ISLAND VOICES
Asia policy rethinking is overdue

By Ralph A. Cossa

In its second term, the Bush administration needs to pay more attention to Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular.

Most important, while Asians need to recognize the importance of the war on terrorism to Washington in the post-9/11 world, so, too, does Washington need to understand that a seemingly unidimensional approach toward Southeast Asia — frequently characterized as Washington's continued "hectoring" on terrorism issues — detracts from the accomplishment of other key objectives shared by Washington and the majority of East Asian nations: the promotion of open markets, democracy and the rule of law; the need to address root causes of instability; human security concerns, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, etc.; the desire for safe and secure sea lanes; and the need to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction, an effort that has gained a sense of urgency over fear that such weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists.

These are among the key findings of an "America's Role in Asia" U.S. task force sponsored by the Asia Foundation, which prepared its report before the November presidential elections to serve as a guide for whichever candidate emerged victorious. They also closely parallel the findings of a simultaneous effort undertaken by scholars and security specialists in Southeast Asia. The task force findings are currently being released in the United States and Asia, and merit careful consideration both by Washington and by those in the region interested in (or concerned about the level of) regional cooperation with Bush II.

The United States and Southeast Asian task forces, and similar groups representing scholars from both Northeast and South Asia, had another major point in common: All saw the relationship between the United States and an emerging China as a key factor in shaping the future geopolitical environment. "The region does not view the rise of China as a threat but as an opportunity and a challenge," the Southeast Asia report states; American task force members (and their Northeast and South Asia colleagues) agree. Washington needs to better articulate its long-term vision regarding China ... and Beijing also needs to articulate its long-term vision for its own role in Asia.

Yet neither the Americans nor their Asian colleagues take China's "peaceful rise" for granted. This is why most support a continued American military presence in Asia as a "hedge" against a more assertive China in the future — as one regional expert noted: "We have no doubt China's rise will be peaceful; it's what China will do once it has risen that is the real concern." While Washington's actions can affect the outcome (either positively or negatively), in the final analysis, it is up to Beijing to address the region's concerns about its future intentions, as its political, economic and military power continues to grow. It is not a "zero-sum game," American and regional scholars argue, and neither Washington nor Beijing should approach its relations — either with one another or with Asia — from this mindset. This having been said, Asians also warn Washington that it is "losing the competition for influence in Southeast Asia" ... and that China is winning. This is not a cry for help; it is a cry for attention!

The American report pays a lot of attention to the most probable Sino-U.S. flashpoint — Taiwan — as does the companion report from Northeast Asia. All too characteristically, Southeast Asian colleagues barely made passing reference to this problem, even though U.S. mismanagement of its own relations with Taipei could have disastrous consequences for the region. Isolating Taiwan is not the answer. Trying to find creative ways of integrating Taiwan into the economic, political and security dialogue makes more sense, although this requires a less-confrontational approach from Taipei and more flexibility than Beijing has demonstrated to date.

The United States and Southeast Asian reports also stress the need for closer cooperation between Washington and the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a whole, rather than its current largely bilateral approach with individual (especially like-minded) ASEAN members. China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand all now participate in annual summits with ASEAN; the United States does not. One key stumbling point is Myanmar, formerly Burma. Both reports encourage Washington to find more effective ways to promote political reconciliation and openness in Rangoon while also calling on military rulers there to honor their Roadmap to Democracy. Finally, the American and Southeast Asian reports both call for Washington to more effectively reach out to Southeast Asia's 250 million Muslims, highlighting in particular the need to effectively, but diplomatically (read: unobtrusively), support Indonesia's democratization.

The message from Southeast Asia is clear: We want to have good relations with the United States, based on a mutual recognition of the region's growing economic and political importance, not just as a "second front" in the war on terrorism.

American and East Asian specialists alike call on the Bush administration, as it starts its second term, to better articulate a comprehensive strategy and vision for Asia in general, and for ASEAN in particular, encompassing a broad spectrum of political, economic, security, and social/cultural dimensions.