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COMMENTARY U.S. Pacific Command modifies strategy By Richard Halloran |
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The U.S. Pacific Command, which controls American forces from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa, has fashioned a subtle revision in its strategy of reassuring friends and deterring potential enemies, notably China and North Korea.
The new strategy, approved this month by the command's leader, Adm. Timothy Keating, is "based on partnership, presence, and military readiness." Earlier versions were more assertive in tone, one saying, "It is a strategy rooted in partnership and military preeminence."
In his cover letter authorizing the new strategy, Keating said, "It underscores the fundamental importance of sustained and persistent cooperation and collaboration in times of relative peace to mitigate situations that could lead to conflict and crisis."
Many Asians and some Americans in recent years have accused the U.S. of going it alone and failing to consult with allies and friends, all wrapped up in the allegation of "unilateralism." In his 15 months as the Pacific commander, Keating has sought to dispel that image and to stress collective action.
At the same time, the admiral said the emphasis on security cooperation "does not signal a departure from our primary responsibility to fight and win." Even so, he said, the Pacific Command would accentuate a posture intended to "preclude the necessity for combat operations."
Officers at the command's headquarters above Pearl Harbor said the revised strategy was aimed at several audiences:
Taiwan, of course, is the most likely cause of war between China and the U.S. Beijing contends the island is part of China and has threatened to use military force to conquer it. The U.S. insists that the fate of Taiwan be determined peaceably and in accord with the wishes of people on both sides of the strait between them.
The revised strategy calls for a "whole of government approach," asserting that security in the Asia-Pacific region "demands a high degree of coordination, integration, and unity of effort" within the Pentagon and across other departments and agencies.
The document applauds Australia and Japan for joining the U.S. "in developing a trilateral partnership dedicated to improving security in the region." It further points to trilateral cooperation among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, which may be no more than a diplomatic nicety as the Japanese disdain the Koreans and the Koreans distrust the Japanese. The U.S. tries to deal with each evenhandedly, but rarely do they work together.
Among the strategy's more striking pledges is the Pacific Command's commitment to freedom of movement, particularly through the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea. More ships sail through that passage in a year than through the Suez and Panama canals combined. The document says flatly the command will not "tolerate disruptions to global supply chains or threats to lines of communication and commerce."
On China, the Pacific Command has sought for more than a decade to assure the Chinese that the U.S. is not out to contain or repress China. At the same time, Pacific commanders one after the other have cautioned the Chinese not to underestimate American military power in the Asia-Pacific region nor the willingness of the U.S. to use it.
Even with the emphasis on partnership, humanitarian assistance, and defeating criminals, the strategy concludes on a distinctly assertive note: In the Asia-Pacific region, the command is to be the "preeminent warfighter."
Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. His column appears weekly in Sunday's Focus section.
