The North Koreans were up to their colorful antics again this week that, if the issue wasn't so serious, might have been downright amusing.

Right after they were censured by the U.N. Security Council for firing a missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean two weeks ago, North Korean leaders charged, through the official news agency, that the council was being "brigandish," guilty of "unjust action" and at fault for "wantonly infringing upon the sovereignty of the DPRK."

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the country's formal name, said it would never again take part in the six-party talks intended to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons and that it would "bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way." China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S. were the others engaged in the talks for the last six years.

President Obama's administration, in office less than 100 days and clearly caught without a ready response, was flustered. Obamaites in the government, politicians of all stripes, think-tankers and specialists on North Korea outside the government, scurried to find or recommend a course of action.

Sifting through the talk, the proposals come down to five, none of them commanding a clear majority:

• Military action: The U.S. could have destroyed the North Korean missile on its launch pad with cruise missiles fired from a submarine or knocked down the missile in flight with newly installed ballistic missile defenses. Nuclear and missile facilities could be taken out by bombers later. But North Korea would surely retaliate by attacking South Korea and tens of thousands would die before North Korea could be defeated.

• Six-party talks: Some analysts argue that the U.S., along with the four other nations in the six-party talks, should strive to revive them, even at the cost of initial concessions to North Korea. With no substantive progress in six years, with the North Koreans having adamantly opted out of the talks, and with no hard evidence that North Korea will give up its nuclear arms, those talks hold little promise of success.

• Direct negotiations: Other analysts say North Korea wants to negotiate only with the U.S. Their objectives would be to reach a treaty replacing the armistice that halted the Korean War in 1953, diplomatic recognition, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, an end to the U.S.-South Korea security treaty, economic and technical aid, and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. Few Americans would pay that price.

• More sanctions: North Korea's economy is in such wretched condition that adding sanctions on top of those already imposed would have little financial or political effect. Moreover, the Chinese, who have long kept North Korea afloat, have given few signs that they are willing to abide by the sanctions of others. The same would be true of South Korea and Russia.

• Walk away: In this scenario, the U.S. would tell the North Koreans in public that when they produce evidence they are ready to negotiate in good faith, the U.S. will meet them halfway. Privately, the U.S. would tell them that any threatening move against the U.S. or its allies would draw retaliation at a time, place, and method of U.S. choosing. U.S. negotiators would then walk away, and wait.

Let's close with a quiz: When was the last time the U.S. or an American ally negotiated with North Korea and reached an agreement that both sides genuinely accepted and implemented?

If you answered "never," go to the head of the class.

Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times as a correspondent in Asia and in Washington, is a writer in Honolulu.