Israel's battle today with Hezbollah and Hamas militants did not result only from a failed peace process. Neither did the U.S. and Arab reactions. The underlying hostilities of today's conflict have been simmering for decades. Perhaps the real seeds were sown nearly 40 years ago during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

At the time, I did not realize the full extent of the consequences of the Six Day War. Israel's swift and decisive victory gave the country control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, formerly held by Egypt, the West Bank, previously controlled by Jordan, and the formerly Syrian Golan Heights. This defeat was crippling not only to the Arab countries' military force but also a major blow to the national pride of Arabs everywhere.

Now, nearly four decades after the fact, I understand better why the June 1967 war was such a key turning point in the modern history of the Middle East and Arab relations with the United States. I realized then that the Arab sense of humiliation and national dishonor would haunt U.S. relations and the prospects for Arab-Israel peace, but I analyzed it as a continuation of the struggle between a well-established Israeli/Zionist nationalism and a bumbling but potentially powerful Arab nationalism focusing on the issue of Palestine.

I saw this focus on Palestine resulting partly out of genuine grievance but also as an excuse for the shortcomings of Arab governments.

The October 1973 war and its aftermath restored some semblance of Arab honor and statecraft. Egypt had demonstrated heightened military capabilities and the wisdom to seek an achievable political outcome. Egyptian nationalism and pride soared. However, this military achievement was not enough to change the basic problem.

The partly successful peacemaking that resulted in peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan did nothing to change the underlying issue. Neither did the political and economic reforms in various Arab countries that moved them on a humane course to modernity and tolerance.

Finally, even the Oslo Accords, where Israelis and Palestinians seemed willing to work together toward a compromise, ultimately did not result in a solution. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems to me that the enduring problem is Israel's domination of East Jerusalem and much of its West Bank hinterland and U.S. acquiescence in Israel's decision. For historic and emotional reasons, Arabs and Muslims are strongly attached to East Jerusalem, which Palestinians need as the capital of an independent state.

Israel's determination to hold on indefinitely to occupied territories including all of greater Jerusalem has changed the conflict from a conflict of national movements to a conflict of religiously defined political ideologies.

Since 1967, Israel has continued to expand and build new settlements in the occupied territories, a policy driven increasingly by right-wing religious groups. The coming to power of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Shi'a religious movements of Iraq and all the repressed clones of the Muslim Brothers are mirrored by the stranglehold the settler movement has been able to exercise over Israeli politics. Al-Qaeda and "wanna-be" al-Qaedas are only the most extreme manifestations.

The attraction these movements have for secular Arab and for non-Arab Muslim intellectuals is a symptom we have been seeing for a couple of decades. Now we are reaping the whirlwind sown by the June 1967 war.

David Mack is vice president of the Middle East Institute. Readers may send him e-mail at communications@mideasti.org. He wrote this for the McClatchy-Tribune News Service.