Associated Press

Lawyers for submarine officers under investigation for the sinking of a Japanese fishing boat sought to shift the blame today to a crewman who failed to report that the ship was nearby.

As testimony at a rare Navy court of inquiry entered its fourth day, criticism mounted of a fire control technician. The crewman neglected to tell officers another boat was in close range of the USS Greeneville minutes before the submarine surfaced and smashed through the Ehime Maru, killing nine people.
Friday marks one month since the accident. The court will help determine the fate of Cmdr. Scott Waddle; Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, the officer of the deck; and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer, the second in command. They could face no disciplinary action or anything from a reprimand to court-martial and imprisonment.

About six minutes before the collision, the technician obtained data showing a boat 4,000 yards from the Greeneville. This happened as Coen and Waddle were conducting periscope scans for surface vessels. Both officers verbally reported seeing no close ships.

The technician should have heard that call and questioned it, Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr. testified.

”(He) should have spoken up and said, `That may be, but I think we have a close guy here,”’ Griffiths said.

When a lawyer for Coen asked whether that could have prevented the collision, Griffiths replied: “Most emphatically yes.” Later, Griffiths added: “I’m certain it wouldn’t have occurred.”

“That would have changed history,” Griffiths said when asked what Waddle might have done if he had been given the information.

Griffiths conducted the preliminary investigation into the accident. The Navy had declined to name the fire control technician, but lawyers identified him in court as Petty Officer 1st Class Patrick Seacrest.

Seacrest, 34, is a veteran crewman who served aboard the Greeneville for nearly a year. He did not return messages from The Associated Press today.

Griffiths has said the technician didn’t report the presence of the ship because 16 civilian visitors aboard the sub blocked his access to Waddle. However, today’s testimony also showed he initially received inaccurate data about the location of the Ehime Maru.

Coen’s lawyer, Lt. Cmdr. Brent Filbert, revealed that at 1:31 p.m., data showed the Ehime Maru was 14,000 yards from the sub and moving away from, not closer to, the Greeneville. The inaccurate course may have been due to a submarine maneuver that makes sonar data less reliable.

The range dropped to 4,000 yards at 1:37:48, as Coen and Waddle conducted their periscope scans, and continued to drop until the Greeneville surfaced at 1:43 p.m.

“The exact moment that change was an issue, (Seacrest) ... should clearly have forcibly told the captain and the officer of the deck,” Griffiths said.

Waddle’s civilian attorney, Charles Gittins, maintained that moment was “the last clear chance” to avert the accident, noting Waddles would have performed his periscope search differently if he’d had that report.

Griffiths disagreed, saying Waddles could still have spotted the Ehime Maru had he conducted a longer scope search at a higher depth.

Waddle approaches relatives

Before today’s hearing began, Waddle approached relatives of the Japanese victims in court and tried to offer an apology. They asked him to wait until all of the relatives could be present.

Some family members have complained that Waddle has refused to make eye contact with them. Last month, he issued a statement expressing “sincere regret” for the crash.

The three admirals presiding over the court appear to have different opinions as to the level of Waddle’s culpability for the accident.

Rear Adm. David Stone suggested Greeneville’s officers failed to do enough to ensure the safe operation of the submarine, such as having enough qualified personnel manning key positions, including sonar stations.

Testimony has shown the sonar room was staffed with one qualified operator, a trainee and a supervisor, even though a second qualified operator should have been present.

“Do you agree that these events ... are reflective of a command that actually increased its risk wh

ile conducting these underway operations?” Stone asked Griffiths.
The investigator said some areas of his probe must be further examined, although “I do agree that the ship made some mistakes, perhaps mistakes in judgment.”

Stone also suggested Waddle was ultimately responsible for the accident, even if on the surface he acted properly based upon the information he had.
“I’ve laid awake for a month now at night, thinking about this issue, thinking about Cmdr. Waddle,” Griffiths said. “He had a bad day where some mistakes were made.

“The ship went through several steps under his guidance that attempted to meet the appropriate requirements in order to maintain safe operations . ... The steps were just not quite far enough.”

Another admiral suggested Waddle may have thought he was acting properly based upon the information he had.

“Would it be fair to say that it’s a two-way street — the CO backs up his crew, and the crew backs up the CO?” asked Rear Adm. Paul Sullivan.

“You need your crew to back you up,” Griffiths agreed.

Gittins later asked Griffiths whether the commander acted criminally negligent in the operation of his ship.

“In my opinion,” Griffiths responded, “he was not criminally negligent”

On the Net:
Pacific Fleet/Greeneville: www.cpf.navy.mil/greeneville.html