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The Honolulu Advertiser
Posted on: Sunday, October 23, 2005

COMMENTARY
America's diplomatic efforts lost in translation

By Richard Halloran

South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, left, chats with North Korean chief negotiator Kim Gye Gwan last month at the end of talks over North Korea's nuclear capability. Because of language prob-lems, the author says, diplomats often end up talking past each other.

NG HAN GUAN | Associated Press

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The Korean interpreter for U.S. diplomats in negotiations with North Korea says an agreement reached a month ago in China "is a linguistic minefield" of "hidden meanings and obfuscation."

In an intriguing essay about the difficulties of communicating across national cultures, political systems and languages that are so utterly different, Tong Kim wrote: "It took one day for the accord to melt into misunderstanding and mistrust."

To take but one example, the Americans and North Koreans, along with Chinese, Japanese, Russians and South Korean negotiators in the six-party talks intended to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions, agreed that they would consider supplying a nuclear reactor to generate electricity to North Korea at an "appropriate time."

The day after the accord was signed, the North Koreans said that meant now.

To the Americans, Kim said, it meant "somewhere between yesterday and never."

In another instance, North Korea supposedly committed itself to abandoning "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs."

In translation, however, the North Koreans used a verb that, Kim said, "could be interpreted to mean leaving the weapons in place rather than dismantling them." The Americans insisted on dismantling.

Kim, born and brought up in Seoul, came to the United States in 1972 and served for 27 years as a State Department interpreter. He sat in on almost every high-level U.S.-North Korean meeting for more than a decade, including 17 visits to Pyongyang. His essay appeared on the Web site of the Nautilus Institute, nautilus.org.

"I listened as these two countries' officials talked past each other, attaching different meanings and significance to the same words," Kim wrote.

"This happens often enough to people speaking the same language; when they're using languages as different as English and Korean, it's even more common.

"The words are hard enough to decipher," he said. "They come with traditions, hang-ups, and history." When the Americans demanded an "irreversible" end to Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, the North Koreans bridled because it made them seem like a defeated nation. After the Americans switched to "permanent," they became less obstinate, Kim said.

Kim's findings would seem applicable to the American venture into Iraq, an Arab nation profoundly different from the United States in culture, politics and language. Yet the United States is painfully short of linguists and specialists in Arab culture.

Jennifer Bremer, a U.S. diplomat in Cairo for three years and now an adviser to the University of North Carolina's Center for the Study of Middle East and Muslim Civilizations, has said only 35 American diplomats are capable of speaking Arabic well enough to engage in a clear and cogent discussion of U.S. policy before an Arab audience.

"This little band cannot possibly cover our need to understand and be understood across 21 embassies and consulates in a region with a population approaching 300 million people, and one, moreover, with very different dialects from east to west," she wrote in the Washington Post.

"There is no substitute for having Americans who can communicate — really communicate — in the local language. The failure to field more diplomats who speak the language gives unhelpful support to the view that the United States just does not take the Arab world seriously."

The Defense Department is in the same fix despite having 140,000 troops fighting an insurgency in Iraq. Not long ago, the press section in the U.S headquarters in Baghdad had 50 military people and civilians on the staff, none of whom spoke Arabic.

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, who has served in Iraq and is on duty in the Pentagon now, has written that Iraqi insurgents have at least one distinct advantage over U.S. soldiers: "They don't need to allocate translators to combat patrols. They understand the tribal loyalties and family relationships that play such an important role in the politics and economies of many developing nations. They have an innate understanding of local patterns of behavior that is simply unattainable by foreigners."

Nagl adds that the Army is seeking to overcome this fault. "Programs to recruit additional Arabic speakers are under way in both the active Army and in the National Guard," he said, "adding another essential weapon to the counterinsurgency capability of the nation."

Few of these difficulties in communicating across cultures are new, but they constitute a lesson that evidently needs to be relearned time and again. As a colorful and experienced British correspondent in Southeast Asia, Dennis Bloodworth, cautioned 35 years ago:

"East and West do not speak the same language, even when it is English."

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia.