Navy court tours sub; commander returns to control room

Later today, court members visited Pearl Harbor’s submarine training facility and simulator. The simulator is a replica of a submarine control room set on huge hydraulic jacks. It allows sailors to experience the pitch of a diving and surfacing submarine, said Navy spokeswoman Lt. Wendy Snyder.

Yesterday, at the opening day of the court of inquiry, an admiral testified that the Greeneville had been behind schedule, suffering from a crowded control room, a poorly supervised sonar trainee, bad decisions and a malfunctioning sonar video monitor.

Court of inquiry’s schedule of events Today No morning courtroom session. The court will tour the USS Greeneville, the Submarine Training Center and simulator facilities. 1 p.m.: Afternoon session convenes as testimony of Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths Jr., preliminary investigative officer, continues. Additional witnesses to be determined. 4:30 p.m.: Afternoon session ends.

The Navy’s rare court of inquiry into the Feb. 9 collision between the Greeneville and the Ehime Maru high school training ship began yesterday with new and troubling details about a cruise designed to display the speed and power of the Navy’s fast-attack submarine fleet.

The Greeneville was running 45 minutes behind on its scheduled return to Pearl Harbor. But Waddle told his executive officer: “I have it under control,” said Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths, Jr., a submariner who conducted the Navy’s preliminary investigation into the crash.

Just before the Greeneville shot out of the water, executing a dramatic “emergency blow,” Griffiths said, the control room was so crowded with civilians that the fire control technician of the watch could not see his captain and failed to report what turned out to be the Ehime Maru as close as 2,500 yards away.

“I would expect that to be very relevant information to the officer of the deck,” Griffiths said. “It was some mixture of physical barriers of people and the (fire control technician) of the watch almost feeling like he was benched at that part of the game. … No matter how busy anybody was, his primary duty is to ensure the safety of the ship. He had information that told him the contact was potentially close.”

But the presence of two civilians who were at the sub’s controls — which outraged many people in Japan — had no effect on the collision, Griffiths said.

At various times during the cruise, Waddle and executive officer Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer were busy shuttling back and forth to the sonar room. A petty officer who should have been supervising a trainee instead was assigned to be a tour guide for the civilians, Griffiths said.

An analog video signal display unit that sits forward on the periscope and displays sonar readings was discovered broken just as the Greeneville got under way, Griffiths said.

“It's a vital piece of gear for ship safety,” he said.… “When I was a submarine CO and that piece of equipment was broken, I felt somewhat naked. It was a big deal.”

Griffiths, who is scheduled to resume testimony this afternoon, said he would have added an “additional conservative layer of actions to reduce the risk that was created by having this key aid to the officer of the deck out of commission.”

The Greeneville had 106 of its 163 sailors aboard when it left Pearl Harbor at 7:59 a.m. The plan of the day was to show the sub’s 16 passengers a deep dive, “angles and dangles” ascents and descents, high-speed turns and the dramatic emergency blow that would shoot the Greeneville to the surface.
As the visitors were finishing lunch, the Ehime Maru left Hono-
lulu Harbor at about 12:15 p.m., headed toward fishing grounds to train its high school students.

The Greeneville had just executed a series of high-speed turns at about 400 feet down. The prudent step before beginning the emergency blow maneuver would be to rise to 150 feet and slow to 10 knots or less to check sonar contacts, Griffiths said.

Generally it would take about 10 minutes for two slow sonar sweeps. Instead, the officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, told investigators that Waddle wanted to be at periscope depth in five minutes, Griffiths said.

Then, just before the Greeneville dived 400 feet before rushing to the surface in the emergency blow, Waddle spent only 80 seconds at the periscope making one last check for ships, Griffiths said.

Normally, Griffiths said, it would take at least three minutes to do a thorough surface scan.

Griffiths estimated the seas to be 6 to 8 feet high, meaning the Greeneville's periscope could have been obstructed by the troughs of swells, Griffiths said. The sky was hazy, making it harder to see the Ehime Maru, which was mostly painted white.

"Periscopes are light-hungry,” Griffiths said. “Periscopes looking out in a haze condition tend to make light objects more difficult to see.… That ship should have been seen, given enough time by the periscope operator.”

At 1:43 and 15 seconds, the Greeneville struck the Ehime Maru just behind the sub’s sail, Griffiths said. The Greeneville's top rudder — made of steel strong enough to cut through ice caps — sliced through the hull “and caused a rapid flooding and the loss of the Ehime Maru,” he said.

“There is no question in my mind that the Greeneville had not detected the Ehime Maru before the collision,” Griffiths said. “I'm sure it was a terrible shock.”

Vice Adm. John B. Nathman, president of the court of inquiry, opened the session yesterday morning, hoping to find out what caused the crash.

“While this inquiry cannot change what has happened,” Nathman told the packed Pearl Harbor courtroom, “a more thorough understanding of what occurred can prevent its recurrence.”

In the next few weeks the court of inquiry is expected to take the world further into the Greeneville’s control room that day as civilians sat at critical controls under the supervision of Navy officers. The presence of the civilians and the lack of a rescue attempt by the Greeneville crew have strained U.S.-Japan relations despite a series of apologies from President Bush on down.

Nathman, under questioning earlier in the day by the officers’ attorneys for possible challenges to the board members, said his reaction to the collision was, “it's a bad day for the Navy and a bad day for the captain. He’s going to have to answer to a lot of questions.

“As a captain, you’re responsible for the conduct of your crew and your ship,” Nathman said. “As a captain, you have to look after your ship and you have to look after your crew.”

Asked about his attitudes toward the role of executive officers, Nathman told Pfeifer’s attorney that an executive officer has an obligation to speak his mind “if he feels like things aren't going particularly well. … You need to speak up.”

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