behavior that has long characterized Pyongyang's interactions with Seoul.
North Korea frequently makes South Korea wait until the last minute (or beyond) before responding to Seoul's initiatives, while Seoul is forced to plead for a response and continually adjusts to the North's inconsiderate whims. Washington is not going to play that game.
The next time Washington offers to send a high-level emissary, Pyongyang needs to respond promptly and directly, in accordance with standard diplomatic protocol.
The next U.S. offer could come as early as Wednesday, when the region's foreign ministers meet in Brunei for the annual ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is scheduled to attend, as is South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong and — so far — North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun.
Paek inexplicably skipped last year's meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, avoiding what would otherwise have been the first direct high-level contact with a senior Bush administration official. His absence again this year would speak volumes about Pyongyang's willingness to engage in serious dialogue, not only with Washington and Seoul, but with its other Asian neighbors as well.
Despite the July 2 cancellation announcement, Washington's "any time, any place, without preconditions" offer to talk remains unchanged. In a little-noticed speech on American policy on East Asia delivered June 10, Powell laid out several specific prerequisites for progress, and these may further reduce Pyongyang's incentive to begin a dialogue with the Bush administration. None of Powell's prerequisites were new, but his speech to the Asia Society seems to cast them in stone.
Powell told the New York gathering that "progress between us will depend on Pyongyang's behavior on a number of key issues." He insisted that North Korea must get out of the proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles that threaten others; must make a far more serious effort to provide for its suffering citizens (including greatly improved foreign monitoring to ensure that food provided by Washington and others gets into hungry mouths); needs to move toward a less threatening conventional military posture by living up to its past pledges to implement basic confidence building measures with the South; and, must come into full compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, as called for in the Geneva Agreed Framework the two sides signed in 1994, and which, Powell stressed, Washington remains committed to following.
This appears to represent yet another hardening of Washington's position; at a minimum, it places "without preconditions" in a new context. Powell's remarks should leave few illusions about Washington's determination to hold a "comprehensive" dialogue that addresses all of its security concerns about the Korean Peninsula.
On the positive side, it does not add more links between North Korea and Washington's war on terrorism, President Bush's earlier "axis of evil" comments notwithstanding.
And Pyongyang is no stranger to preconditions; it has a number of its own, including withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the peninsula. Earlier this month, it added an interesting new demand, insisting that Seoul tear down the statue of Gen. Douglas MacArthur that proudly commemorates his landing in Inchon. Pyongyang claims it's an "insult" to Koreans .
Pyongyang also seems more comfortable blaming Washington for everything that happens than discussing ways to avoid crises and misunderstandings — it claims Washington "orchestrated" the naval incident. (In what may be a more hopeful sign, however, Pyongyang has expressed regret over the incident..)
Unless both sides are prepared to move beyond their seemingly unyielding positions, prospects for meaningful dialogue are slim. All eyes will be on Brunei, first to see if North Korea's Paek shows up, then to see if the two ministers can set a more positive tone for future dialogue.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and is senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly online journal.
