The debate over Afghanistan troop levels is repeating the same arguments as the Iraq troop surge discussions. Reinforcement opponents rightly have noted that aid, education, economic reconstruction and political reforms are the keys to victory.

Unfortunately, the Taliban also recognizes that fact and is attacking aid projects, killing aid workers, murdering teachers and destroying schools, often with the students still in them. They are particularly brutal in their atrocities against female students and their instructors. Many have been burned alive. Terrorists target honest and hard-working government officials as often as corrupt ones, making service in the government a risky affair for those willing to do it.

These tactics are nearly identical to the terrorists employed in Iraq and they teach the same lesson: There can be no economic reconstruction, education or effective public services and political reform without security, and security requires troops.

Defeating an insurgency requires a complex military-economic-political strategy that addresses security challenges as well as the causes of both the insurgency and the conditions feeding its ranks. Rules of thumb dictate that security requires a 10-to-1 numerical advantage over the insurgents because they hold the initiative, attacking whenever and wherever they want. To defeat them, their opponent must 1) secure the border to prevent infiltration and supplies getting into the country, 2) provide security around key aid projects, government facilities and in each town and village, 3) patrol and secure transportation networks and facilities, and 4) pursue the insurgents into their strongholds.

However, military security is only a short-term solution if the population sees no stake in supporting the government. The insurgents need only destroy and discredit, not govern, to wear the population down.

The government must provide public services and ensure a working economy to earn the population's loyalty. That places a premium on economic development, education and health care. The population must also see the government as committed and responsive to their needs. Those elements of the insurgency fighting for a stake in the government will leave the fight if their political concerns and aspirations can be met.

Fulfilling all the requirements needed to achieve victory is a time-consuming and costly process that continues until the Afghan government has the resources to meet them on its own.

Ultimately, the debate over Afghanistan boils down to one question:Do the United States and its allies have the will to commit the military, economic and political resources to win in Afghanistan? If victory is essential to the international community's and region's security, the answer must be yes. If it is not, then the United States should cut its losses and accept the global and dire regional consequences that follow.

More importantly, that is not just a question for the United States. NATO signed on to support us in this war but its commitment has been uneven and hollow at best. The British, Canadians, Dutch and French have been fighting beside us and the Germans have joined the fight only recently. Most of the others have not provided the promised forces and have placed caveats on their troop employment. Those troops sit in safe areas, neither patrolling nor even assisting other national contingents under attack.

NATO's European members' combined economic and military resources exceed America's, yet the U.S. is providing the bulk of both in this war. The Europeans should be told that America's views of NATO and its commitment to their security will be shaped by their commitment to assisting us with ours.