SECOND OPINION
Philosophy, not law, basis of Michigan-case ruling

By Cliff Slater

Hawai'i is not the only state battling race issues in the courts or the only one with emotions running high and objectivity low. It is difficult to be objective when dealing with familiar people, places and institutions. Under such circumstances the immediacy of the disputes stirs our juices and obscures the legal principles at play.

Students demonstrated as the Supreme Court debated on April 1, 2003 in Washington whether colleges and universities may legally consider race when admitting students. Advertiser library photo • April 2003

If we were to pick one case that might show what is happening elsewhere in the country and what the Supreme Court justices are thinking on the subject, we could do worse than to review the recent Supreme Court decision in the Barbara Grutter affirmative-action case (and its companion, the Jennifer Gratz case). This case provides us with valuable insights into the makeup of the court and their thinking on race matters.

Grutter, an applicant denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School, sued the school in U.S. District Court for using race as an admission factor, giving black, Hispanic and Native American applicants "a significantly greater chance" than Japanese, Chinese and Caucasians in violation of the Constitution and U.S. statutes despite having no "compelling state interest" in doing so.

For its part, the school claimed that while race was a factor in their admission process, which was designed to achieve a "critical mass" of "racial and ethnic diversity," it met the criteria formulated in earlier cases where it had been deemed lawful to take race into account as a "plus factor," provided that admission policies were "narrowly tailored" and with a "compelling government interest" in using race discrimination.

The District Court found the school's use of race to be unlawful. On appeal, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court reversed the lower court's decision. Grutter then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the Sixth Circuit's findings in a narrow 5-4 decision with Justice

Sandra Day O'Connor joining those generally regarded as the court's liberals, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter, Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens.

The majority said, "Today, we hold that the law school has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. ... Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."

Among nation's best

The facts: The Michigan Law School ranks among the nation's best and receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of around 350 students. The school's expert witness testified that a race-blind admissions system in 2000 would have admitted only 4 percent of underrepresented minority students versus the actual admission of 14.5 percent.

The issues: Judging by the court's opinion, the three primary questions before it were whether Michigan had a "compelling state interest" in using race discrimination, whether "critical mass" was essential and whether the admissions policy was "narrowly tailored."

"Compelling interest": Was it compelling for Michigan to use race discrimination in the admissions process for the school, one of the nation's top five law schools?

While the 1964 Civil Rights Act is explicit: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," all laws are tempered by certain "compelling state interests."

For example, First Amendment free-speech rights are justifiably tempered by the potential harm of crying fire in crowded theaters.

Was the admission policy that compelling? Yes, says the school, the courts have long held that schools have a compelling state interest in achieving diversity.

The court's majority said they "struggled" with using race discrimination but said, "We endorse [the] view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions." But they did not make the case logically and, other than citing prior cases, made no attempt at it.

Justice Clarence Thomas' response was: "Today, the court insists on radically expanding the range of permissible uses of race to something as trivial (by comparison) as the assembling of a law school class. I can only presume that the majority's failure to justify its decision by reference to any principle arises from the absence of any such principle."

He asks what Michigan's "compelling state interest" is in having an elite public law school. He points out that five states, including Massachusetts, have no public law schools at all — let alone an elite one. He notes that it is not as though the graduates serve Michigan's citizenry since of last year's graduates only 16 percent elected to stay in Michigan. In contrast, Michigan's only other public law school, Wayne State, had 88 percent of its graduates stay in the state.

He asks that if the school is so enamored of underrepresentation, it should be concerned that black women students outnumber black men students nearly 2 to 1, yet the school does not discriminate in favor of black men.

Justice Thomas revisited all the court's prior treatment of racial classification cases and concluded that where the court has in prior decisions "accepted only national security, and rejected even the best interests of a child, as a justification for racial discrimination, I conclude that only those measures the state must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a 'pressing public necessity.' "

"Critical mass": Did the school also need a certain number of the underrepresented minority? Yes, said the school, and "such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race."

However, Chief Justice William Rehnquist pointed out that over a five-year period, the school admitted 13 to 19 Native Americans, 47 to 56 Hispanics and 91 to 108 blacks annually. He argued that, "If the law school is admitting between 91 and 108 African Americans in order to achieve 'critical mass,' thereby preventing African-American students from feeling 'isolated or like spokespersons for their race,' one would think that a number of the same order of magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and Native Americans."

He asked why this concept was applied differently among the three groups. Thus, the school's actions "demonstrate that its alleged goal of 'critical mass' is simply a sham."

"Narrowly tailored": Did the school's admissions policies meet this requirement?

The court's majority opinion had said, "The law school's interest is not simply to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin. ... That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional."

And the school's director of admissions "testified that at the height of the admissions season, he would frequently consult the so-called daily reports that kept track of the racial and ethnic composition of the class (along with other information such as residency status and gender) ... to ensure that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students would be reached so as to realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body."

Racial balancing

Justice Rehnquist showed a table demonstrating a direct correlation between the percentage of each type of minority applicant applying for admission and the percentage of those actually admitted. He termed the process "a naked effort to achieve racial balancing."

Justice Antonin Scalia called it "a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions," adding that, "The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception."

He further criticized "universities that talk the talk of multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses — through minority-only student organizations, separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate minority-only graduation ceremonies."

Then Justice Thomas turned to the use of race discrimination as a policy: "What lies beneath the court's decision today are the benighted notions that one can tell when racial discrimination benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups and that racial discrimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills."

Thomas observed that:

• "The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all."

• "It must be remembered that the law school's racial discrimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our nation."

• He quotes author and commentator Thomas Sowell: "Even if most minority students are able to meet the normal standards at the 'average' range of colleges and universities, the systematic mismatching of minority students begun at the top can mean that such students are generally overmatched throughout all levels of higher education."

• He discusses at length the harm that these programs "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority" and that because some blacks are admitted only through racial discrimination, that all are tarred as undeserving.

The decision: It was what The Economist called "tortuously reasoned," resulting in "a legal fudge."

In short, the majority decision was one by philosophy rather than by the law. From this, it would appear that Hawai'i cases favoring race-based actions may prevail — but it will depend on which Supreme Court faction prevails.

Cliff Slater's column, "Second Opionion," appears regularly in The Advertiser.