As expected, Shinzo Abe emerged last week to take Junichiro Koizumi's place as Japan's Prime Minister. His popularity within the Liberal Democratic Party was demonstrated well in advance of his election to the party's leadership on Sept. 20. His victory virtually assured, he spent much of his time in debates with his contenders, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki, laying out how the LDP differs from the major opposition Democratic Party of Japan and setting the stage for next year's crucial Upper House electoral contest.

When election day came, Abe received more than 60 percent of the grassroots support of his party and approximately two-thirds of the national legislators. But he is just as popular with Japanese outside the LDP. In a poll taken by one of Japan's largest national daily newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun, the day after he was sworn in as prime minister, Abe received 70 percent of the public's support.

Abe presents a young and dynamic face for Japan. He is the first Japanese prime minister born in the postwar, and he conveys to most Japanese a sense of energy and confidence. His political pedigree contributes also to his credibility. His grandfather was Nobusuke Kishi, the conservative prime minister in the late 1950s who renegotiated Japan's security treaty with the United States. And his father was the late Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, for years a member of the ruling elite. Thus, despite Abe's decidedly postwar identity, his family has been at the forefront of leadership throughout Japan's tumultuous 20th century.

This considerable support for Abe within Japan is offset, however, by some serious concerns from those outside Japan.

For many outside observers, Abe seems to be too willing to loosen the self-imposed constraints that have defined Japan's postwar international relations. He is sympathetic to the idea that Japanese must revisit their understanding of Japan's modern history, both in terms of rewriting the formal narratives of the past and in terms of debating their contemporary role in international relations.

On a personal level, he is said to have reservations about the process and the outcome of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, and it seems that he would like to continue the practice of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He also has advocated and worked for the revision of the "no war" clause of Japan's postwar Constitution.

Abe has been willing to take up the task of creating what the conservatives argue to be a more "normal" Japan. Since the early 1990s, this vision suggests that Japan has been hampered by a foreign policy that emphasizes the need to avoid the exercise of power, particularly with regard to its military, in international relations. Ichiro Ozawa, now leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, articulated it when he argued for a greater Japanese engagement with the United Nations.

But it also has been associated with those who want younger Japanese to develop greater pride in their country, its history and its contemporary achievements, and want to change the way educators teach in the classroom. Abe is keen to see Japan's Basic Education Law revised, and will likely move on this legislative agenda early on in his tenure as prime minister.

On the defense side, Abe is not alone in his belief that Japan's foreign policymaking must be based upon the concept of national interest. He played a key role in Koizumi's efforts to negotiate with North Korea, and he has clearly developed an agenda based on that experience.

He already has suggested the need for better policy making regarding national security, and wants to create a U.S.-style national security council to serve the prime minister. Nor is he shy about the need to be more ready militarily in case Japan is threatened. After Pyongyang's July 5 missile launches, he argued that Japan should be prepared to defend itself with a pre-emptive strike. He is particularly hard line when it comes to dealing with North Korea, and one of his first initiatives as prime minister was to give his Cabinet secretary the additional high profile portfolio as special advisor on Japanese abductees in North Korea.

But his greatest priority, and his most important challenge, will be putting Japan's relations with China and South Korea back on a stable footing.

Here Koizumi's legacy will continue to haunt him, but it will be the willingness of leaders in Beijing and Seoul to open channels with Abe that will ultimately determine the outcome of his stated desire to improve Japan's relations with its neighbors.

Initial efforts to create better relations with Seoul have been met by a stubborn resistance in the Blue House as President Roh Moo-hyun continues to reject a rapprochement with Tokyo. Abe's own conservative views may be sorely tested as he attempts to find his way with Beijing, but here there is perhaps more room for optimism. Despite the deep distrust between Hu Jintao and Koizumi, there may be greater opportunity now to create at least a polite dialogue between the two leaders of Asia's largest economies.

Still, Abe's closest friend is likely to continue to be President Bush. Japan's new prime minister shares his predecessor's belief that a close alliance between Tokyo and Washington is in Japan's best interests. In a phone call with Bush on Sept. 27, Bush made it clear that he hopes to develop the same level of close personal ties with Abe as he had with Koizumi, and invited Japan's new leader to Washington as soon as possible.

Abe has already met the president, but his first meeting with him as Japan's prime minister is likely to be in November at the APEC Summit meeting in Vietnam. If Abe has his way, that also could be the occasion for his first meetings with China's Hu and Korea's Roh, as well.

While many around the globe have feared a Japanese nationalist, it is more likely that Asia and the world will be introduced very shortly to Shinzo Abe, Japan's newest pragmatic internationalist.

Sheila A. Smith is a research fellow in politics, governance and security in the East-West Center Research Program. Smith also is affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University. She has conducted extensive field work in Tokyo at the University of Tokyo and in Okinawa at the University of the Ryukyus, and has had research fellowships at the Japan Institute for International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security. Reach her at 944-7427 or via e-mail at SmithS@EastWestCenter.org. She wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.