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COMMENTARY An effective way to counter North Korea By Richard Halloran |
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Ever since the North Korean fireworks of missile launches on July 4, the world has watched the spectacle of the political leaders and diplomats of America, China, Japan and South Korea scurrying in search of a response to Pyongyang's "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il.
Most of the thrashing about has focused on traditional diplomacy with an occasional suggestion of economic sanctions or dark hints of military action, all of which have been shown to be ineffective or infeasible. Thus, maybe the time has come for a new, possibly radical strategy, one that might be called the Strategy of the Triple-I's — Ignore, Isolate and Implode.
A Japanese authority on North Korea, Masao Okonogi of Keio University, points to the nature of North Korea's maneuvers. The missiles, he says, were "only Act 1 in North Korea's brinkmanship." Since Kim Jong Il's mastery of brinkmanship is widely recognized, the new posture would seek to take away that brink.
The United States would take the lead in implementing this action and could most likely count on Japan as a partner. Features of the Triple-I strategy:
A longtime Asia hand, retired Marine Lt. Gen. W.C. "Chip" Gregson, cautions that the U.S. should keep unofficial channels open to the North Koreans. "They will never bargain in good faith," he argues, "but we need some channels to talk to them."
Covertly, the U.S. would seek to disrupt North Korean financial transactions, much as it has with Al-Qaida terrorists. The U.S. has already sanctioned a bank in Macao for laundering North Korean counterfeit dollars. (News of this covert financial operation might be leaked to the press as part of the psychological warfare against Kim Jong Il.)
The U.S. should openly support Tokyo's moves to counter North Korea. In particular, Japan should be encouraged to stop financial transfers to Pyongyang from North Korean residents of Japan and to press North Korea on the issue of their abductions of Japanese citizens over many years.
For now, military action has been all but ruled out because the death and damage to South Korea would be devastating even though North Korea would eventually be defeated.
The premise behind the Triple-I strategy holds that Kim Jong Il will not give up nuclear weapons or missiles unless the U.S. withdraws its forces from South Korea, Japan and the Western Pacific, breaks the security treaties with South Korea and Japan, and formally pledges not to attack North Korea from the sea or air.
Proclaiming this Triple-I strategy would confront China and South Korea with two choices: to support their unruly neighbor or to allow the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang to implode. Either way, the cost to Beijing and Seoul for regime survival or regime change would be enormous.
As professor Okonogi says with quintessential Japanese understatement: "Should North Korea's political system collapse, China would be greatly affected, so it would remain reluctant to drive North Korea into a corner. The same holds true of South Korea."
Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. His column appears weekly in Sunday's Focus section.
