Submarine's crew may have revered skipper too much

Early testimony on the USS Greeneville accident has portrayed Cmdr. Scott Waddle as the kind of charismatic leader whose repeated successes, dedication and nurturing personality inspire complete confidence in his crew.

Court of inquiry’s schedule Today 8 a.m.: Morning session convenes; cross-examinations of Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths Jr., preliminary investigative officer, by lawyers for Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, officer of the deck aboard USS Greeneville at the time of the incident. Testimony from Capt. Thomas G. Kyle, N7, Submarine Forces Pacific, is scheduled to follow Griffiths. Then, Rear Adm. Albert H. Konetzni Jr., commander, Submarine Forces Pacific, is to testify. 1 p.m.: Afternoon session convenes, testimony continues. 4:30 p.m.: Afternoon session adjourns.

But his command style may have inhibited the crew from raising concerns in the critical time before the Feb. 9 incident that killed nine Japanese sailors, said Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr., who performed the Navy’s initial investigation of the accident.

The image of Waddle in complete control cuts against him at the court of inquiry, handing him complete responsibility for the accident, say some military experts. They say the finger of blame also points to Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer, the ship’s executive officer, who is responsible for bringing concerns to the skipper.

Griffiths, who spoke Tuesday and yesterday about the "human equations" on the Greeneville, said he got a sense in his interviews with crew members of a captain who was "very explicitly involved, personally involved" with every aspect of the Greeneville’s operation and that "the ship was acclimated to that approach to business," because it had brought success in the past.

"This was not a ship where you would be shot for talking to the commanding officer," Griffiths elaborated. "He was a very nurturing commanding officer who was revered universally by his crew. They’re not afraid of him — it’s a different type of respect for his abilities."

When Waddle gave an order, Griffiths said, it would be performed without question "because it had worked well before, and you become accustomed to that." But, he added, that command climate "may have broken down the inclination · to give him timely and forceful back-up."

Pfeifer, the No. 2 officer, "is paid to give the captain private counsel," Griffiths said, to question orders when he sees cause. But Griffiths said Pfeifer may not have had a chance to do that in the time before the accident because of the civilian visitors on board.

Former submariner Lt. Michael Nahoopii said it’s not unusual for a sub captain to have a strong personality and leadership style.

"Submarine officers are hand selected to get into the program," he said. "The ones I’ve had were really great people. They’re the ones who know what is going on. They know everything. Only the very top guys make it to that level."

And the position has become even more competitive as the Navy’s submarine force shrinks, Nahoopii said.

Griffiths agreed in yesterday’s testimony, telling the court of the "aggressive winnowing process" of becoming a sub skipper.

"By the time you have a commanding officer assigned to a nuclear submarine in our Navy, you are talking about a competent, knowledgeable person, an elite member of our force," he said. Waddle was "absolutely not" considered an officer who would cut corners, he added.

While Waddle is ultimately responsible for what happened on the Greeneville, Nahoopii said Pfeifer’s job is "to be the devil’s advocate, almost. He’s the worry wart. He worries about everything. His job is to provide the captain with a viewpoint that is different from his own, to provide an independent view of things. He runs the day-to-day stuff on the sub so the captain can focus on the overall mission."

Jay Fidell, a former Coast Guard lawyer and court of inquiry investigator, agreed that Pfeifer had the duty to privately counsel Waddle if he saw a problem. "But the question is, in these circumstances, could he do it? Was he locked out of it by the presence of all these people?" Fidell wondered, referring to the civilian guests aboard the Greeneville who crowded the control room.

Further, Fidell said, Waddle can’t be held responsible if one of his crew — in this case, the fire control technician plotting the movements of the Ehime Maru — knew about a potential problem but did not relay that information to the captain.

But he added, "Maybe the captain is responsible if he is micromanaging. There’s an implication here that he was not delegating responsibility properly. Perhaps they were in awe of him to an inappropriate degree. Perhaps they need more of a team effort, where people are trained to speak up if they see a problem."

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