COMMENTARY
It's time to stop pretending there is no North Korea crisis
By Ralph A. Cossa
While the Bush administration is to be commended for not overreacting (or reacting in kind) to North Korea's saber-rattling, and to its continuing assertion that it seeks a diplomatic solution to the current nuclear standoff, Washington needs to stop pretending there is no crisis, or that there is no difference between one to two suspected nuclear devices and a full-blown North Korean nuclear weapons program involving the extraction of enough plutonium to make (or sell) numerous bombs. This is a peninsula security and nonproliferation crisis that must be dealt with as such.
To be fair, it is wrong to accuse the Bush administration of ignoring the problem. A great deal of diplomatic effort has gone into tightening the noose around
Pyongyang and demonstrating to its leadership that its actions are only further isolating the "hermit kingdom" and putting its people at greater disadvantage. President Bush's willingness to wave some carrots in front of North Korea — his promise of a "bold approach" toward future cooperation in return for compliance with previous nuclear obligations — is likewise a positive gesture.
Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's assertion that the United States can deal simultaneously with Iraq and North Korea and his order to prepare for the deployment of attack aircraft to East Asia if needed underscore President Bush's reminder that "all options remain on the table."
Based on behavior thus far, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il appears to have drawn the conclusion that he has a free pass to misbehave as long as Washington remains focused on (and refuses to be diverted from) Iraq. "All options" assertions are likely to be viewed as not very credible, especially since Seoul keeps handing out the carrots while ruling out the sticks. Unless Washington and Seoul jointly can convince the North that its decision actively to pursue nuclear weapons will threaten, rather than enhance, North Korea's national security, Pyongyang's efforts to pursue a nuclear weapons program will continue unabated.
In criticizing the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea, many Koreans (North and South) call for a return to the policies of the Clinton administration. They forget that President Bill Clinton was prepared to use force to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. When former Secretary of Defense William Perry says that "the credibility of our determination to remove the nuclear threat even if it risks war" is a key ingredient in any possible solution to the current standoff, he speaks from experience. He was drawing up the plans for military action while former President Jimmy Carter was striking the deal that made military action unnecessary in 1994.
But the other key ingredient, according to Perry, is "the courage and the confidence to pursue creative diplomatic alternatives to war." Washington needs to be — and to appear in the eyes of South Koreans — more flexible and forthcoming in dealing with Pyongyang. This does not mean asking a former president to go to Pyongyang, although sending a high-level emissary (former Secretary of State James Baker or former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft) at some point should not be ruled out. It does mean making the North Koreans an offer they can't refuse, or one which, if refused, would leave little doubt that the nation is interested in nothing less than developing nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration needs to go beyond vague references to a "bold approach" and, as Scowcroft recently argued, "offer a clear vision of the diplomatic solution it favors — and a road map to get there." The urgency of the crisis, says Scowcroft, "brooks no delay over matters of form." While the administration's offer of a 5-plus-5 forum remains reasonable, agreeing to bilateral discussions does not "reward" Pyongyang for past indiscretions. Combining both approaches could provide a way forward.
New South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has stated that he is committed to working closely with Washington, Tokyo, China, Russia and others to "resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue." If so, rather than just call for talks, he should offer formally to host a multilateral senior-officials meeting (at the assistant secretary level or higher) to bring all the concerned parties (including North Korea) to the table before Pyongyang takes steps — such as beginning to reprocess its spent fuel — that may force a military confrontation.
For its part, Washington should reinforce its earlier stated willingness to meet separately with Pyongyang along the sidelines of such a multilateral meeting (which should also include a North-South bilateral on the nuclear issue). An agreement by Washington and Seoul that reprocessing represents a "red line" that will require a reassessment of the current joint U.S.-ROK commitment to a peaceful solution could provide some added incentive for Pyongyang to accept such an offer.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He is senior editor of the quarterly electronic journal Comparative Connections, www.csis.org/pacfor.
