COMMENTARY
N. Korea talks still rest on U.S. dismantlement formula

By Ralph A. Cossa

North Korea has agreed to participate in a six-party working group meeting Wednesday in Beijing that would help lay the groundwork for the third session of more senior-level, six-nation talks anticipated before the end of June.

Washington has said its position remains unchanged going in: It seeks the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" — or CVID — of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, who heads the U.S. delegation at the plenary sessions, recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the "acronym and the important goal it represents (have) been accepted by all but the North Koreans."

While it is true that all parties — North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States — profess to seek a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula, and the others (less North Korea) pay at least lip service to the CVID objective, it is not clear that all agree on the definition of its components. Nor has Washington been very specific as to what CVID entails.

'Complete'

Washington has made it clear that "complete" means both plutonium- and uranium-enrichment-based programs. However, despite the highly publicized confession by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan, that he sold uranium-enrichment equipment to North Korea, Pyongyang continues to deny having a uranium-based weapons program, and several other members of the six-party process seem openly skeptical of Washington's accusations — or at least more willing to disregard evidence.

Thus, it would appear that North Korea's acknowledgment of a uranium-enrichment program must be the first order of business if there is to be any hope for future progress.

'Verifiable'

"Verifiable" means just that. It has long been acknowledged that devising a verification regime intrusive enough to satisfy hard-line skeptics will be no mean feat. This is why the "Libyan model" is potentially so important.

As Kelly told Congress, "(North Korea) needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world — as other countries have done — to abandon all of its nuclear programs." In case the reference was too subtle, Kelly later noted that he had "discussed Libya's example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance."

In truth, verification can work only if the North cooperates in turning in its hidden hardware (not to mention reprocessed plutonium).

'Irreversible'

The definition of "irreversible" is most subject to interpretation. At a minimum, it would seem to require an end to all North Korean nuclear programs, including energy-associated efforts (both production and reprocessing), to guard against future backsliding. Pyongyang has at times intimated that its "peaceful nuclear energy program" might be put on the bargaining table — if the price is right.

Washington has argued that there is no "peaceful" program, and has made no secret of its desire to avoid an Agreed Framework II or a revival of any lightwater reactor programs, although it has yet to demand formally an end to all nuclear energy-related programs.

'Dismantlement'

Finally, Washington sees "dismantlement" as an action, not as a future promise. Previously it dismissed North Korean "freeze" proposals, saying it would not reward the honoring of past (broken) promises. However, a breakthrough seems possible in this area, depending on how

Pyongyang defines its current "reward for freeze" proposal. While U.S. incentives will come only after dismantlement begins — which is itself a step beyond the Bush administration's "no rewards until dismantlement is complete" approach — Washington has indicated it would not object to a South Korean plan to offer energy assistance to North Korea in return for a "complete and verifiable" freeze, as long as the freeze were identified as "a first step toward dismantlement."

For any freeze proposal to work, it must encompass all of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs. It must also be accompanied by a return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and monitoring devices.

Success at the working-level talks Wednesday — like success at the six-party talks that hopefully will follow — continues to rest on North Korea becoming more forthcoming on the full extent of its nuclear programs, and for China, South Korea and others to insist that any freeze be "complete and verifiable" before significant new rewards are provided.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute. Reach him at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com.