Is China prepared to take "yes" for an answer? For a number of years, Beijing pushed the Bush administration about elevating bilateral talks on regional security issues to a ministerial-level "Strategic Dialogue." The best they could get was a "Senior Dialogue" involving deputy ministers. As a consolation prize, ministerial-level talks between finance ministers were dubbed the "Strategic Economic Dialogue," but the upper echelons of the State Department (and the Defense Department) remained at arm's length.

All this has changed. The Obama administration has clearly signaled that it is prepared to make China part of the solution in dealing with global political, economic, and security challenges but it remains unclear if Beijing is prepared to take on the extra responsibilities associated with being a world leader and a strategic partner of the United States.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first signaled this change in U.S. policy in early February when she asserted that the Obama administration was "committed to pursuing a positive relationship with China, one that we believe is essential to America's future peace, progress, and prosperity."

"When you are in a common boat," she noted, citing an old Chinese saying, "you need to cross the river peacefully together."

Gone were the references to China as a "responsible stakeholder," a term that some in China found judgmental and offensive (since Washington reserved the right to determine what constituted "responsible" behavior). Instead, Washington pledged a "positive, cooperative and comprehensive" relationship, a catch phrase made official when used by President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao when they met along the sidelines of the G-20 Summit meeting in early April. By contrast, the Bush administration usually described the relationship as "constructive, cooperative, and candid" — in diplomatic-speak, "candid" normally means troubled or contentious.

The two leaders announced a two-track "U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," with the strategic track chaired by Secretary Clinton and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and the economic track chaired by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan. They pledged to improve relations between the Pentagon and the Peoples Liberation Army as well.

Some in Washington even started talking about a so-called "G2," implying that Washington and Beijing, working together, held the key to resolving the current global financial crisis. While this formulation was never officially adopted by the Obama administration — so as not to offend the world's second-largest economy (Japan) or the European Union (whose combined GDP outweighs China's) — administration officials quickly pointed out that the crisis could not be solved without close cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

Despite these many offers to step up to the plate, Beijing still appears content to remain in the dugout, however. It has focused almost exclusively on stimulating its own economy while gleefully pointing out how the crisis started in — and should be largely blamed on — the United States, while boasting that the Chinese economic model may be more appropriate for long-term stability than the so-called "Washington Consensus."

More important has been China's great reluctance to join Washington (and most of the world) in promoting and enforcing strict countermeasures in response to North Korea's recent (and threatened future) missile and nuclear weapons tests. Beijing insisted on a weaker U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement, rather than a more binding resolution, after Pyongyang's missile firing in April and demanded that the use of force not be authorized to enforce the harsher sanctions agreed upon after North Korea's defiant nuclear weapons test in May. It also continues to block strong criticism of Iran's nuclear aspirations (and has been silent while the rest of the world condemns Tehran's current violence against its own citizens), resists U.N. measures against Sudan, and has been the primary defender and apologist for Myanmar as its kangaroo court continues against Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

The PLA has been even less forthcoming. At this year's Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Secretary Robert Gates (unlike his predecessor) took an exclusively positive approach in discussing Sino-U.S. relations, noting that it was "essential" that the two sides find "opportunities to cooperate wherever possible." By contrast, the senior Chinese official at the meeting, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, complained about the threat posed by U.S. alliances and Washington's "cold war mentality," in a speech that could have been written five years ago, during the Donald Rumsfeld era.

The Obama administration, by its words and actions, has demonstrated that it is prepared for a fundamentally changed relationship with the PRC but so far it has been business as usual in Beijing. Seeking a strategic dialogue is one thing; actually having one appears to still be a bridge too far. It's time for Beijing to step up to the plate, quit hiding behind its "non-interference" principle, and hold fruitful discussions with Washington aimed at seriously addressing and solving growing security problems around the globe. Until it does, the Obama administration's outreach notwithstanding, China will remain part of the problem rather than contributing to the solution.

Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.