COMMENTARY
Threats to peace continue in South Asia
By Ralph A. Cossa
U.S. envoys such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage deserve praise for their seemingly successful efforts to move India and Pakistan back from the brink of war once again.
Associated Press
As history has brutally (and all too frequently) demonstrated, even a conventional armed conflict between these two South Asia adversaries would cause untold human suffering on both sides.
If India and Pakistan put nuclear weapons into the field, the chances of those weapons falling into terrorist hands increase.
It also would seriously detract from Washington's continuing war against terrorism and could even put Pakistan-based U.S. forces directly at risk. Alarmist reporting notwithstanding, the latest confrontation was and is not likely to degenerate into a nuclear confrontation, however.
Both Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf have made it clear, publicly and privately, that the use of nuclear weapons is not being contemplated.
For its part, New Delhi is on record proclaiming a nuclear weapons no-first-use policy. More importantly, India not only doesn't need to resort to nuclear weapons but actually would put itself at a strategic disadvantage if it were to do so, given its overwhelming conventional superiority.
Meanwhile Islamabad, while appreciating the role of its nuclear arsenal as the "great equalizer," also fully understands the last-resort nature of such weapons. Unless the survival of the nation is at stake — and India's clear objective is not Islamabad but terrorist camps in Kashmir — use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan makes no strategic sense. In fact, it would hasten the end of the Pakistani state.
As long as both countries' nuclear arsenals remain firmly in the hands of the respective national command authorities, deliberate, accidental or precipitous use of such weapons remains an extremely slim possibility.
Herein lies the rub! Strategic planners in both countries remain unsatisfied merely in possessing such weapons. They continue to plan for the field deployment of nuclear warheads atop missiles pointed at each other's capitals and other key targets. Were this to happen, the prospects of accidental or even deliberate pre-emptive use could increase significantly. More importantly, it would increase the likelihood of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups or those sympathetic to terrorists. Current concern over "dirty bombs" should not distract us from the greater threat of actual nuclear devices falling into the wrong hands.
One of the great ironies of India's 1998 decision to come out of the nuclear closet by declaring and demonstrating its nuclear weapons capability — an action which Pakistan quickly echoed — is that this action has limited rather than expanded New Delhi's options.
Would the world's leaders be rushing to South Asia and speaking out so forcefully against Indian strikes on Islamic terrorist bases in Pakistan if both countries were not nuclear-armed states? It is the possible consequences of a nuclear exchange, with estimated death tolls ranging from 3 million to 12 million, that has driven international pressure against India's otherwise seemingly justifiable retaliation (notwithstanding the low probability that such weapons actually would be used).
If becoming a nuclear power has limited India's military flexibility, field deployment of such weapons would be even more counterproductive. This is not because India lacks the expertise or discipline to maintain effective command and control over such weapons; it probably does (although some would debate this point).
But as was the case following India's 1998 nuclear tests, an operational deployment of nuclear weapons by India is almost certain to be followed immediately by a similar Pakistani move.
Indeed, the Pakistani military's ability (some would argue even its desire) to keep such weapons out of the hands of Islamic extremists who would not hesitate to use them against India (or Washington, or perhaps even the Musharraf government) is much less certain.
This is not a new concern. At the July 1998 ASEAN regional forum meeting in Manila shortly after the India and Pakistan nuclear tests, the assembled foreign ministers urged both countries "to refrain from undertaking weaponization or deploying missiles to deliver nuclear weapons," recognizing such a step would be a serious threat to peace and stability.
But today, this critical aspect of the South Asia nuclear equation is being completely overlooked. It should not — indeed, it must not — be ignored any longer. Otherwise, future crises could prove much more explosive.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and is senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly online journal.
