Complete U.S. disengagement would mean:

• Walking away from the six-party talks in Beijing, cutting off all communication with Pyongyang, strengthening economic sanctions and warning North Korea that any military threat to the United States, to U.S. forces in Asia, and to U.S. allies would be met with terrible retribution.

• Withdrawing all U.S. forces from the peninsula and abolishing the U.S.-South Korea mutual security treaty because of rampant anti-Americanism in Seoul, a rising tendency to appease North Korea, and a penchant for blaming America for blocking reunification.

On the future of the Koreas, Washington would tell South Korea and North Korea that they themselves must resolve the question of reconciliation or reunification but not to expect American political or economic help. As the U.N. Command in Seoul would be dissolved, the United Nations would be advised that its Security Council would be responsible for executing whatever policies were decided for the Koreas.

Elsewhere, the United States assures the Japanese that the withdrawal applied only to the Koreas and that Washington would fulfill all of its security obligations to Japan. In addition, the United States would pledge full support to Japan in dealing with North Korea on the issue of abducted Japanese citizens, and would back Japan on whatever economic sanctions it decided to apply to Pyongyang.

Similarly, Washington would reassure Taiwan that America would continue to meet its obligations to help defend that island nation under the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States would reassure treaty allies in the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, and friends such as Singapore, that the United States was not pulling out of Asia.

Further, the United States would tell the Chinese, who have been hosts of the six-party talks intended to dissuade North Korean from its nuclear ambitions, that we would quietly support Beijing's efforts to contain North Korea. Just as Washington does not want North Korean missiles aimed at Okinawa or Hawai'i, so the Chinese do not want North Korean nuclear arms facing them across the Yalu River.

The consequences of the U.S. disengagement from the Koreas would be several. Perhaps most telling would be a more intense isolation of Pyongyang from the outside world. That, in turn, might well increase the internal pressures for reform and even regime change within North Korea.

North Korea's economic disasters resulting from mismanagement and natural causes are well known. Now, even though it is a hermit kingdom, hints are leaking out that not all is well politically and that dissent has begun to rumble through Kim Jong Il's government.ÊPerhaps the regime of the "Dear Leader" will collapse of its own misdeeds.

An American disengagement from the Koreas would most likely nudge Japan to accelerate its already steady move toward a more assertive security posture, which the United States would welcome. There is no reason to believe, however, that this would push Japan to acquire nuclear arms.

China would be faced with a critical decision.ÊSome years ago, Chinese leaders quietly told American officials that they would do whatever was necessary to keep North Korea afloat and that they have the foreign exchange reserves — the world's largest — to do it.ÊChinese leaders may have since changed their minds and would see Kim Jong Il's departure as advantageous.

For the United States, the main benefit of disengagement would be freeing American troops now in South Korea for duties elsewhere. U.S. forces are stretched thin around the world, and obtaining the services of those in South Korea would be welcomed in the Pentagon. Those troops would not go to Okinawa, where there already is friction between Japanese and Americans, but could be posted on Guam, in Hawai'i, or on the U.S. Mainland.

The chances of this strategy coming to pass are limited because it is too unconventional, and all political leaders seem to be pursuing negotiations. But maybe this is a time for imaginative, alternative thinking.