Inquiry to unravel tragic sinking

For the next three weeks or more, starting this morning, the world will enter the control room of the USS Greeneville as it broke the ocean’s surface off Diamond Head on Feb. 9 and rammed a Japanese fisheries training ship.

On the line are three — perhaps four — military careers and Navy practices and procedures that allowed civilians to be aboard the fast-attack submarine during the accident, albeit under close Navy supervision.

It will also be a chance for Japan to learn firsthand about a military disaster that claimed nine lives — four of them teenagers — and strained the country’s relationship with the United States.

Today’s court of inquiry, the Navy’s highest administrative form of investigation, is used only for the most serious accidents.

Nearly a month ago, the Ehime Maru sunk within 10 minutes of its collision with the Greeneville. The Japanese vessel remains on the ocean floor, 2,003 feet down.

Calling for a court of inquiry "is quite a big deal," said Eugene Fidell, a former Coast Guard lawyer and founder and president of the National Institute of Military Justice. "It indicates the high stakes that are involved for both the Navy’s procedures and the potential implications for U.S.-Japanese relations."

At the heart of the inquiry are the roles of the Greeneville’s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, executive officer Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, and Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, officer of the deck. All are considered "parties to the inquiry."

Waddle, 41, was reassigned to a desk job within 24 hours of the Greeneville’s return to Pearl Harbor.

In his order creating the court of inquiry, Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, also directed the court to investigate the possible role of Capt. Robert L. Brandhuber, chief of staff for the fleet’s submarine force. Brandhuber was serving as Navy escort to the 16 civilian guests.

Brandhuber is not a party to the inquiry. But Fargo directed the court to examine "whether he, as the senior officer aboard the USS Greeneville on 9 February 2001, was in a position to intervene and prevent the chain of events leading to the collision."

A separate investigation under way by the National Transportation Safety Board found that the Greeneville was using only its passive sonar, not its more sensitive active sonar, to search for surface ships before executing a dramatic "main emergency ballast blow" and crashing into the Ehime Maru.

The NTSB investigation also found that the Greeneville identified a sonar contact an hour before the collision, later determined to be the Ehime Maru.

And a sailor plotting surface ships with pencil and paper told NTSB investigators that he was distracted by some of the civilians, although he continued to input the information into the Greeneville’s computer system.

Dan Nakaso can be reached by phone at 525-8085, or by e-mail at dnakaso@honoluluadvertiser.com

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