Crew error caused sub collision, Navy says
By William Cole
Advertiser Military Writer
The Jan. 27 collision of the USS Greeneville with the USS Ogden in the Arabian Sea was caused by a multitude of command and crew errors including each captain's belief that the other would take avoidance measures during a crew transfer, a Navy investigation concluded.
"The fundamental cause of the collision was the failure of each commanding officer to take positive action to avoid or prevent the collision," 7th Fleet commander Vice Adm. J.W. Metzger said.
The navigators on board each vessel were asleep during the operation in rough seas near Salalah, Oman, the report indicated.
The collision between the Pearl Harbor-based submarine and the Ogden, an amphibious transport, caused a combined $2 million in damage to the ships $1.5 million of it to Greeneville.
For the Greeneville, it was the third accident in a year the most serious of which was the Feb. 9, 2001 sinking of the Ehime Maru during a surfacing drill. Nine men and boys aboard the Japanese fisheries training vessel were killed.
The fast-attack submarine was preparing to transfer two sailors to the Ogden via inflatable boat when the Greeneville's stern stabilizer plane punched a 5-by-18-inch hole in the Ogden's hull about 15 feet below the waterline. Ogden's fuel tank was punctured, resulting in the release of 23,000 gallons of fuel.
Yesterday, Pacific Fleet submarine forces said "there is a need to raise the bar of our standards with respect to seamanship and navigation."
The investigation conducted by the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet based in Yokosuka, Japan, and obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, found that Greeneville captain Cmdr. Lindsay Hankins, "allowing a perceived sense of urgency to affect his judgment, placed the safety of his ship unduly at risk when prudent seamanship dictated otherwise."
The fact that the accident was the Greeneville's third in a year and Hankins was the sub's fifth commanding officer in that time led Metzger to conclude, "Readiness and training of Greeneville during the period is a matter of concern, and should be reviewed."
The Navy investigation also found that the experience level on the Ogden, a San Diego-based ship, was "inappropriate" for the crew transfer conducted, and that the Ogden should have assigned an experienced watch team to the bridge.
At a disciplinary hearing in May, Rear Adm. John Padgett III, commander of the Pacific Fleet submarine force, gave Hankins a letter of reprimand for "negligently hazarding a vessel," officials said. He had been in command of the Greeneville 98 days at the time of the collision.
But Padgett kept Hankins in command of the Greeneville after determining he still had confidence in the skipper. On Feb. 21, the Navy relieved Cmdr. William Edwards of his duties as captain of the Ogden.
Four other Greeneville crew members were charged with negligent dereliction of duty in non-judicial proceedings. The officer of the deck and contact coordinator were each given a letter of reprimand, Merrell said, while the fire control technician of the watch and radar operator were placed on 30 days restriction and made to forfeit half a month's pay.
Last Aug. 27, the Greeneville briefly ran aground while trying to enter a harbor in Saipan, causing $120,000 in damage and prompting the Navy to remove Cmdr. David Bogden from command.
According to the Navy investigation into the latest accident, the Ogden contacted the Greeneville 50 minutes ahead of schedule to say it was approaching for the crew transfer. Greeneville's navigator was not notified of the schedule change and was asleep when the collision occurred, the Navy said.
Ogden's navigator was not on watch and was also asleep during the procedure, according to the report.
The Greeneville initially had expected a helicopter transfer with another ship the USS Bonhomme Richard and did not plan for a "close aboard" maneuvering transfer.
Ogden maneuvered astern of Greeneville for the transfer and was 500 yards from Greeneville's port beam. The Greeneville's executive officer announced in the control room that the Ogden appeared close, but did not notify Hankins, the Navy report said.
The report states that the failure of the Ogden's commanding officer and other crew members to account for the vessels' drift drove the Ogden into the Greeneville, but the report also says briefings on board both ships failed to include adequate plans to keep the vessels at a safe distance.
Although the investigation found that seas of 4 to 6 feet increased the difficulty of the transfer, the report said weather was not a factor in the collision.
Reach William Cole at wcole@honoluluadvertiser.com or 525-5459.
Correction: An earlier version of this story omitted parts of the Navy's response. Lt. Cmdr. Kelly Merrell, spokeswoman for the Pacific Fleet submarine forces, said it conducted "extensive self-examination" of its forces after the collision and determined it needed to raise its standards "with respect to seamanship and navigation." That was to be accomplished, she said, through a rigorous assessment of its minimum standards from areas ranging from how it operates its submarines to how it handles emergencies. "We have acknowledged that exercising good judgment requires both knowledge and experience," she said. "While the submarine force has invested in knowledge, there is room for improvement in our assignment policies to ensure that our leadership has the requisite experience level to succeed."