DAVID POLHEMUS
Wishful thinking can twist intelligence

By David Polhemus
Advertiser Editorial Writer

I was surprised to see an editorial in the Friday New York Times that said the original conclusions that led President Bush to make war on Iraq cannot be faulted by hindsight; that they were "based on the best intelligence available."

It's true that Saddam Hussein had a history of using chemical weapons, that he had received U.S. help in biological weapons in the 1980s and that he certainly had nuclear ambitions.

But it's also true that by March, when Bush launched the war, a robust U.N. inspection team on the ground in Iraq had failed to find any sign of weapons of mass destruction or current programs to acquire them. (And skipping ahead, the Americans leading a hunt for these weapons over the last four months are preparing a report that says they've also failed to find them.)

More important, the Times and other newspapers had reported extensively on public efforts by officials in the CIA and the State Department to discredit the intelligence that was being relied upon by the White House and the Defense Department.

The most suspect information was coming from people close to an Iraqi exile named Ahmed Chalabi, whose sources assured the Pentagon that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were poised for instant use; that Iraqi army divisions were negotiating surrender terms even before the war started; that the Iraqi people couldn't wait to greet American troops as liberators; that the American occupation would be over in less than 90 days.

Chalabi, now president of Iraq's governing council, has suddenly begun calling for American forces to get the heck out of Iraq immediately, much to the White House's frustration.

It appears the White House was cherry-picking intelligence that favored its predispositions. Indeed, the Defense Department formed an intelligence unit of its own, apparently because it didn't like what was coming from the traditional intelligence agencies.

But it's also beginning to appear that Chalabi manipulated those desires to his own advantage. That hardly adds up to the "best intelligence available."

In its Friday editorial, however, the Times makes a broader point with which I agree completely: "Even the best intelligence can turn out to be mistaken, and the likelihood that this was the case in Iraq shows why pre-emptive war, the Bush administration's strategy since 9-11, is so ill conceived as a foundation for security policy."

Pre-emptive war turns out to be rather like the death penalty: It's irreversible when it turns out to be mistaken. It's a policy that Bush defended in his U.N. speech last week.

Perhaps these weapons will eventually turn up; it's impossible to imagine that Saddam wouldn't have amassed and used such weapons given half the chance.

The tantalizing puzzle for postwar historians will be this: Why didn't Saddam prove, when the United Nations demanded it, that he didn't have weapons of mass destruction available, and avoid catastrophe?

You can reach David Polhemus through letters@HonoluluAdvertiser.com