EDITORIAL
Iraq shows Uncle Sam poised to be global cop

One of the most urgent post-war issues to be examined by the Pentagon, particularly by the commanders representing "boots on the ground" forces, is this:

What got U.S. forces to Baghdad so swiftly, so easily? Was it a brilliant battle plan that succeeded despite doubts and unprecedented public second-guessing by ground force commanders? Was it a dubious dice-roll that succeeded in spite of itself because of brilliant, heroic soldiering? Or was the enemy simply weaker and more poorly organized than predicted?

It did more than raise eyebrows when the civilian leaders of the Defense Department overruled experienced and battleihardened generals, and disregarded intelligence assessments, in slashing the size of the invasion forces and their preparation time.

The initial three-pronged drive from Kuwait, which plunged 200 miles into Iraq with little concern for the long supply lines that were left exposed, was cause for nail-biting, not only on the part of Mondayimorning quarterbacks at home, but by the troops in the tanks at the head of the columns.

Even with Baghdad in U.S. hands, those supply lines are still exposed. But it appears Iraqi forces, almost from the start of the war, were too degraded, demoralized and disorganized to exploit them. Dangerous work and perhaps some bad surprises remain for coalition forces in Iraq, but the issues are reduced to unit-by-unit tactics. The strategic questions, for now, have been answered.

If a review of the lighter, faster Rumsfeld battle plan concludes that it is reproduceable elsewhere, then the reach and grasp of American foreign policy will increase substantially. It took more than a decade to re-muster the political will for a new war after the six-month buildup of the half-million-strong force that liberated Kuwait in 1991. The Rumsfeld plan allows the White House to focus much faster on the next problem to be solved by military force, or credible threat of it.

But the remarkable success of the Rumsfeld plan in Iraq may actually reduce the need for its use elsewhere in the future. No doubt leaders in North Korea, Syria, Iran, Libya and perhaps Colombia, not to mention Russia, China and Europe, are already adjusting their own calculus in light of America's exponentially improved ability to project force.

Just as the Panama invasion successfully extended the pre-emptive Monroe Doctrine into the 21st century, the Iraq invasion may have extended that doctrine globally.