COMMENTARY
Koizumi trip to North Korea 'bold gamble'
By Ralph A. Cossa
I'm not sure whether to be cautiously optimistic or cautiously pessimistic about Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's upcoming visit to North Korea on Tuesday, but either way, "caution" is the watchword.
I am strongly in favor of increased dialogue with North Korea, by South Korea and the United States as well as by Japan. The fact that Pyongyang suddenly seems serious about engaging in high-level discussions with all three simultaneously presents an opportunity that should not be missed or squandered, even if it must be approached carefully.
Some may question Pyongyang's motives. Such questioning appears appropriate, given North Korea's previous track record of on-again, off-again negotiations and broken promises.
But more important than guessing what Pyongyang expects to get from its current round of "smile diplomacy" is a clear understanding and articulation by Tokyo of what it hopes to achieve, both individually and cooperatively with Seoul and Washington, as a result of this bold diplomatic initiative.
Tokyo has been careful not to set expectations too high. Koizumi acknowledged that he was "anticipating no settlement of all the issues" that separate the two countries, but that this was "the only way to break the ice" and get the normalization process back on track.
He also acknowledged the risks involved: "I will stake my political life," Koizumi reportedly asserted, on what he himself described as a "bold gamble." This has led some pundits to speculate that the Japanese leader might be so eager for a successful visit that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il would somehow be able to leverage this against Koizumi, to Japan's (and America's) detriment. I think not!
The risk for Koizumi is not in accomplishing too little but in giving away too much.
This should put a natural brake on how much he will be willing to offer. North Korea's heavily criticized failure to practice even asymmetrical reciprocity in its dealings with South Korea should also cause Tokyo to insist on some deliverables in advance of (or at least simultaneous with) any aid or development assistance that may be forthcoming as a result of the visit.
One such deliverable is some forward progress on determining the status of the dozen or more missing Japanese citizens suspected of having been kidnapped by North Korea.
What will increase the Japanese leader's flagging popularity at home and abroad will be the opportunity the trip provides for Koizumi to directly express Tokyo's concerns about North Korean activities, even while expressing his nation's regrets for its own past misdeeds.
While it is probably too much to hope for, some acknowledgment in return by the North's Dear Leader that the unresolved state of hostility between Japan and Pyongyang since the end of Japanese occupation has resulted in occasional unfriendly acts by the North toward Japan as well could help create some Japanese good will.
While some have argued that the visit could undercut Washington's security objectives on the Korean Peninsula, the reverse also is true.
North Korea might find it easier (and potentially more rewarding) to make a pledge to Japan (over whose territory the missiles fly) than to an American interlocutor to continue its current missile-test moratorium beyond the Jan. 1 scheduled end date.
The result would be the same: the elimination of a potential crisis point in U.S.-North Korean relations that all concerned parties would just as soon avoid.
This would be a relatively low-cost diplomatic gift to Koizumi, since clearly it is in Pyongyang's interest to avoid the political and economic consequences a resumption in missile testing would most certainly bring.
Reports that the United States was "blind-sided" by the visit also appear overstated.
While great (if only partially successful) effort was expended to keep the deliberations secret, all evidence points to careful coordination between Tokyo and both Washington and Seoul. Koizumi neither sought nor required "permission" from either nation, but the close coordination among the three, originally instituted as part of the process initiated by former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, remains alive and well.
Finally, some have argued that Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang and the possible resumption of normalization talks will put additional pressure on Washington to finally send its own high-level delegation to Pyongyang. One hopes that this is true. At last weekend's Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group meeting in Seoul, senior representatives from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul all endorsed the Koizumi visit.
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, previously earmarked to lead the first Bush administration senior delegation to Pyongyang, also reaffirmed Washington's "readiness to hold comprehensive and unconditional talks with North Korea," but no date has been set.
Even Washington's hard-liners would have difficulty arguing against a Kelly visit if genuine progress is made during Koizumi's historic diplomatic mission.
Of course, the reverse could also be true if sensitive issues are completely avoided and Koizumi returns empty-handed.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal.
