EDITORIAL
Report on 9-11 leaves unanswered questions

The failure of the CIA and FBI to communicate with each other before the Sept. 11 attacks is by now well known. The long-awaited report by the House and Senate intelligence committees adds a good deal of detail but few surprises in that area.

If you didn't already know that the two agencies had, and missed, several opportunities to apprehend or investigate some of the hijackers, you know it now.

And while it offers some bureaucratic remedies such as appointing a "director of national intelligence," a close reading of the report suggests that the real changes must take place at the foot-soldier level: a counterterrorism career track, better pay and incentives, and some sign from agency leaders that such work is valued.

Key questions omitted

So the most lasting importance of this report may ultimately lie in the questions it begs by its omissions:

• How directly engaged were Presidents Bush and Clinton in counterterrorism before the attacks?

The White House resisted efforts to answer this question in regard to Bush, invoking executive privilege. The report contains much more information about Clinton, but still omits some information as classified.

The report does tell us that the "President's Daily Briefing" of Aug. 6, 2001, included information "acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of [Osama] Bin Laden supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives."

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser, says it was an "analytical report" about al-Qaida methods, and "not a warning."

The CIA declined to declassify this briefing for inclusion in the report, and the White House declined to overrule the CIA.

• There is a great deal of information omitted, and some tantalizing details included in the report, regarding connections, official and otherwise, between Saudi Arabia and the terrorists who hijacked four airplanes on 9-11.

'Incontrovertible evidence'

The report cited one CIA memo that concluded there was "incontrovertible evidence" that Saudi individuals provided financial assistance to al-Qaida operatives in the United States.

The CIA refused to permit publication of information potentially implicating Saudi officials on national security grounds, arguing that disclosure could upset relations with a key U.S. ally.

Lawmakers complained that many omissions, both on the White House role before 9-11 and on Saudi involvement, were all about dodging embarrassment.

Attention focused

The report is helpful in describing how the FBI, CIA and NSA ignored myriad signs of an impending terrorist attack. Where it's weaker is on how better leadership might improve that performance.

But where it's most useful may be in focusing attention on questions that officials now are ducking.