Posted on: Monday, May 24, 2004

EDITORIAL
Pacific commander must be diplomat, too

There's little surprise in the news that Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, is planning to retire sometime this year.

What might raise an eyebrow or two is talk that Fargo could be replaced by an Air Force general. Bristling at that idea is Hawai'i Sen. Dan Inouye, who says the Pacific Command is a "water command" that should be led by an admiral.

We're not nearly as concerned with the color of the new commander's uniform than with his (or, one day soon, her) qualifications for the demands of a job that has expanded and evolved enormously in recent years.

The huge Pacific Command spans half the globe, and its commander is responsible for a variety of missions in the region, ranging from high-level diplomacy and preparation for traditional war-fighting through the new, complex war on terrorism.

It is a post that can ill-afford much getting-up-to-speed. Because Fargo had been commander of the Navy's Pacific Fleet, right down the hill from his present offices at Camp Smith, he already knew the region and was familiar to both military and civilian leaders across Asia.

It was a distinct advantage, one that a commander from the other side of the world, whether Navy or not, would not enjoy. We've seen Pacific commanders set back most often, not by military tactical errors, but by putting their feet in their mouths. That argues for military proficiency heavily counterweighted by a knack for diplomatic nuance.

There's a potential blow-up in Asia for every service: A naval blockade of Taiwan could call for U.S. seapower, a nuclear threat in North Korea might be answered with air power, while an invasion of South Korea might require extensive ground forces. The Pacific forces commander must be on top of all these contingencies — but his most important role may well be in working with his foreign counterparts to prevent any of them from happening.

Of more concern is talk that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been planning sweeping revisions in the way military forces are controlled. Rumsfeld's 2002 order eliminating the title "commander in chief," or "CINC," for the military's top commanders has so far been cosmetic only. Their powers are undiluted.

If that changes, we hope it receives due deliberation in Congress and elsewhere. There's too much at stake in Asia and here in the Pacific to make such a change casually.