Associated Press

PEARL HARBOR — The submarine was 43 minutes behind schedule. The commander ordered his ship to periscope depth in five minutes when it routinely takes 10, then scanned the ocean surface for just 80 seconds instead of the standard three minutes.

The answer to why a U.S. submarine collided with a Japanese fishing boat may come down to one key question: Did haste prevent crew members from properly doing their jobs and create confusion that kept one crewman from reporting data that could have prevented the tragedy?

The first week of a Navy court of inquiry uncovered much about what occurred in the control room of the USS Greeneville during the half-hour leading up to the collision.

It also showed how much more is yet to be learned.

“We are seeing several areas that we need to examine further,” said Vice Adm. John Nathman, the presiding officer of the court.

Nine people, including four teens, were killed when the Greeneville surged from the ocean depths and sliced through the hull of the Ehime Maru on Feb. 9. The submarine was demonstrating a rapid-surfacing drill for 16 civilian passengers when it sank the Japanese trawler, a training boat for young commercial fishermen.

Greeneville Cmdr. Scott Waddle; his officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen; and the executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer, are the subjects of a rare court of inquiry. They could face discharge, courts-martial and even imprisonment.

The top Navy investigator whose testimony dominated the first week of the hearing concluded five factors may have contributed to the accident, including a broken sonar monitor, improper staffing in the sonar room and a communications barrier created by the number and location of civilian guests.
However, the three admirals overseeing the court have focused their questions on his last two possibilities — that Waddle rushed preparations for surfacing and that crewmen may have been reluctant to speak up because they trusted Waddle’s instincts.

The head of the investigation, Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr., testified that a “misordering of priorities and an artificial urgency” led officers to hurry. He theorized they were trying to get back on schedule because lunch with the civilians had run long. Surfacing, originally set for 1 p.m., was delayed 43 minutes.

In preparing to surface the ship, Waddle ordered Coen to get the sub to periscope depth in five minutes, even though it typically takes 10 minutes to obtain enough sonar data to ensure there are no nearby surface vessels. Once at periscope depth, Waddle and Coen spent just 80 seconds looking for other ships rather than the standard three minutes. They saw no other vessels.

The rush may have created confusion among sonar operators and a fire control technician trying to track a sonar contact now believed to have been the Ehime Maru.

At 1:31 p.m., data showed, the trawler was 14,000 yards from Greeneville and moving away. But six minutes later, just before Coen and Waddle conducted their periscope scans, the range had plummeted to 4,000 yards.

Griffiths said the fire control technician should have reported the contact but probably thought his range was incorrect after Coen and Waddle reported seeing no ships through the periscope.

Lawyers for the officers, particularly Waddle and Coen, have sought to shift the blame to the technician, saying he had a duty to alert the officers, whether he thought his data was correct or not.

“Time was not an issue,” Waddle’s attorney, Charles Gittins, told The Associated Press today. The commander “knew he was going to be late and accepted that fact. Since Greeneville was the only vessel at sea at the time, he had maximum flexibility in getting back to port.”

Griffiths, however, pointed out that the crewman would have had more time to analyze his data had Waddle not moved so quickly. He also said Waddle should have seen the Ehime Maru through the periscope given a longer search.

In their exchanges with Griffiths, the admirals openly questioned Waddle’s judgment, but they acknowledged they have yet to examine all the pieces of the puzzle.

Unless Waddle testifies, the court may never know why he seemingly took abbreviated steps before surfacing the submarine.

Whether Waddle, or any of the officers, will testify remains uncertain. Lawyers for Waddle and Coen asked the court to grant the officers “testimonial immunity” to ensure that whatever they say can’t be used as a basis of charges. The court has not acted on the requests.

The inquiry is expected to last several weeks.

For Waddle, the beginning of an inquiry that could end his 20-year naval career was an emotional roller coaster. He choked back tears when Griffiths recounted the moments after the collision.

The emotional ups and downs were shared by the relatives of some of the victims who came to Hawaii to watch the inquiry. Initially, they understood little of what was happening in the court and were angry that Waddle wouldn’t make eye contact with them.

But on Thursday, the commander and the families came together in a room near the courtroom, and Waddle gave them an apology.

Tears fell from his eyes as he bowed deeply and told them: “This is a burden I will carry to the grave.”

Said one relative: “Now I feel kind of sorry for Waddle, too.”

On the Net:
Pacific Fleet/Greeneville: www.cpf.navy.mil/greeneville.html