False alarm — they were only businessmen impatient to beat the traffic.

Formica was pleased, though, that the Iraqis had acted decisively. He had reports that insurgents were planning a major attack, and inspecting vehicles entering the capital was an important part of preventing it.

The U.S. decision to cede sovereignty suddenly, two days ahead of the June 30 scheduled date, was intended to catch the insurgents off balance. The huge security effort by U.S. forces, including Formica's 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, also played a part.

Formica had kept his 4,500 soldiers busier than ever before. In nine days up to July 2 they conducted 2,441 patrols, mounted 262 checkpoints and 70 raids, and arrested 82 suspects in the western half of Baghdad.

The result, tracked by an Associated Press reporter covering the 2nd Brigade, was a negligible increase in minor attacks but no big, bloody ones. In terms of the military's objective — to prevent large-scale violence between June 23 and July 8 — the outcome could be called an invisible victory.

The 2nd Brigade's part of the operation was named Black Jack Storm, derived from the unit's nickname, the Black Jack Brigade. It was responsible for all of western Baghdad, including the highways to Fallujah, a city where intelligence officers believe many of the insurgents live and build car bombs.

These officers had reliable information that the guerrillas intended to stage big attacks on Iraqi government and U.S. targets beginning June 28, two days before the handover date.

Full-time checkpoints using concrete barriers and barbed wire went up on the main roads. Troops doubled their armored patrols searching for insurgents and roadside bombs.

On the first day of Operation Black Jack Storm, Formica met with neighborhood council members to explain the growing number of U.S. troops on the streets.

"My soldiers and I are committed to fighting beside you to see your democracy move forward and we are committed to die if necessary," Formica told them. "You will see an increase in our operations in the next few weeks. What you must tell your people is that we are hunting down terrorists."

Most council members nodded in approval, but a few yawned in studied indifference — those Formica knew to be the least cooperative, coming from some of the most volatile parts of Baghdad.

Formica has six maneuver battalions under his command that operate outside his base at Camp Victory, next to Baghdad International Airport.

While many of the U.S. raids find nothing, some find the unexpected.

During a raid on the home of a man suspected of financing the insurgents, troops found medical equipment sufficient to set up a small blood bank. The supplies backed up intelligence that the insurgents were preparing for a sustained battle.

Another raid captured two suspected foreign fighters, one Somali, the other Palestinian. Yet another found several rocket-propelled grenade launchers, rifles, training manuals and a suspected Iraqi militant.

On the morning of June 28, Formica's normally jovial demeanor at the morning staff meeting was gone. He was preparing for battle.

That open field on the camp's flank? Put up extra security, he ordered.

That mortar launch point used by militants in the middle of the village market? He wanted artillery zeroed in for the next mortar attack from that spot.

"When the market empties, we're going to pound it," Formica said.

Then came word that in 10 minutes the Coalition Provisional Authority would hand over power to the new Iraqi government.

"Excellent. That is a smart move," Formica told his men. "Take the initiative away from the enemy; that's really good news."

On June 29, just after three insurgents were killed launching an ambush, Formica met with tribal leaders to discuss security. He and Lt. Col. Tim Ryan, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, had worked with them before and attacks had diminished. Now they wanted more help.

"During this critical time, it is important we maintain these open lines of communication, because together, we can defeat this threat," Formica told the sheiks. "We need your help to either get them out of (the area), or tell us where they are, and like this morning, we will kill them."

Formica's bluntness startled some of the sheiks. One of them, Sheik Hosham Najim al-Dulaymi, tried to reassure him.

"I go to the neighborhoods late at night and I tell tribal leaders that they need to take control of security, not just for the Americans, but for the Iraqi people," he said. "You started this big operation, set up these roadblocks, and the people see that things are better, not worse, so they support this."

Ryan and Formica gave the sheiks their phone numbers and told them to call if they saw anything suspicious. They also announced five new hot lines for the public to call with tips.

While Formica trusts some of the sheiks, he knows others are involved with the militants. One sheik who claimed to be cooperating with the Americans was later arrested with suspected bomb-makers and tests showed he had been handling explosives.

On June 30, the second full day of Iraqi sovereignty, Formica had lunch with Lt. Col. Mohammed Faiq Raoof, an Iraqi battalion commander assigned to his brigade. Raoof explained the increased combat patrols and checkpoints he had initiated.

"Now the terrorists are quiet, but maybe today or tomorrow they will attack," Raoof told Formica through an interpreter. "They will see the Iraqi police and the Iraqi National Guard and they will back down."

On July 1, at the morning intelligence briefing, Formica dared to be optimistic.

The raids, arrests and patrols had disrupted attack plans by Iraqi nationalists, intelligence reports from classified sources suggested. The raids also uncovered evidence that the early reports indicating a major attack was in the works were accurate, including apparent plans to set up a field hospital to treat their wounded insurgents.

The second enemy consisted of international terrorists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the intelligence assessments said, and their attacks were only delayed by the patrols and checkpoints; their stockpile of weapons and explosives for car bombs remained intact.

The invisible victory was only temporary, Formica concluded.