Investigator urges improvements in subs' ability to rescue

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The search-and-rescue efforts of the USS Greeneville following its fatal collision with a Japanese fishing ship showed both the professional response of the crew and the limitations of U.S. submarines, the chief investigator into the crash testified yesterday.

Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths Jr. ended his four days of testimony about the accident by urging the court to push Navy officials to improve submarines’ search-and-rescue capabilities.

The Greeneville did not try to bring victims of the Ehime Maru ship aboard because of poor weather, the sub’s design and the impending response of Coast Guard rescuers, Griffiths testified.

But the Greeneville’s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, still had several operations simultaneously under way, Griffiths said:

Crewmen on both of the submarine’s periscopes searched for survivors not in life rafts.

Divers were prepared to swim to any victims in trouble.

The Greeneville used a small engine to maneuver the 6,900-ton sub to try to block wind and waves from the life rafts, but waves were coming from all directions.

The Greeneville crew would not have done anything differently had the Japanese fishermen been members of the sub’s own crew, Griffiths said.

But Griffiths said he worries about what would have happened had the Feb. 9 collision occurred 1,000 miles from land, or if the Greeneville came upon a ship disaster and was the only hope for rescue.

"I’m not sure how we’d solve that problem today," Griffiths said.

Contrast in testimony

Griffiths’ final testimony contrasted with the picture he had drawn of the Greeneville leading up to the collision. Equipment malfunctioned, a poorly supervised crewman monitored sonar equipment and the control room was crammed with civilian visitors, which hampered critical communication among the crew, he testified.

Yesterday, Waddle’s attorney also revealed that the civilians were listening to whale songs on a "work tape" normally used to record sonar contacts.

Griffiths’ testimony about the Greeneville’s search-and-rescue effort carries the potential to change Navy procedures and equipment. The president of the court, Vice Adm. John Nathman, suggested that he and the other two admirals may urge Navy authorities to review submarine rescue capabilities.

The Greeneville’s response underscored the general high reputation of Waddle and his crew, Griffiths said.

"They had just suffered a trauma, an unimaginable trauma," Griffiths said. "I think it was a remarkable performance."

The lack of a more vigorous response angered victims’ families in Japan. And Griffiths acknowledged the Greeneville crew was several minutes slow in notifying Pearl Harbor by radio and later in writing that it had been in a collision.

But he offered only praise yesterday.

"I think Greeneville did very well in the search-and-rescue effort," he said. "I’m proud of what they did. The judgment that they exercised and the actions that they took are all that we can ask of them."

‘Deliberate watch stander’

Earlier in the day, Griffiths said that the Greeneville’s officer of the deck at the time of the crash was probably the most methodical junior officer on board.

Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, one of three Greeneville officers at the center of the Navy’s court of inquiry, is "a very deliberate watch stander," Griffiths said. "Of all of the junior officers in the ward room, (he is) perhaps the most deliberate."

Griffiths said Coen’s reputation was considered both "criticism and praise.

"If they need to do things in a hurry, he’s probably the worst junior officer to get you there because he is so deliberate," Griffiths said. ". . . But he never ever skips the steps. . . . He can be relied on to be meticulous."

Coen qualified to be an officer of the deck in June, Griffiths said. Waddle had said that Coen "needed careful watching because he was inexperienced, something to that order," Griffiths said.

Coen’s attorney, Lt. Cmdr. Brent Filbert, walked Griffiths through the events inside the Greeneville’s control room on Feb. 9:

The Greeneville was on a day trip designed to show 16 civilians how fast-attack submarines operate and was running 45 minutes behind schedule.

Waddle told Coen that he wanted to rise to periscope depth within five minutes, quicker than usual procedures, Griffiths said.

"I think a commanding officer telling (that to) a young officer of the deck would influence how a young officer of the deck executes his duties," Griffiths said. "I would think he would have to operate with a great deal of alacrity, maybe more than he’s used to."

Waddle was preparing the Greeneville for a critical scan for surface ships, just before dropping down, then shooting back to the surface in a dramatic "emergency blow."

With Coen looking through the Greeneville’s No. 2 periscope, he was dependent upon the fire control technician to alert him to a sonar contact that later turned out to be the Ehime Maru, Griffiths said.

But in a control room crowded with visitors, the fire control technician failed to tell anyone about the sonar contact 2,000 yards away.

Telling Waddle or Coen about the sonar contact, Griffiths said, "would have been one of the things that could have changed history."

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