Fargo says collision was result of many factors
By Johnny Brannon
Advertiser Staff Writer
The Pacific Fleet's commander concluded yesterday that a U.S. attack submarine's fatal collision with a Japanese fishing vessel was the result of faulty sonar and periscope searches, poor communication among key crew members, and distractions by civilian guests.
"Let me be clear: There was no fault or neglect on the part of the Ehime Maru's captain or crew," he said. "There was no equipment or system failure on board the Ehime Maru that contributed to the collision."
Instead, the Greeneville's crew failed to track the ship after detecting it with sonar, and Waddle was unable to spot the vessel when he rushed a periscope sweep shortly before ordering an emergency drill that sent the sub rocketing to the surface.
Closely following the recommendations of a Navy court of inquiry that investigated the accident during a rare open hearing at Pearl Harbor last month, Fargo reprimanded Waddle but decided against a court-martial.
"There was no evidence of criminal intent or deliberate misconduct," Fargo said, adding that it was doubtful a court-martial would uncover new facts. "We have held commander Waddle and the crew accountable for their failures."
He reiterated U.S. apologies to the victims' families, adding that he believed "no process, none whatsoever, will fully compensate for the loss of life."
Fargo ruled that 16 civilians on board the Greeneville had not "directly" caused the accident, but that they had distracted Waddle and key crew members.
Fargo called for the close review of a program that brings such visitors on board Navy vessels at sea, and he said they should not be allowed at control positions, as three had been on the Greeneville.
"The three civilian guests who participated at controls in the emergency surfacing maneuver were properly supervised at all times and did not contribute to this accident," Fargo said. "The remaining guests were quiet and attentive to instruction.
"They did, however, prove to be a distraction to the commanding officer, hindered the normal flow of contact information in the moments leading up to the collision and, as such, affected the performance of his control room watchstanders. It was Cmdr. Waddle's responsibility to prevent this from occurring."
Fargo stressed that the "Distinguished Visitor Program" should continue, however, if under tighter controls.
"The public has a right and need to know and understand how the Navy operates and the service it provides to the country," he said.
Most of the others to be punished face lighter discipline than Waddle, with the exception of Patrick Seacrest, the fire control technician.
- The court of inquiry determined that Seacrest failed to report a closing sonar contact with the Ehime Maru and should face a disciplinary hearing known as a "captain's mast," in which the Greeneville's new commander could reprimand him. Fargo agreed and forwarded the recommendation to the commander of the Navy's Pacific submarine fleet.
- The court found that Capt. Robert Brandhuber, the sub fleet's chief of staff, should be admonished for failing to question Waddle when he believed the sub was preparing to surface too quickly. Fargo agreed, concluding that Brandhuber, who escorted the civilians on the Greeneville, "provided little assistance as an escort when it was in fact his purpose to do so."
- While the court called for the Greeneville's new commander to discipline the sub's officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, Fargo decided instead to handle the task personally. Fargo said he held an "admiral's mast" disciplinary hearing for Coen and "counseled him to ensure he fully understood his obligation with regard to the safe navigation of the ship and the proper supervision of personnel on watch in the control room, despite the presence of the commanding officer."
- Fargo agreed with the court's recommendation to admonish three additional Greeneville crew members: executive officer Gerald Pfeifer, for lack of administrative oversight; chief of the boat Douglas Coffman, also for lack of administrative oversight; and sonar supervisor Edward McGiboney, for permitting an unqualified sonar operator on watch.
Fargo said his ruling on the politically sensitive case had not been influenced by the Pentagon, State Department, or others in the Bush administration.
"My judgment was based on the report of the court of inquiry," the views of the admirals who presided over it, "and my experience as a naval officer," Fargo said.