It is a question that won't seem to go away: Is a resurgence of Japanese militarism likely?

Chinese, South Koreans and North Koreans frequently assert that the Japanese are seeking to rebuild their armed forces and once more to use them aggressively. Indonesians, Singaporeans and Australians say the same, but less often and less vehemently. Liberals in America and Europe and left-wingers in Japan itself voice concerns.

Even some American military officers, while applauding Japanese deployments to support U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan and Iraq, say they are worried that the Japanese will revert to the harsh ways of 1931-1945, when their armies overran much of Asia.

On the other hand, Japan's stance as America's leading ally in Asia was high on the agenda when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's met with President Bush last week in Washington, and when they visited Graceland, home of Elvis Presley, in Memphis, Tenn. Koizumi has long been a fan of "The King."

The litany of grievances against Japan begins with allegations that the Japanese have not atoned for the brutalities of yesteryear despite some 35 apologies for the excesses of that period. Next comes visits by Japanese politicians, notably Koizumi, to the Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to Japan's war dead. The Yushukan military museum next door is another target.

Add history books that downplay Japan's aggression or pleas for redress by "comfort women" forced into prostitution; or the Rape of Nanking, when tens of thousands of Chinese were slaughtered; or inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, including barbaric medical experiments.

Even the Rising Sun flag and the national anthem, "Kimigayo," which prays that the nation will persevere until a great rock is covered with moss, are lamented as symbols of belligerence.

Note that these complaints arise from events 60 to 75 years ago. In contrast, there is scant evidence that Japan intends to acquire today a military force commensurate with its economic strength and size of its population. Equally scant is evidence that the Japanese seek to employ military power as an instrument of an ultra-nationalistic foreign policy.

Japan is not a heavy spender on defense. Its defense budget runs to about $45 billion a year, roughly a tenth that of the United States and half that of China. That budget takes one percent of Japan's gross domestic product, compared with 3.8 percent in the U.S. Japan's defense spending has been stagnant for most of the past decade as Japan's economy has been in the doldrums.

Moreover, what a nation spends for military forces is far less indicative than what it buys. The costs of Japan's personnel, arms and equipment are among the world's highest; thus Japan pays $45 billion a year to field a force of 240,000 people. By contrast, China spends $90 billion to field a force of 2.25 million, nearly ten times as large.

Japan's small force is in a class with those of Germany, France, Britain and Italy, but it is smaller than those of its neighbors, China, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and Taiwan. Even if Japan had expansionist intentions, its armed forces would run into large, well-armed adversaries in contrast to the ill-trained colonial forces Japan faced in the 1940s.

Japan's Self-Defense Force is well named. It has first-class tanks, fighter planes, warships and submarines but it has little capacity for projecting power beyond Japan's shores because it lacks long-range bombers, aerial transport, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships.

Most of all, the lack of political will for aggressive military power is evident in a society that is emerging from the pacifist cocoon in which the Japanese wrapped themselves after the destruction and defeat of World War II.

That absence of political will is true in all political factions save the small far right wing, among business leaders, the universities, the press and unions. A clue: For Japan to arm itself enough to project power abroad would require a draft. That is so distant from anyone's thinking today that polls haven't even been taken.

Why, then, the persistent barrage of criticism?

Asians have long memories. Japan's past is a convenient tool to apply today to gain concessions. Lambasting Japan diverts attention from vexing domestic problems in Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang.

Moreover, the Japanese have only themselves to blame, to some extent, because they will go to great lengths to avoid confrontation. Individually and collectively, Japanese find it extraordinarily difficult to stand up and defend themselves.

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. His column appears weekly in Sunday's Focus section.