COMMENTARY
How to approach pakistan
The Obama administration has placed its relationship with Pakistan at the top of its foreign policy agenda, and for good reason.
Put simply, a solid relationship with Pakistan is key to a stable Afghanistan and, in turn, national and global security.
Many of the safe havens of al-Qaida, surely the No. 1 "enemy" in the war on terror, are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan next to Afghanistan. This is where as many as 50,000 U.S. troops will be stationed in the near future.
The increase in violence in Afghanistan is directly related to cross-border infiltration. Equally significant, Pakistan has become one of the biggest victims of terrorism. Its authority is increasingly being challenged by the militants in many parts of the country.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Obama administration has taken steps to chart a new course after the failure of the Bush administration's policy on Pakistan. For example:
But the complexities of U.S.-Pakistan relations are many. They are rooted in the past and are visibly present today, leading to serious "trust deficit" in both countries.
After aligning with Pakistan to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the U.S. not only abruptly left Afghanistan but also imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the 1980s for the latter's secret nuclear program, a program initiated in response to a similar initiative from India.
Even though Pakistan aligned with the U.S. after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration shifted most of its military and other assets to Iraq. This led to the regrouping of al-Qaida and the Taliban in the historically ungovernable border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Then, the U.S. forged a strategic, long-term relationship with India, giving India access to nuclear technology outside the existing global nuclear technology regimes. Similar access was not granted to Pakistan.
Militant groups operating today between Pakistan and Afghanistan were sponsored by the Pakistani intelligence agency in the 1980s, with the support of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, to fight the Soviets. This leaves a legacy. To this day, doubts persist in the U.S. about the sympathies of some elements of Pakistani intelligence in joint efforts to defeat al-Qaida and Taliban.
The use of force has been the main instrument of the U.S. policy in uprooting al-Qaida and Taliban from the border areas. This poses a problem, because the Pakistani military has neither the ability nor the willingness to use excessive force against its own citizens.
Weak political institutions in Pakistan represent a major obstacle to a long-term and sustainable relationship between the two countries. Pakistan has been ruled by military-led governments for about half of its existence. Four military coups have weakened the nation.
Cultural perception gaps are also a major impediment to sustainable U.S.-Pakistan relations, as shown by the reaction of the two countries to the Pakistani agreement with the Taliban in Swat Valley. The U.S. saw this as an agreement with "murderers and killers" and an affront to human rights. Pakistani leaders saw this as an arrangement based on the Pakistani constitution.
If the U.S. saw the accommodation with militants in Swat as a deal with the devil, Pakistani citizens saw equal irony in the U.S. making an alliance with the former Sunni militants in Iraq who killed thousands of civilians and U.S. personnel.
It is in the U.S. interest to forge a multifaceted and long-term relationship with Pakistan, recognizing the above and related complexities. Here's how:
The situation in Pakistan is grave. Challenges are alarming. The need for investment of financial, diplomatic and military resources is in the vital national security interests of the U.S. President Obama is right in "shifting gears quickly" to have a new policy on Pakistan. Achieving results is not going to be easy. But the cost of inaction will be too high.
Shabbir Cheema is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.
Reach Shabbir Cheema at (Unknown address).