Posted on: Monday, July 5, 2004

Supply system failed in Iraq

By David Zucchino
Los Angeles Times

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. — American soldiers who defeated the Iraqi regime 15 months ago received virtually none of the critical spare parts they needed to keep their tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles running. They ran chronically short of food, water and ammunition.

Also, their radios often failed them, their medics had to forage for medical supplies, artillery gunners had to cannibalize parts from captured Iraqi guns, and intelligence units provided little useful information about the enemy.

These revelations come not from embedded reporters or congressional committees but from the Army itself.

In the first internal assessment of the war in Iraq, an exhaustive Army study has concluded that American forces prevailed despite supply and logistical failures, poor intelligence, communication breakdowns and futile attempts at psychological warfare.

The 542-page study, declassified last month, praises commanders and soldiers for displaying resourcefulness and resiliency under trying conditions, and for taking advantage of superior firepower, training and technology.

But the report also describes a broken supply system that left crucial spare parts and lubricants on warehouse shelves in Kuwait while tank crews outside Baghdad ripped parts from broken-down tanks and raided Iraqi supplies of oil and lubricants.

"No one had anything good to say about parts delivery, from the privates at the front to the generals (at the U.S. command center in Kuwait)," the study's authors concluded after conducting 2,300 interviews and studying 119,000 documents.

Among other highlights, the report revealed that the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad before cheering Iraqis was the brainchild of a U.S. marine colonel, with help from psychological operations, or PSYOPS, units. The report also credited another U.S. Army colonel with shortening the war by "weeks, if not months" with his dramatic "thunder run" into Baghdad.

Portions of an early draft of the report were described by The New York Times in an article in February. The study has since been revised and refined, but the overall conclusions in the final, unclassified report have not changed significantly.

Within the 3rd Infantry Division, which spearheaded the U.S. assault on Baghdad, "literally every maneuver battalion commander asserted that he could not have continued offensive operations for another two weeks without some spare parts," the study said.

The study, titled "On Point" and aimed at "lessons learned," is at odds with the public perception of a technologically superior invasion force that easily drove Saddam from power.

In fact, as the authors point out in their battle-by-battle narrative, there were many precarious moments when U.S. units were critically short of fuel and ammunition, with little understanding of the forces arrayed against them.

The study, by the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group at Fort Leavenworth, called ammunition re-supply "problematic" and said the medical supply system "failed to work." Engineers desperate for explosives foraged for abandoned Iraqi explosives and tore apart mine-clearing charges to use the explosives to blow up captured Iraqi equipment.

Many soldiers plunged into combat not knowing whether they had enough food or water to sustain themselves in punishing heat and blinding sandstorms.

"Stocks of food barely met demand," the study said. "There were times when the supply system was incapable of providing sufficient MREs (meals ready to eat) for the soldiers fighting Iraqi forces."

Military intelligence provided little useful information about the deployment or intentions of Iraqi forces, the study concluded. A 3rd Infantry tank commander whose company was attacked by Iraqi fighters hidden in an elaborate bunker and trench system in Baghdad said he later learned from a French journalist that newspapers had reported details of the bunker network. Yet his own intelligence officers had told him nothing.

Most significantly, military planners did not anticipate the effectiveness or ferocity of paramilitary forces that disrupted supply columns and mounted suicide charges against 70-ton Abrams tanks.

Some of those same forces, using tactics refined during the invasion, are part of the ongoing insurgency.

The report says the military's "running start" — the strategy of launching the invasion before all support units had arrived — made it difficult for commanders to quickly adjust from major combat to postwar challenges. Because combat units outraced supply and support units, combat commanders were caught unprepared when Saddam's regime collapsed after three weeks.

The study critiques the Army's combat performance with an eye toward future wars.

The principal authors — retired Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E.J. Degen and Lt. Col. David Tohn — warned that Iraqi forces could have created significant problems if they had attacked relatively undefended U.S. units staging in Kuwait in the winter of 2002-2003. Those units arrived without significant firepower or reinforcements and were vulnerable to a surprise attack.

The authors also said Iraqis could have extended the battle for Baghdad for weeks if they had destroyed or blocked approaches to the capital, or had forced American troops to fight a drawn-out battle in dense urban areas.

The study credits a relatively junior commander — Col. David Perkins of the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division — with shortening the war with a bold armored strike into the heart of Baghdad on April 7. Perkins' so-called "thunder run" surprised Baghdad's defenders with its speed and firepower, collapsing the regime from within before Iraqi forces could draw the Americans into a protracted urban war.

The authors said Perkins "made the single decision that arguably shortened the siege by weeks, if not months."

U.S. forces prevailed despite seriously underestimating paramilitary forces, especially Saddam Fedayeen, Baath Party militiamen, al-Quds local militiamen and Muslim jihadists from Syria, Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries, the study said. Those fighters harassed U.S. supply columns and nearly overran Perkins' forces along Highway 8 south of Baghdad on April 7.

Attempts by U.S. psychological operations units to persuade Iraqi forces to surrender largely failed, the study concluded.

Despite success in minimizing damage to oil fields, PSYOP units "produced much less than expected and perhaps less than claimed," the authors said.

Some PSYOP leaflets baffled Iraqi forces, while others were outdated, forcing units to resort to loudspeaker broadcasts, the report said.

Poor U.S. intelligence efforts were compounded by ground commanders' decisions — because of the dangers involved — not to send scouts and other reconnaissance troops ahead to report on enemy positions. In addition, long-range surveillance units flying in lightly equipped helicopters "did not produce great effect for the investment of talent and the risk to those involved," the report said.