'Collision was solely the fault of USS Greeneville'

Excerpts from the statement of Adm. Thomas Fargo on the findings of the court of inquiry:

"There were two fundamental causes for this collision:

"First was the inadequate acoustic and visual search conducted by the USS Greeneville in preparation for surfacing on 9 February. In short, Greeneville completed only an abbreviated sonar and periscope search that did not conform to standard operating procedures of the commanding officer's own standing orders.

"Second was the failure of the ship's watch team to work together and pass information to each other about the surface contact picture. The team utilized an unqualified sonar watchstander, failed to compensate for the loss of a video display, failed to identify important information that would have made it clear the Ehime Maru was close and did not adequately update the contact picture to provide sufficient backup to the commanding officer.

"As you read this report, the reason for these two causes is quite clear. The commanding officer USS Greeneville created an artificial sense of urgency in preparation for surfacing on 9 February when prudent seamanship, the safety of his submarine and good judgment dictated otherwise ...

"Let me be clear. There was no fault or neglect on the part of the Ehime Maru's captain or crew ... this collision was solely the fault of USS Greeneville. This tragic accident could and should have been avoided by simply following existing Navy standards and procedures in bringing submarines to the surface...

"The responsibility of the commanding officer for his ship in this regard is clearly stated in U.S. Navy regulations. It is absolute. And it starts with safe navigation of the ship. Today, I found Commander Scott Waddle ... guilty of committing two violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice at admiral's mast. These were Article 92 — dereliction in the performance of his duties and Article 110 — negligent hazarding of a vessel ...

"With respect to the (visitors) on Greeneville, I concur with the court's opinion that none of the embarked civilians onboard Greeneville on 9 February directly contributed to this collision ... They did, however, prove to be a distraction to the commanding officer, hindered the normal flow of contact information in the moments leading up to the collision and as such affected the performance of his control room watchstanders...

"With respect to Greeneville's search and rescue response ... I can only characterize it as exceptional and immediate. There was nothing to indicate that the Greeneville did not do everything they could possibly do in the search and rescue for Ehime Maru crewmen ...

"The propriety of the USS Greeneville's operating area on 9 February was also found to be suitable and appropriate for independent submarine operations ...

"To the families of the lost, I again offer my profound sorrow and regret for this tragedy. We have expressed our apologies throughout this difficult period. It has been our objective to bring forth the facts related to the causes of this accident in a fair, just and open manner from the beginning ..."