Friendly-fire incident puts focus on 'go pills'
By Greg Miller
Los Angeles Times
WASHINGTON — The Air Force calls them "go pills," and that is what they do: keep pilots going in the air long after their tired minds and bodies would have preferred to fall asleep.
The stimulants have been used by airmen since World War II, and were doled out by the thousands in the Persian Gulf War and Afghanistan. But the practice is coming under new scrutiny in the investigation of two F-16 pilots who were taking Air Force-provided amphetamines when they mistook a midnight training exercise for hostile fire and bombed Canadian soldiers.
Four Canadians were killed in the April accident, and eight others were wounded. The Air Force has taken the unprecedented step of pursuing criminal charges against the pilots, Majs. Harry Schmidt and William Umbach, each of whom faces up to 64 years in prison.
But if the case proceeds beyond a preliminary hearing scheduled for Jan. 13, the Air Force could find many of its own practices also on trial, including its distribution of drugs that are banned in commercial aviation.
A lawyer for one of the pilots said last week that he intends to argue that the airmen's judgments were impaired by their repeated use of amphetamines prescribed by Air Force doctors in Afghanistan — drugs, he said, that would cost the pilots their jobs if they were caught using them behind the wheel of a car instead of in the cockpit of an F-16.
"Were these pilots' perceptions affected by their use of dextroamphetamine? I don't know," said Charles Gittins, a Virginia attorney and former Navy flight officer representing the pilot who dropped the bomb on the Canadians. "But we're going to present it and let the (court) decide."
A Pentagon investigation of the bombing ruled out the use of stimulants as a factor, concluding instead that the pilots were guilty of "reckless" behavior and had violated rules of engagement.
Experts say Gittins could have a hard time connecting the pilots' fateful mistake to the influence of a relatively small dose of dextroamphetamine. And even he acknowledges that the drugs aren't at the heart of his case.
Instead, he said, the accidental bombing was the result of a series of breakdowns, including the failure of the Air Force to notify the two pilots, both members of the Illinois National Guard, that there were training exercises in the area.
But the high level of attention surrounding the unusual case already is calling attention to the Air Forces' little-known drug policies. Some say that if the Air Force were forced to change those policies, it also would change the nature of its pilots' missions.
Many in the service see the use of stimulants as a prerequisite for the nightlong fighter patrols and transoceanic bombing runs that are mainstays of the modern aerial campaign.
"They're used because pilots are sometimes required to fly missions that exceed 10 to 12 hours," said Col. Alvina Mitchell, an Air Force spokeswoman. "Or they're (used for) missions that are scheduled during time when pilots would ordinarily be sleeping."
Mitchell stressed that use of the pills is voluntary, safe and monitored closely by Air Force surgeons, who prescribe them only after testing pilots' reactions to them on the ground.
The military has a long and uneasy history of experimenting with stimulants as a means of enhancing the performance or endurance of its fighters. Histories of World War II indicate widespread use by German and American soldiers.
But pilots' use of amphetamines expanded dramatically during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when pilots struggled to adapt to that conflict's largely nocturnal schedule. Fliers were given "go" pills to keep them awake for nighttime missions, and "no go" pills, or sedatives, to help them sleep through the noise and desert sun on base during the day.
