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The Honolulu Advertiser
Posted on: Thursday, October 20, 2005

Final report out on sub collision

By Mike Gordon
Advertiser Staff Writer

Scott Waddle, the former Navy commander of the Pearl Harbor-based submarine that collided and sank a Japanese fisheries training vessel, agreed yesterday with the findings of a National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the accident.

Waddle was skipper of the USS Greeneville when it collided with the Ehime Maru on Feb. 9, 2001, during a surfacing maneuver 9 miles south of Diamond Head. Nine people aboard, all Japanese, died.

"It was an ugly event," Waddle said by telephone from a Nebraska airport. "But the one guy who is responsible is the captain and the buck stops there."

The safety board released its 50-page findings yesterday. It blamed the collision on poor communication between senior crew members of the Greeneville and shortcuts made by Waddle, largely to accommodate 16 civilian guests who were not adequately managed. The report said his actions gave the crew a false sense of security about nearby surface ships — what submariners call "contacts."

"The civilians, although not directly a hindrance, were a distraction," Waddle said. "And, no, they were not properly managed. The submarine was at sea for one purpose and that was to entertain them for the day. And my team — myself included — failed to manage the contact picture adequately."

The safety board said Waddle's "overly directive style" of leadership led to "teamwork problems." It also noted that he made "critical errors" when key people operating the Greeneville failed to perform their duties and communicate vital information.

The breakdown led to three mistakes by Waddle:

  • He failed to adequately analyze the whereabouts of surface ships in the area.

  • He rushed the submarine to periscope depth, adversely affecting his crew's ability to understand what was on the surface.

  • He ordered the surfacing maneuver in the direction of the Ehime Maru.

    Contributing to the errors made by senior personnel responsible for the ship's safety was Waddle's failure to ensure that the civilian visitors did not impede operations, the report stated.

    The guests were part of the Navy's "distinguished visitors" program and most of them were in the control room with Waddle when the submarine shot to the surface from a depth of 400 feet. The crew had executed an emergency main ballast tank blow, a procedure that forces the submarine to the surface as quickly as possible. Once begun, the sub's course cannot be altered.

    The report concluded that Waddle added the emergency maneuver for the visitors and that he took a series of "procedural shortcuts" rather than perform standard-risk assessment beforehand. The report said he was apparently more concerned that the visitors were involved in the maneuver, personally assigning a civilian to sit at the helm controls and allowing another to operate the levers that launch the maneuver — although both were under direct supervision.

    Waddle then served as a narrator for what was going on.

    "I cannot refute what the NTSB said," Waddle said. "The reason the procedures were rushed was that I thought it was prudent. I thought it was safe. In hindsight, I was wrong. I don't think anyone would have done an emergency surfacing procedure if they knew there was a ship that close."

    Waddle said he did not expect to see anything on the surface when he originally peered through the periscope before sending the sub back down for the maneuver.

    "In my mind, I didn't expect to see anything and I didn't," he said. "Everybody was just enjoying the fact that the civilians were out there and that was screwed up."

    The collision created an embarrassing international incident for the Navy and ended Waddle's career. He had been one of the most-respected officers on the Pearl Harbor waterfront.

    The report's conclusions mirrored those reached by a Navy court of inquiry in April 2001 — something the Navy reiterated yesterday.

    Since the collision, the Navy made several changes to the way it trains submarine commanders to manage risk, said Jon Yoshishige, a spokesman for the Pacific Fleet. A submarine's commanding officer and executive officer are required to attend a rigorous six-week course where they are encouraged to challenge their trainers when presented with real-life scenarios, Yoshishige said.

    Taking civilians on a cruise remains a key public relations tool for the Navy, Yoshishige said, but guests are no longer allowed to touch the controls.

    "Our commanding officers are expected to operate their ships and in fact routinely do operate their ships under conditions considerably more stressful and complex," Yoshishige said. "It is the commanding officer's responsibility to prevent his crew from being distracted."

    In 2001, the Navy found Waddle, now 46, guilty of dereliction of duty and negligent hazarding of the Greeneville. Waddle retired with full benefits and has since written a book and is now a motivational speaker. He has 150 to 200 speaking engagements a year and has stood before school groups, church groups, lawyers, bankers and business and professional associations.

    Waddle said he remains a staunch supporter of the Navy, adding that his daughter is a freshman at the U.S. Naval Academy, his alma mater.

    "If I could go back in time and have a few more of those minutes back," he said of that Friday afternoon off O'ahu, "I wish we could have looked a little bit higher with the periscope and a little longer. I am confident we would have seen the Ehime Maru. Two feet higher, 30 seconds longer and we would have seen it."

    Reach Mike Gordon at mgordon@honoluluadvertiser.com.

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